Fascinating interchange between Messrs. Turner and Hart. Thank gentlemen for being forthright in expressing your thoughts. Might as well muddy the water even more, so here goes. First, this can't be a comprehensive response to viewpoints expounded upon, and I hope you'll accept random comments on some issues.
   First, I went to VN in 1971 believing much of what most people believed here in US: war was hopeless, ARVN was useless, VC/NVA were honorable patriots, US forces were all deranged barbarians. Within two weeks the process of being disabused of this nonsense had begun, and it should be noted that I took personal offense at not only the rabid "anti-war" types but also the US goverment which failed to explain matters to the American people, bluntly and honestly. In good part I think this is because the American government was too ignorant; it certainly was clumsy and unimaginative. Within two months I went from being a "closet dove" to a "badger" or "mongoose." Leave me alone and people I believe in and we'll be fine. Kill them and I'll do what I can to kill you until you stop. Sounds cruel and barbaric, but then again what Hanoi's ideology was doing in Laos, Cambodia and South Viet Nam was cruel and barbaric. Don't rely on my word, simply ask the gaggle of former Hanoi communists who have defected or are under quasi-house arrrest-today-in Viet Nam. In any event, after my first tour I went back, voluntarily, with the Defense Attache Office, from 1973-1975. My job took me to about 18 of the former RVN's 44 provinces. I spoke VN and tried to learn all I could from anyone I could, about VN, the war, etc. My opinions were formed by discussions with former VC, a former NVA, and common people in VN, be they in the ARVN 7th Division, soup vendors in Can Tho, or ARVN 9th Div. HQ. Because of what I learned from these people, I supported the effort to stop Hanoi's war, and subsequent research produces the conclusion that it could have been done and should have been done. A corollary conclusion is that the primary reason this did not come about is because of the utter vacuity in Washington D.C., along with a-from my point of view-fairly obscene disregard for SE Asian people blended with a crypto-managerial cavalier attitude regarding US personnel placed in harm's way. That's another story. Back to the discussion at hand.
   Myth, to me, is defined as perceptions that are simply not backed up by facts, and an abundance of them. What frustrates and angers me is hearing sheer idiocy passed off as "VN commentary" that "everyone" knows is true. Did all RVN people support the VC? No, and if they had I'd have been dead 15 times over. Were all RVNAF(Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces)-as distinct from ARVN (Army only) pathetic losers? Not in the least. It wasn't simply the "elite" Airborne, Marine and Rangers who were good; in the latter years, and I'm quite sure is was very, very different early on, RF and PF, the usually maligned "Ruff-Pupps"-acquited themselves extremely well. Mr. Turner is correct in stating the indigenous VC were no longer a strategic force, and the vestigal VC presence that did survive was kept from decimation only by NVA regulars, armed to the gills with modern Soviet and Commnist bloc weapons which were in many respects superior to what RVNAF had.
   Mr. Hart's initial pair of questions is very important. These pertained to conflicting views of returning VN vet as hero-or traitor-for taking "anti-war" posture, and the "stick it out until victory" or "hopeless by 1968, cut loses and get out" arguments. Resolution of these questions demands much more serious discussion than has characterized public debate until now, and a much greater assemblage of factual content upon which to base conclusions. THIS is what has not been done, and THIS is what allows unfounded myths to persist. Mr. Turner agreed that honorable people can reach opposing positions, yet I've never seen any indication that the American public has any depth of informed knowledge about VN, Laos, Cambodia, what took place there, how, why, to what end, etc. This is pathetic. The "anti-war" people never told me about utterly ruthless VC/NVA behavior; the "pro-war" people painted an unrealistic panorama of unalloyed optimism.
   Whether Kerry did or did not do whatever he is accused of, or admired for, is to a large degree totally irrelevant. Wars are neither won or lost because one person is or is not a reprehensible bastard, or has or has not killed someone in cold blood. At the risk of appearing pedantic we'll quote the late Admiral Hyman Rickover: "Great minds discuss ideas, average minds discuss events, small minds discuss people." Please...no suggestion is made that either of the disputants have "small minds" and the content and depth of commentary proves this is not the case, yet the fact remains that VN's hard, documented history remains unknown. Today's high school and college textbooks contain the entirely specious argument that arrival of US ground forces created such havoc...and throw in agent orange...that VN's rice production dropped and the country was forced to import rice to fend off famine. Sounds logical but is not. Rice importing began a year before American infantry combat units arrived in country, and all because of VC depredations in the countryside. This is typical of the completely unfounded myths that have gained currency.
   At this juncture it is necessary to point out that I do believe idiotic American policies and moronic pseudo-strategy produced more societal disruption, death and destruction that would otherwise have been necessary. You'll find no blanket approval of US policies here, and another seminar should be held by the Southeast Asians exploring how and why American was such an awkward doofus ally. This being no reflection on those individuals who did their jobs to the best of their ability; it is only regretable there was no vehicle by which to channel their positive attributes in the most efficacious manner.
   Mr. Hart stated the word "won"(as in "won the war") has no meaning for him. Let's define "won" as having stopped Hanoi's war and allowing Laos, Cambodia and South Viet Nam to go their own ways, free from the de facto fascism of Hanoi's pathetic ideologues. This is not an abstract matter as many PEOPLE would be alive today, people who died violent deaths after 1975. Too many of them were friends of mine. They were fine people who despised Hanoi's idiocy while at the same time holding their own corrrupt government in contempt. Still, there were only two choices, and the Hanoi option was terminal madness unacceptable to them. They, like their US counterparts, were denied capable national leadership though it must be clearly stated that the GVN was not as bad as is always made out. It was not a "corrupt government" as it was a viable and slowly improving government plagued by corruption. A very fine distinction perhaps, but a valid one nonetheless. Mr. Hart's views are clear to me, as is his logic, but I do believe that if he experienced what I did he would see that my outlook is not simply a "contrived" view useful to me because I cannot "adjust emotionally to happy ending." Given what took place in Indochina, I do not want to be the type of person who could "adjust emotionally" to the carnage, just as I cannot and will not "adjust emotionally" to the assassination of Medgar Evers. Perhaps I'm not jaded to the extent that I'm simply innured to injustice, and fact is I do not care. The key point is here, and one hopes will be addressed at the conference, is that all participants should accept ALL elements of the truth on the table, unpleasant or not, and go from there. This has NEVER been done in the national debate and discussion on Viet Nam, which remains locked in a nearly medieval state of crypto-sorcery and philosophical alchemy.
   On Kissinger as depicted in Larry Berman's book: I do not have either Nixon's or Kissinger's picture on my wall. They were as human as the rest of us, with the standard allotment of virtues and vices, and perhaps even more of the latter. Still, they were greatly constrained by the country's mood at the time, and were faced with ever-narrowing options, the toxic by-product, payment deferred, for credibility squandered by Johnson and McNamara and their pathetic excuse for strategy. It was a sell-out yet it is all too easy to forget how poltical forces boxed both of them in, leaving few other options. It's been awhile since I read Berman's book, and I do not recall his assertion that the bombing was only to bring Thieu back on board. More recent research, and I've discussed this briefly with Mr. Berman, shows that Hanoi did give in on points they'd never conceded before. They finally agreed to a much larger ICCS contingent, accepted Thieu as president rather than calling for his removal, and retracted the last-minute changes they came up with AFTER Thieu threw his understandable tantrum. Excuse my feeble memory but a more recent book by someone named Asselin, very well researched, says the bombing DID bring Hanoi back to the table, and DID force them to make concessions they'd never agreed to before. Still, the fact that the Kissinger-negotiated deal was flimsy is quite correct, though we are compelled to acknowledge the volatile American public opinion of the time, the looming democratic congress threat to cut off all funds to RVN, and the extremely limited room for maneuvre.
   Finally, the one "great myth" of American superiority is lost on me. I've met anyone who does not acknowledge that SE Asian soldiers, due in good part to the factors Mr. Hart cites, and throw in incessant Hanoi indoctrination, were anything but capable and sometimes insanely courageous adversaries. This is not to say SOME American units were not incredibly good at what they did, or that the VC/NVA were bumbled like the rest of we humans, but I've fortunately been spared hearing allegations of American warrior superiority. They were tough guys, many of them motivated by, as they saw them, very positive reasons. Then again, the same can be said for the Hitler Jugend. Another aspect of VN's multi-faceted tragedy is that so many idealistic young NVN youth were squandered for a lie.
   I'd like to be present at a continuation of this discussion, and trust all will abide by rules of civility, with mutual agreement that all, ALL, pertinent material be on the table, a condition far too often absent in the great national VN debate.