To call Lee a bad general is an absurd claim. He was a man faced with a tough situation that did the best he could. He understood certain sacrifices that had to be made in order to give the South a fighting chance at winning the war. Hindsight is always 20/20, and when we look back at Lee we can certainly criticize some of his tactics, but he preformed exceedingly well given the cercumstances. After reading the selection from Nolan's book, its clear Lee was faced with formidable odds, but he was a consistent preformer on the battlefield.

General Lee was not just the most exemplary Confederate military leader, but he was the personification of true Southern character. He served his country in an honorable and heroic fashion. He faced overwhelming odds in fighting the Federals. They had a large man advantage, as well as better supplies and supply lines. The war was fought almost exclusively in the South where the destruction of bridges, railroads, and towns would have massive repercussions. This is why Lee went on the offensive, to rid his beloved state of the attackers, without a Southern offensive the Northern armies would be content to wage war across the south until the South ran out of supplies and was strangled by the blockades. Lee was faced with a daunting task and almost was able to drive the Northern armies out. This is why his decisions were supported and it made him the most effective general in the South.

In hindsight, the Confederate military strategy led by General Robert E. Lee has been hallmarked as an “addiction to the offensive.” Lee and the Confederates adopted an aggressive style of military tactics which expressed that peace would come when the Confederacy could “defeat or drive the armies of the enemy from the field.” There are instances when an aggressive military offensive is called for and times when it is appropriate to asses the losses and live to fight another day. Frank E. Vandiver a notable military historian describes Lee’s aggressive strategic tactics as being “too addicted to the offensive, even against outstanding firepower.” Furthermore, he goes on to state “Lee’s addiction [to the offensive] and his losses limited the South’s chances of winning the war.” Great leaders poses a capacity to accurately analyze a military situation and make appropriate decisions which include a wide range of versatile military strategies as opposed to limiting oneself to a single-minded commitment to the military offensive, a capacity Lee obviously did not poses.

I cast my vote to Group 3, who argued that Lee was an over-rated civil war general. Group 1 made some points, but some of the arguments were "wishy-washy" and I could not tell if they were supporting or criticizing Lee. On the other hand, Group 3 made very strong points, proving that he lost an unneccessary amount of men and that his offensive tactics are to blame. Group 3 did made the case clear that Lee was not as much of a war hero as he is made out to be.

I feel like both groups had good points. However, I think the group that had to claim that Lee was greatly overrated as a leader, won the debate. They presented strong arguments that were convincing enough to make Lee appear as a general with severe leadership flaws. The reiterated point about the lack of sufficient troops and manpower served to undermine the greatness of Lee as a military leader. I believe their arguments were the most effective in this debate.

I am going to have to side with the group that was defending Lee as a great general because of the situation that he was placed into would have been difficult for any man. The Union originally asked Lee to command their troops which comments on his talent and ability as a leader. Furthermore, I think that we must take into account the negative biases that the book placed on Lee. It had a negative tone in its discussion of Lee as a leader talking about his "addiction to the offensive" and other notable flaws in his strategy. The general arguments provided by the Lee defenders were strong and clearly pointed out his ability to command with lack of resources and competent leadership.

here is a post from the Jackson reading since i was unable to read the material that day:
I have to say that Jackson was the reason the Confederates did as well as they did. His "never back down" strategies proved him the victor in many crucial battles as Royster points out. He even goes as far as comparing Jackson to the figure of George Washington. This is a very true statement. The press reported on Jackson's victories and his public picture was huge and very influencial on the public moral. He was able to rally his troops many times where other commanders would not have been able to. The author agrees with the statement, "Stonewall's aggressiveness brought Confederate success." If he would have lived throughout the whole war, the outcome might not have been the same for the Confederacy.

Edited by author 04-09-2008 12:00 PM
Analytical Comparative Book Essay (5-7 pp. based on assigned books)
Due dates will be staggered:
Week 9: last names starting with A-E. (Comparison of Woodworth and Ayers)
Week 10 last names starting with F-N (Comparison of Ayers and Horowitz)
Week 12 last names starting with O-Z (Comparison of Burton and Billingsley)

Edited by author 04-09-2008 03:08 PM
Some questions concerning the Ayers text:

1. What (if anything) seems to have differentiated these two communities?
2. What new insights does the book reveal about the coming of war and the
motivations for combat? What was the war about in Franklin and Augusta?
3. What impact did the war have on factions, alliances, and national identity in the two communities?
4. What does the book tell us about the changing relationships among civilians, soldiers, and political leaders in wartime?
5. How did slavery and racial attitudes change in both communities? What did African Americans think about these changes? What did Whites think?

The Keegan text was an interesting piece on the way battle has been recorded throughout history. Often, accounts have been written by those who know little of battle, and both exaggerate and oversimplify the events. Generals such as Julius Caesar have written their own accounts with a political purpose, and serve to glorify their own deeds. Continuing to the near past, writers such as the American General Marshall have looked at the more human element of battle. In his writings, he discusses the ways that soldiers are a product of the society's cultural values, and how that can best be taken into account when structuring an army.

General Buell's report on the battle of Perryville seems to give a fairly objective account of the events. Here, he is most concerned with the actions of his own subordinate generals in shaping the outcome of the battle, rather than emphasizing the actions of himself or the individual troops.

Bragg's proclamation to the people of Kentucky is interesting in the way that he considers his aim to liberate them from the Union. He wants Kentucky to join in the struggle for 'constitutional freedom' by breaking its bonds with its own constitution. This message shows some of the effects of war, as he invokes the memories of the dead at Shiloh to try and rally the Kentuckians around the Confederate cause.

I thought that the Keegan text was especially interesting when applied to the Buell and Bragg readings because you are really able to see what he means when he discusses the different methods used when recording battles. I also found it interesting how most people who wrote about battles don't have a large background of them. For this reason battles tend to look easier than they are and are unable to usually convey the complexity of the maneuvers. I was really intrigued with the Marshall concept that everyone is afraid of battle, but when they go into battle they fall back onto their beliefs and culture. Even though the rest of his theory does not play out as well, I think this has a huge impact on how the Civil War was fought. Soldiers on both sides fought for reasons that make Confederate and Union states distinguishable

With the Bragg reading we can see that he takes a more biased and political turn in his discussion of Perryville. He is quick to call of his successes, and then at the end appeals for more troops. The reading also comes off as a means to rally support and patriotism for the Confederate States. Buell's account is a lot shorter and unbiased. He seems to not want to discuss anything unless he can verify it for fact such as the number of casualties and gave more of a timeline to the battle than his personal feelings or details.

Keegan highlights the importance of motivation behind retelling battle narratives. Caesar's political ambitions drove him to exaggerate his own role in victory, while Du Picq seems driven by honest curiosity to understand the actual experience of lower-ranking officers and their soldiers. The first account necessarily relegates most fighters to mass anonymity, and the second relishes the individual, reminiscent of today's discussion of the difference between textbooks and the Ayers narrative.

The battle stories of Du Picq and the Cincinnati Gazette are, like Ayers, not without their own brand of interpretation and perspective, yet there is something more honest to them. The writer of the Cincinnati Gazette article, in all of its length and detail, did strive to present an accurate account of the battle at Perryville. But some authorial and editorial bias is unavoidable, especially when the writer is emotionally and physically invested in the proceedings. The article, interestingly, does not hesitate to criticize the Union generals or praise the Confederate soldiers for awing presence on the battlefield. He neither makes the Union forces angels who are incapable of mistakes, nor does he dehumanize and monsterize the Confederate soldiers. But once soldiers begin dying, the author's language becomes more frantic and emotional, less an objective account than a narrative. His level of specificity combined with his raw feelings for the carnage enhance the reader's understanding of the battle. Caesar's account romanticizes war to a great degree, far-removed from the dirty reality. Du Picq's account would be, perhaps, for many readers who have not experienced battle, too intense to stomache. The Cincinnati Gazette attempts to combine both approaches successfully, in my opinion.

Edited by author 04-12-2008 03:20 PM
   Keegan’s article was interesting in that it gave a background to the historiography of military narrative. It took me some time to understand the relationship of Caesar to the Civil War, but then I finally made some connections.
   The comparison that struck me most was Keegan’s analysis on Caesar and Thucydides. Caesar, the Roman historiographer, can be compared to Buell’s account of the Battle of Perryville. Caesar writes about a particular history, giving a specific account for military commands and battle formations. Soldiers have no character or personality, if they are even mentioned. Buell gives available statistics and describes the army’s specific movements.
   On the other hand, Bragg’s address to Kentucky is similar to how Thucydides writes a general history. They both touch on the human behavioral side of battle, attaching to nationalism and pride to stir emotions. They make appeal to the people, to gain their support for battle.
   Keegan gives the reader a good view of different forms of historiography with analysis from Caesar and Thucydides.

Keegan gives the proper perspective with which to view history. He shows how history can be viewed through two different lenses, and what it means to look at battles through each one. I really enjoyed his example of how the US court system and the French court system are different. What intrigued me the most was his idea that everyone should question first if the event truly happened before moving on to accusing someone.

The Cincinnati Gazette was a long, detailed account that was full of information. Suprisingly the paper's bias did not completely overwhelm me, but the "rebel defeats" described within are all colored with Union patriotism. When he demonized the Southerners, in his description of the charge at Perryville, one could plainly see the paper's bias. The Gazette describes war always as Union victories and never as defeats, unless referring to the rebels.

   The individual soldiers' battlefield experience has definitly been historically ignored in favor of larger movements and action. The Keegan piece deals directly with some of the misconceptions we have about individual behavior in a large scale. Many of these concepts (that soldiers are more likely to die when retreating, that charges are not met with an initial 'shock') may have been familiar to the few experienced men in Civil War armies, but so many in those armies were inexperienced and unfamiliar with military concepts. The idea that it has taken until the 20th century to acknowledge battle as a terrifying experience is interesting to me. We are now familiar with such terms as post-traumatic stress disorder, but what were the affects on the huge numbers of discharged soldiers after the Civil War, and how did society deal with them?

Sam Watkin's account of Perryville, while certainly engaging, is suspicious in its late publication. Why wait until 20 years later to puclish contemporary memoirs, or perhaps even more relevant, what did he remember after 20 years. Interesting also is that fact that he doesn't lable his work as history. Like most of society, he has bought into the notion that history is generals and leaders--he acknowledges this when he says no one ever saw a private in battle, just generals. Only in more recent times has the history of the individual become a subject of academic interest. Buell's account reinforces this with his reports prioritizing the reporting of general's and officer's deaths without acknowledging or seeking an accurate account of general casualties among the men.

General Buell's official report seems to follow the typical "battle piece" that Keegan describes more than humanize the battle. Buell gives specific locations and times similar to a chess match. He makes statements such as "More or less skirmishing has occurred daily" or "driving out the enemy's rear guard of cavalry and artillery" that do not really give you a good picture of individual soldiers in battle (more of a mass of soldiers moving back and forth on a field. The loss of human life does not seem as relevant as the position of the soldiers. However, Buell does describe some confusion as he "heard with astonishment that the left had been seriously engaged for several hours and that the right and left of that corps were being turned and severally pressed Re-enforcements were immediately sent forward from the center". He tries to send orders, but "it was impossible for it to get into position in time to produce any decided results". In the end he mentions that there was most likely a heavily loss of men and the only two names mentioned are General McCook, General Crittenden, General Jackson (died), and General Terrill (died). This goes along with Keegan's statements of the officers as the only names mentioned. Buell does not describe motivations or influences of the battle. This does make sense in that he is giving an official report and needs to be brief and to the point, but his report gives you an insight on how leaders of war think and run battle - very much like a chess match. The individual and why he fights or the fact that he dies does not matter outside that he has a use as another body on the field.

Bragg's report also followed the typical "battle piece" described by Keegan, though not completely. Bragg describes why he chose to make certain actions that does not follow a typical "battle piece". "Not having succeeded in getting my supplies from Lexington to my new depot near Bryantsville, it was necessary to hold a large portion of General Smith's forces in that direction." He describes tour of inspection, installing the Provisional Governor into office", supply lines. He also descibed some of the chain of command. However, Bragg gives a typical losing perspective. He describes the troops as "never faltering and never failing in their efforts" though they were engaged in "the severest and most desperately contested engagement within my knowledge" and "fearfully outnumbered". He makes blanket statements of the troops never hesitating, in reality, as Keegan describes, that goes against human nature. Bragg goes on to decribe in detail what they did accomplish. Like Buell, Bragg does not emphasis the horrible loss as he states "in such a contest our own loss was necessarily severe" and goes on to specifically name the officers wounded. Another indication that the individual soldiers are not important is the paragraph he refers to the enemy is a "he" not "them". His statement, "Nobler troops were never more gallantly led" really seems to highlight the point Keegan makes of most battle-pieces. Everything is simplified to the officers being the most important and inspiring to the men and the troops acting as one without questioning.