| Who | When |
Messages | |
|
|
|
| aeroreloapy
|
11
|
 |
|
10-21-2008 10:34 PM ET (US)
|
|
oh yeah, one more thing I can be sensitive about my innocent quota I have a fresh joke for you) Why was Santa's little helper depressed? Because he had low elf esteem. Lets speack about something! |  | |
|
| caolora
|
10
|
 |
|
08-17-2008 03:22 AM ET (US)
|
|
paserordomta
|
|
|
9
|
 |
|
07-22-2006 12:28 AM ET (US)
|
|
Deleted by topic administrator 07-23-2006 02:08 AM
|
| Zoe
|
8
|
 |
|
07-21-2006 04:03 PM ET (US)
|
|
your discussion is very good! I will wait for updates. Give a look at morphine sulfate webpage devoted to morphine sulfate. 10 500 lortab webpage devoted to 10 500 lortab.
|
|
|
7
|
 |
|
07-19-2006 07:25 PM ET (US)
|
|
Deleted by topic administrator 07-21-2006 09:03 AM
|
| Carlos Vallespi
|
6
|
 |
|
01-23-2006 10:06 AM ET (US)
|
|
I found missing to this dissertation and explanation of how we generalize. That is, given a few views of an object we are able to extract just a few set of rules (apparently simple) that makes us recognize the object with uncredible accuracy. This block seems much more important to me than the others and I think that should be added in Cavanagh's recognition model.
I also found missing a deeper explanation of how other senses play role in our recognition system and how are interconnected. At least, in Cavanagh's visual object recognition model, there should be a connection with the other senses.
|
| Ellie Lin
|
5
|
 |
|
01-23-2006 03:26 AM ET (US)
|
|
It's interesting to consider the possibility that our visual system only needs to store 2D information from our 3D world and that our brains can reconstruct the rest. I also would have liked to see some experimental evidence.
|
| Nik Melchior
|
4
|
 |
|
01-22-2006 10:08 PM ET (US)
|
|
This is an interesting set of evangelical theory papers, but as Stefan pointed out, it would have been interesting to see some experimental evidence, particularly in that second paper.
Cavanagh's insistence that discontinuities are not lines is interesting in the light of the description of the human visual system from the last class. Discontinuities are, in fact, lines in the derivative space, so it seems natural that we would draw and recognize objects based on their edges.
|
| Stefan Zickler
|
3
|
 |
|
01-22-2006 12:37 AM ET (US)
|
|
Cavanagh comes up with some interesting models of how our top-down vision processing might work. However, I find it important to point out that his model of prototype matching is merely a theory. There is no real hard evidence (at least not that I know of) that we internally have a designated prototype/2D template matching system. Surely, our process does externally appear to be some sort of matching model, but internally it might contain much more subtle underlying neural processes than just the algorithmic symplification of visual prototype-matching. And even if we happen to use a prototype model, the question is how much of the system is purely vision-based and how much of it is connected to rather non-visual semantic knowledge (and whether these are really separate entities). We might for instance be able to visualize and identify things that we have never seen, but of which we have heard a purely linguistic description. I believe that our top-down processing is a lot more complex and interconnected with more abstract/semantic world knowledge than Cavanagh's purely visual 2D template model describes.
|
| Tomasz Malisiewicz
|
2
|
 |
|
01-21-2006 09:24 PM ET (US)
|
|
Regarding the 1995 paper:
Although Canavagh realizes that we should focus on internal representations, he provides no additional insights regarding the matter. If the thesis that we are doing viewpoint-dependent pattern-recognition is correct, then it must explain how we are able to visually recognize such a large number of objects and understand novel(seen for the first time) objects.
Clearly some hierarchical organization of objects is necessary, and the problem of how a human's experience of the visual world interacts with this internal representation of objects must be addressed. The problem of defining an internal representation of objects that accounts for reasoning about parts of objects, hierarchical classes of objects, and learn about novel objects given little training data should not be under-estimated. Like mentioned before, we want a representation that can interface with the planning component of the brain; in reality, what we want is deeper than a theory of vision, we want a way to efficienty represent the world internally and reason about it. We should address the issues of viewpoint-dependent recognition and hierarchical representation in tandem.
|
Dave Bradley
|
1
|
 |
|
01-15-2006 02:37 PM ET (US)
|
|
Please post your thoughts on the three papers by Patrick Cavanagh that we discussed on January 23rd.
|