Edited by author 08-21-2002 04:03 AM
Some misconceptions about the Habeas approach are driving objections.

The idea is not that any mail without the SWE headers will be bounced; rather mail with the SWE headers will be let in. So an important point is: this makes other spam-filtering mechanisms work better. The biggest problem with spam-filters is false-positives: losing one truly important mail per 100 spams could offset all the savings of killing the spam.

The SWE headers make it easier for legitimate mail to make it through. Wide use could thus boost the use of other spam-killing options, because people are more confident they won't lose legitimate mail.

Faking the SWE headers risks international penalties above-and-beyond the repercussions (if any) for normal spamming. It ups the ante for spammers: and with SWE-forgery, a court doesn't even have to consider broader issues of whether unsolicited communication is allowable, it just has to consider whether spammers are allowed lie and fraudulently appropriate Habeas' valuable signalling labels. That's a cut and dried case.

Looking at some of Cory's concerns:

Cory: "In order for this ridiculous system to work, it will have to be widely deployed."

It works better with wider adoption, but as soon as legit mailing lists and individuals start using it, less of their mail will be killed by mistuned filters. (The real key thing for the system to work is a few successful prosecutions of SWE-forgers.) This will allow more people, at the margin, to confidently adopt (or turn up the sensitivity of) spam filters.

Cory: "useless in regard to 419 scams"

419 mail is unsolicited and sent to multiple people unrelated to the sender. Thus, it can't use the SWE headers. So whereas before, no one person had enough economic incentive to go after 419ers, if they start unauthorized use of Habeas headers, Habeas has an incentive to hunt them and seek judgements.

Cory: what if they break their covenant/get acquired/etc?

If their mark comes to mean nothing useful, because they drift from their initial promises, fail to effectively enforce its use, whatever -- then you just stop using it as a passthrough expeditor. You're never at the mercy of their changing org; use their mark as a passthrough aid if it's helpful, ignore it if not. There's only an upside, no downside, for mail recipients.

Cory: "we are asking these people to sit in judgement as to which bulk communications are acceptable and which ones are unacceptable"

Not really; it's not a case-by-case judgement call. They have a very compact, simple description of "Habeas Compliant Mail" which qualifies for use the SWE headers. Any mailing list which requires an explicit, address-verifying subscription confirmation step qualifies.

You'll never *need* to use them on any list, large or small. You could always figure that your opt-in subscribers have cleared some other path for your messages through their mailwalls. I also suspect that there will be a proliferation of similar ways to warrant that mail is not spam -- see Ironport Systems' Bonded Sender Program, for example -- and whichever ones provide the best guarantee at an economically reasonable price will thrive.

Cory: "I'm hardly a First Amendment purist, but this is raw, steaming Stalinism."

Oh come on. Stalin lied to, oppressed, starved, and killed millions with a reign of poltical violence. These people provide a voluntary system of email sorting hints. Is this your "Hyperbole Valenti" impression?

At worst, Habeas might sue you if you use their labels without permission.

I *am* a First Amendment absolutist, and I hope this idea -- spam control through accurate labelling, with creative penalties for forgery -- takes off.