Like Joe, I was also shocked to find out how racist the KKK was in its early days. I was always led to believe, even by some primary school teachers, that Nathan Bedford Forrest, along with others, founded the Klan with decent intentions. I also was taught that the Klan transformed into a hate group in the 20th Century, and lost focus of its original intentions. However, after reading Nelson’s book, it certainly seemed that hatred was one of the driving forces of their actions during Reconstruction. I think Kim proved in her assessment that more was driving these men than just politics. It almost seems like these ex-Confederate are in some way trying to vindicate themselves after losing the war by terrorizing freedmen. Particularly disturbing was the “ceremonial slitting of the throat after the shooting.” (126). These people are already dead, and Klansmen are mutilating their corpses. If hate is not involved there, I don’t know what hate is.

In response to Joe’s question of why the Democratic Party was allowed to exist, I think it is fair to give some blame to the North. In Nelson’s book, he more than adequately showed the power these Northern Railroad corporations had over politics (controlling everything from politicians to newspapers), and people like Tom Scott were going to pull any strings necessary to complete his grand railroad ideas. Scott supported the Redeemers, and tried to correlate his Southern Railroad with southern conservatives when it suited his financial aspirations. The almighty dollar was the driving force during Reconstruction, and influential Northerners like Scott were willing to sacrifice former slaves to reach their fiscal goals (i.e. allying with Benjamin Hill). If that meant letting Democratic leaders dress up in sheets and lynch people, so be it as long as it didn’t effect the railroads. This is just another example of why it is hard for me to believe the North was fighting a war to bring civil rights to African Americans. It seems like more steps would have been taken to ensure not only freedmen’s civil rights, but their very lives… especially when 100,000+ blacks fought and died beside Northern whites.

As everyone has mentioned, the KKK was strongly linked to the Democratic party. I found it interesting that many members came from upper-class respectable families. It seems like an organization that a bunch of blood thirsty backcountry people would be affiliated with. Doctors, merchants, and even ministers belonged to the underground group. The article even says, "every unmarried young man of respectability in the town" was in the KKK. This leads me to believe there was a certain amount of pressure for whites to join the group in order to maintain status in their community. It sounds like a case of you are either with them, or against them. In order to not be terrorized, men joined out of fear. This is precisely how the KKK worked, by using scare tactics. I had always thought the KKK was a group of drunk racist guys who burned crosses, yelled obscenitites, and committed sporadic murders, but it turns out they were racist guys trying to control politics with violence.

It amazes me that the Klan and the Democratic party were so closely related. The Klan used intimidation to make sure blacks and other republican supporters would not show up on election day. However their intimidation tactics only lasted so long until the federal government stepped in and passed laws against the klan that would suspend habeus corpus. I always believed that the Klan was originally a racist group started because of the lose of the civil war and the laws passed making blacks their civil equal. I never knew that it had so much political background.

I agree with Scott's response, but I think that Shapiro's whole point is that Simkins' "myth" is not really a myth at all but what is perceived as a horrible and widespread cruelty was really as horrible and widespread as it has been made out. I think however we are ignoring the social implications of Klan violence and black social groups which I have found somewhat interesting to look at in parts of Nelson. I think obviously it is not just "us" here but Shapiro, et al. I also want to echo was Scott is saying about the Democratic Party. It seems from the Shapiro piece that the leadership of the Klan and the Democratic Party were virtually inseperable. Why then was the Democratic Party allowed to persist? I was also interested in find out, which was not my childhood understanding, that the Klan was an overtly racist and political group from its very earliest days. I think I had always been told that this did not come about until the resurgence in the 1920's.

"The Ku Klux Klan came into existence in the Carolinas to fight the northern railroad because they saw it as a threat to a southern way of life built around black subordination." Now Simkins claimed that the Klan was political in its purpose because it was aimed at "the Negro as a citizen- one attempting to be a voter and at times the social equal of other men". In Nelson's book, other historians agree that it was a political aim but because the Klan attacked white Republicans and freedmen. Nelson proved that just with Benjamin Hill's opening speech alone politics was not the Klan's only motivation. The violence, abuse, torture that they inflicted on men and women is just hard to imagine, that someone could be so cold as to go to such lengths to stop people from voting or to stop people from being on a equal footing as themselves. And it wasn't just a few select people, because the Klan would not have survive without the support of the community. By taking the law into their own hands, murdering many innoncent victims the Klan raised the morale of the southern conservatives, that just amazes me.

In response to Derick's post, I think that Shapiro is saying that the Klan was important in the overall political power struggle in the Reconstruction-era Upstate. He is seeking to discount Simpkins' underanalyzation and understatement of it, not supporting him. To downplay the KKK's murderous and unpalatable actions is a disgrace to the men who died as a result of violence that purposefully sought to undermine democracy.

The activities of the Klan, overall, have re-emerged in recent times. Some political group, founded on the issue of superiority of some basis? That appears to me to be precisely like the rise to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan, with the purposeful subjugation of women and any other entity that got in their way. As for Simpkins, I find is despicable that anyone can write on the eve of World War II, when Jews were already being purposefully subjugated in Nazi Germany, of the "romantic" views of any group whose primary purpose is to terrorize innocent men, women, and children. The Democratic Party should be ashamed of its antics in the situation, as well. If one studies the foundations of the Democratic party, since southerners as a whole are generally (and I intentionally use a stereotype here) regressive and historically-minded, how can the "Negro" existence of subsistence farming in general be attacked so violently? Incredible irony surrounds the mere name of the "Democratic Party," given their abhorrable actions and support of the KKK.

Unfortunately, the KKK's ideals actually did come to fruition. The mere existence of the Klan was sufficient enough to defeat Radicalism and reinstate the southern conservatives who had fallen out of favor and political prominence with the end of the Civil War. The KKK is directly responsible in every major way for the suppression and subjugation of the African-American in ways that are readily cognizant even today.

Shapiro opens his document with an objective to separate the actuality of the Ku Klux Klan from the myth. He cites Simkins' view that the Klan was really an unimportant political movement of poor whites. Shapiro then proceeds to prevent the evidence of Klan activity as one of political aims. Is it me, or does he blatantly confirm the "myths" of the Ku Klux Klan? Is this satire, was I asleep, or did he really do exactly what he intended not too? As I began reading, I expected an argument for justification or at least downplay of the Klan's activities. What I got was confirmation of what I had already perceived the Klan to be. Sure, it may have started out with political goals, but it is clear that the Klan boiled down to an organization feuled by hate, racism, prejudism, etc. It was led by the leaders of society with popular support; It was not a minority of poor whites. The only thing stopping its absolute success was the Federal government's legislation. The Klan broke up but awaited a day when they could take advantage of a passive government.

Edited by author 08-13-2003 12:02 AM
The Mississippi Black Code of 1865 shows how whites tried to keep black people down during reconstruction. The document is full of ways to get fined or have to go to work to pay off fines. Every few lines there is some fine lurking. The money collected from these fines goes to the county treasury for general county purposes. What exactly is a general county purpose? I can only imagine how much of that money was misused. The state kept blacks in the manual labor work force because so many of these men could not pay the fines they received. White officials decided on the amount the fine would be. They could make it the maximum amount so the man would be forced to be hired out for work when he could not pay. Though it may not always be the most ethical way to conduct business, states charge so much money for breaking the law that it deters criminals from committing crimes. They did it 150 years ago and they are still doing today. Ahh, what a great way to empty the pockets of the people to create a "better" state.

 I like how Scott coined the “new” South as having a “pseudo-slavery” system, because after reading the Mississippi Black Codes this certainly seemed to be the case. It almost seems as if the South is closer to a European model feudal system than it was before the war. I just don’t see how a state legislature during Reconstruction would be allowed to pass such laws, and I would like to see the Republican response to these black codes. Given the reactions we saw from Congress against President Johnson’s policies towards Southern blacks (i.e. Swain’s proposal to put black trials in the hands of state courts) in the Nieman piece, you would think they would have blocked these Southern black codes. However, as we know from previous history classes, these black codes dominated the South for decades, so Congressional Republicans must have either been unaware (which I doubt) of the codes, they couldn’t do anything about them, or they simply ignored them. Whatever the case, it is sad that nothing was done to stop these codes until the 20th Century.

 I also liked Scott relating the black codes to apartheid in South Africa. I think Joe’s expanding that to Nazi Germany is taking it a little too far, but when you look at Civil war writers post WWII, the Holocaust definitely made them rethink their views of slavery. The old thoughts of slavery being some form of paternalistic system were lost for good, and that is why you will be hard pressed to find a positive view about slavery even amongst the most fervent Southern Apologists (not even in a Sons of Confederate Veterans meeting I would suppose). I also think the racial hatred we viewed in Germany had a profound impact of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960’s as well, and I would go as far as to say the movement wouldn’t have happened as fast without America’s World War II experience. However, Nazis were hell bent on genocide, which I don’t think you will find as wide scaled in the South during Reconstruction. You can’t get more racist than trying to eliminate an ethnicity. I wouldn’t say the South’s racial hatred was minute in comparison to the Third Reich, but to put them on equal footing is a stretch.

I like what Scott said about the modern day parallels to the Black Codes and South Africa and we could add Nazi Germany as well. I think this interesting because of the way we approach our own history and the way we approach others history. I think we have a tendency to view our own history as Americans, Southerners, descendents of slave-owners, etc. in a much less sinister way than we view, say, South African history. I would not go so far as draw direct parallels to Nazi racial policy, but I would say that Nazi racial policy was an aberration in German culture and quite surprising, however Southern racial policy was undeniably imbedded in Southern culture both before and after the war as seen from these pieces and there for maybe even more sinister? Yet I am still interested in my original question of how we come to terms with these negative portions of our history. Does the Freedman's Bureau help us come to grips with the negative portions by claiming it as our own and talking of it as the enlightened antidote?

I am also interested in what might have happened if as Kim pointed out the Bureau had not ended with Reconstruction. How much farther would Freedmen come if there had a been a continuous bureau (such as the Bureau of Indian Affairs, whose history is pretty dicey I understand) to guide the process of economic and societal integration beyond Reconstruction and throughout the country.

Edited by author 08-12-2003 07:24 PM
It takes a lot of time to transform people's mind from the old way of doing things to a new way of doing things even if the old way wasn't working, which is why I think the Bureau had a hard time.
  After reading Nieman's piece on the Freedman's Bureau, I was just curious as to what else they did. Like Ben said, they did provide legal protection to freedmen, but I found in the Valley of the Shadow that they did a lot more or rather they tried to do a lot more than just help not only freedmen, but "destitute whites" as well. They provided social services, such as clothing and food. They recieved many applications for help building churches and schools, however the budget being so small they were unable to meet all the requests. However, the Bureau is responsible for a number of churches in Augusta County. Unfortunately violence didn't end with the Civil War, many Freedman sought the Bureau's protection against local civil authorities, but the Bureau's efforts in that regard were futile, the most the did was to allow their office to be used as a haven for victims. Another service they perform was the help in reuniting families after the war as well as becoming a conseuling center for those with domestic problems. The Freedmen Bureau in Staunton was "deeply involved in labor issues" such as contract disputes, filing claims against the US gov't, and labor contract with former masters, as well as being an employment agency. "The people of Augusta County appeared to have neither cared much for the Freedmen's Bureau nor its purpose to aid freedmen. The community considered the Freedmen's Bureau as a symbol of hostile Northern intentions to advance the black community at the expense of the whites. Many Southerners believed that freedmen should turn to their former masters for aide." This feeling was probably not limited to Augusta County, I imagined many Southerners felt like this which is why the Bureau was limited in its authority, it's budget, and it's support. So it was not surprising to me that it ended with Reconstruction.

During Reconstruction, the Freedman's Bureau was set up to provide freedmen with legal protection. However this was difficult due to the racial phobias still present in the South. Blacks accused of crimes against whites were refused to testify, eliminating the possibility for a fair and unbiased trial. Howard realized that police and local judges continually denied freedmen rights and privaleges. The Freedmen's Bureau was somewhat of a failure due to southern racism. Mississippi's Black Codes outlawed umemployed freedman the fight of assembly also it outlawed blacks to own any type of weapon. The civil libertys granted to the negro during reconstruction many went unenforced.

The Black Codes only facilitated pseudo-slavery in the former Rebel states. Slavery existed, but merely in the sense of actuality than in a sense of legality. As Derick says, the same cultural ideals were in place for the South as before the war. Any attempt to change southern methods of existence was met only with fortified resistance. Nothing Johnson, Howard, or any other of the Reconstructioninsts could have done would have altered southern resistance, precisely as the current situation in Iraq attests. The black codes were a spit in the face of northern abolition, intentional and precise. "Freedmen" were now indentured servants to the ages of twenty-one or eighteen. Passes were required for movement, a policy that would be re-enacted in apartheid South Africa, to draw a modern parallel to the codes. The black codes were merely quasi-slavery...despite Johnson's attempts through the Freedman's Bureau to restore and reconstruct the former Confederacy.

President Johnson was to eager to reestablish the southern state governments. White southerners were still a people guided by the same beliefs and principles that they were fighting for in the war. Therefore, the government founded on these people and their values were as inherently prejudice as before the war. No matter what measure was made to provide for equal protection and administration of justice for freedmen, the result was void because prejudism implemented the measures, canceling them out.

Pres. Johnson attempted to use efforts to ensure freedmen's rights to make the southern states look good and gain credibility to win Northern support for restoration. Talk about blatant "false philanthropy!" His primary aim was to reestablish order without conflict, and Howard of the freedmen's bureau wanted to actually provide equality. Because his efforts could not stop broad interpretations by southern justices and politicians, and could not block Presidential interference, they were rendered ineffective.

 I felt that the correspondence between Hood and Sherman was one of the more interesting pieces we have read this term. You can see elements of David Hume’s argument we studied earlier, with Hood condemning acts Sherman has made during the war (when he might have been committing those same acts – i.e. Johnstone’s evacuation of Jackson), and vice versa. I think that further shows, along with the heated exchange between the two commanding generals, the hyper-emotionalism of both sides, and this emotionalism was even lasting to the last days of the war. Since we’re thinking about how earlier readings relate to this piece, I think you can also see elements of J.G. Randall’s propaganda theories in Hood and Sherman’s letters. Both men seemed to ramble off what there own respective sides official positions were on the causes of the war, and which side was just. There responses to one another concerning the wrongs of the early stages of the war look like something that could have come straight from the Richmond Whig or New York Tribune.

 I have to say I disagree with Siler and Joe in their comments regarding how Hood was stupid for trying to stop Sherman’s proposal by appealing to God and humanity. I don’t think Hood in any way felt that what he said to Sherman would effect his decisions, and in fact he accepted the “proposition to declare a truce of two days …to accomplish the purpose mentioned.” I took his protest in the name of God and humanity as Hood’s subtle way of calling Sherman a S.O.B.. Thus, the ensuing fiery exchange between the two generals. I think it is important to realize how much Sherman really wanted to protect the poor citizens of Atlanta. This was more of a punishment for secessionists, and the added bonuses of forcing these people to leave their homes is evident. This would mean more mouths for Confederates to feed, more feelings of needing to protect one’s families among Confederate soldiers, and ultimately a quicker end to the secessionists morale. The fact that Sherman was trying to pass himself as some kind of humanitarian is what pissed Hood off, and that’s why he called him a S.O.B..

 Also, I was kind of taken back by Sherman’s comments regarding African Americans. By this point in the war, the Northern cause was supposed to be heavily centered on freeing the slaves. However, Sherman says “we don’t want your Negroes” and claimed there were no “Negro allies” in his corps. I imagine he was so adamant of pushing the cause of Union because of the makeup of the corps below him. I imagine most of his corps were men from the Midwest, and they would not be to thrilled to think that the war was about emancipation.

Edited by author 08-12-2003 12:32 AM
I liked the correspondence between Sherman and Hood, Sherman the most though. Because he was sarcastic, straight-forward, started his first letter with much respect and patience. But by the end he was like forget it, I don't owe you anything. For Sherman, this war wasn't about freeing the slaves, it wasn't about trying to suppress the Southern civilians by taking their property or occupying their land; it was all about making sure that there was "a just obedience to the laws of the United States." And unfortunately whatever that entitled or whoever became subjected it could not be help, for it was nothing personal. Bringing me to my next point: Sherman made a statement that showed how he would be able to try and continue his relations with the South before the war. He would not hold a grudge for he understood that men were fighting for what the believed in. He believed in peace, but when that peace was achieved "you may call on me for anything. Then I will share with you may last cracker and watch with you to shield your homes and families against danger from every quarter." Then at the end of the correspondence, Hood sent him a longer letter to which Sherman responded with a paragraph in which he basically says, I was right you were wrong; I wasn't bound to give notice, you were bound to take notice, read on it; now I didn't start this, but I am going to finish it.
Sincerely, your obedient servant, Sherman. Classic.

Sherman's march to the sea caused much damage to the South and many see it as an over-aggressive act. Arson had been a factor in the war long before Sherman. As it stands, Sherman simply won the game of who could burn more stuff. New York, Vermont, and Pennsylvania had all been subjects of arson. The march was revenge for trying to burn out the North. Sherman even asked the citizens of Atlanta to evacuate and avoid the events to come, as others have already pointed out. Many people never hear that Sherman didn't even burn Columbia. In an effort to burn cotton supplies, the Confederates accidentally let the flames get out of hand and the fire spread rapidly. This is probably an event that just gets categorized immediately to Sherman's march, even though he wasn't fully responsible for the act.(I'm sure he didn't try and stop the fires) I also agree with others that Hood's pleas were stupid, but you can't blame him for trying.

I also found the piece for the Atlantic the most entertaining of the pieces assigned for today. I don't know whether to agree with Scott that he was a prisoner of his stereotypes about the South or to think that not much has changed. His tenth paragraph on South Carolina's arrogance holds true in some degree among many today as do his comments about Southern ignorance and popular education also ring true for the modern day. Surprising though were his comments that "the best citizens of to-day are the Confederate soldiers of yesterday" this is one instance I would point to as not seeming to fit into some Northern, stereotypical mold.

The Sherman-Hood correspondence is quite ridiculous when you consider that one wanted to annhilate Atlanta, but do so with courtesy and the other thought he could stop it by appealing to God and in the name of humanity. Did Hood really believe that Sherman would step back and say "no I won't do this to a brave people (the enemy) simply because the enemy commander asks." It seems Hood was effectively deluded by archaic notions of Commander's Courtesies. This only serves to mask in alot of ways what both guys were really doing, which explains why they get all incensed when someone mentions what they really have done.

The letters exchanged between Sherman and Hood Sherman asked Hood for the removal of all citizens out Atlanta. THe citizens of Atlanta also wrote to Sherman asking for him to not innvade, for they had no where to go and could not be able to take their sick and elderly. Sherman ridicules Hood and blames him for having his defensive lines too close to Atlanta and that this is why his muskets and cannons landed in the city. The fact that Sherman asked the people of Atlanta to vacate goes against the common view of southerners that northerners were all un hummane. Althought the destruction that Sherman inflicted on Atlanta was barbaric he did ask them to evacuate. The accounts of the destruction Shermans armies did were described by Burge's diary. She states that with the passing of Shermans armies she was "30,000 dollars poorer and a much stronger rebel."

Three Months among the Reconstructionists struck me as the most interesting of the pieces assigned for today. The extent to which the author is a prisoner of his own stereotypes is amazing. The man appeals to stereotypes common at the outset of war- the overarching ignorance of southerners, for example. At one time the author asserts that “the people are utterly without knowledge. There is everywhere a lack of intellectual activity” (3). The inherent laziness of southerners, following on the early theme of “soft but violent planters” discussed in class, is also addressed by the author believing that the “chief end of man seems to have been to “own a nigger.”

Amazingly, the author also alludes to the vitality of the Slave Power, which had been discounted in early Federal invasions. The Federal occupying forces had discovered that the yeoman farmers were every bit as reproachful of the invading armies as the slaveocracy was, the author still insists that the “inherent antagonism to everything from the North—an antagonism fostered and cunningly cultivated…by the politicians in the interests of Slavery” (7) exists in strength. How the author can still ascribe to the greater truth of this idea in the immediate years following its very public and violent defeat is baffling.

The author also appeals to general stereotypes of the newly-freed slaves of the South. He describes the social complexity issues of the white and black southerners, and their commonly-held stereotypes of one another. Then the author asserts that “the Negro is no model of virtue or manliness, he has little conception of right and wrong, and he is improvident to the last degree of childishness” (6). The former slave shall also require “almost infinite patience,” for the black man “comes very slowly to moral comprehensions” (6). How a Massachusetts man, from the hotbed of the abolitionist movement, can ascribe to such common, ignorant stereotypes in the region that had originally attacked these conceptions is also perplexing.

The Sherman/Hood correspondence discounts many of the commonly-held conceptions, by southerners in particular, of the engagements in and around Atlanta. Surprisingly to many southerners, it is Sherman who commands the civilians to vacate Atlanta for their own personal safety, in the interests of avoiding civilian casualties. Hood, writing from his viewpoint and comprehension of southern society, refuses to allow the destruction the Atlanta sense of community so integral to the southern citizenry that Sherman was attempting to remove, albeit for the personal safety of the Atlanta citizenry. In fact, Sherman blames Hood for forming his lines so close to the actual city of Atlanta that unintentional destruction was unavoidable. Would it have been too difficult for Hood to move his lines forward in order to protect the city’s inhabitants? In the interests of preserving the rapidly diminishing Confederate forces, probably so. But the correspondence between the two men definitely debases some of the arguments demonizing Sherman, as the allowance of a truce to remove civilians and their personal effects from the city of Atlanta is a commendable move on behalf of Sherman.

However, the view offered by Sherman’s correspondence is not verified by the accounts of Mrs. Burge. She tells a tale more familiar to southerners- the complete devastation wreaked by the northern armies in Georgia. Mrs. Burge states at one point that she lost thirty thousand dollars in one day due to Yankee acquisitions. The utter cruelty, part of the intentional destruction of the southern will to fight, of Federal men in the treatment of Sadai is heart wrenching. What kind of a man would still a doll from a little girl? What purpose in the overall scheme of warfare and Sherman’s tactics does this theft serve? The example merely exemplifies the extent to which the Federal armies destroyed southern moral on the home front- not a man, woman, nor even a little child was spared.

The writter for the Atlantic Monthly found the South divided and backward. Rich ruling classes controlled the poor who were ignorant and uneducated and taught to hate the Yankees. This sounds like the stereotypical South that the Northerner's believed existed before the war. This gives evidence to those who view the Civil War as not really causing much change or being a war of revolution. He believes that Southerners must be taught to respect all men and to respect labor, which they believed was degrading.

The correspondence among Sherman, Hooker, and Calhoun was entertaining. Hooker sounds to be like a bitter, complaining school girl that did not receive the memo that there is a war about. Of course Sherman wants to take Atlanta. Believe it or not Hooker, the enemy wants to win too. Therefore, he will obtain a vital town to the South. The least he could do is warn you and allow you to remove the families when occupation is imminent. I find it ridiculous to punch the gift horse in the mouth in this situation.

When the Yankees Came

 Stephen V. Ash’s book, When the Yankees Came, discusses Southern communities that were invaded by Union forces during the Civil War. The Union’s occupation started a chain of events that redefined the aims of warfare at that time. This began with the disruption of local southern communities, which in turn provoked resistance by the south, and resulted in new tactics that the Union armies would use against the Confederate south.
 
   Before Yankee invasion, the South was dependent upon its various trades due to its high efficiency level of communalism. Different people of different classes worked together to create a social system of productivity. Even though the southern way of life was one of the most important aspects, their entire society was changed after northern occupation in southern territory. Ash describes how, for many farmers and yeoman, “the fear of losing home and livelihood prevailed over fear of the enemy”(19). This clearly shows how much southerners valued their land and their way of life.
 
   Upon the arrival of the Yankees, southern crops were seized and homes were destroyed. Poor whites, who had previously depended on the extensive southern communalism, in turn lost their jobs because their farmland was destroyed and the Yankees looted what little crops were salvaged. More aristocratic families of the south became afraid of the poorer class because these workless men would raid the homes and families of the wealthier citizens. Already, the southern classes were bickering amongst themselves and the sense of communalism was beginning to break.
 
   The longer the northern troops stayed in the south, the worse the conditions became for the Confederate states. Communities were collapsing more and more as time passed due to northern oppression and an increasing loss of morale amongst the southern people. However, the South did not go down passively; instead they came up with means of resistance. The primary southern war strategy to try to make the Northern troops retreat was that of guerrilla warfare. Other common means of resistance included “verbal defiance,” “noncooperation,” and smuggling contraband. Through these efforts, the South attempted to regain some kind of control over their disheveled community.
 
   The south developed a system of guerrilla warfare in hope of resisting northern aggression. Guerrillas were members of the southern community who attempted to defend the honor of the community against Union rule. Ash defines guerrillas as “not soldiers, but citizens; they were not an arm of the Confederacy, but of the community” (48). They used their network of friends and family to aid them tasks such as the destruction of railroad tracks, installing telegraph wires, and organizing ambushes against the northern army. This strategy combined the South’s strong desire for the return of communalism by making all efforts to save the honor of their society, which the Union army had tried so hard to destroy. By 1862, guerrilla tactics had become so effective that Union soldiers were afraid to travel outside fortified areas.
 
   Regarding the other means of resistance, Confederate women played a large role in rebelling against Union commands. Not only would the women degrade the Northern soldiers to their faces by holding their noses as they passed them on the streets; but also, they would refuse to walk under Union banners in the cities (42). Also, smuggling quickly became a very popular act of resistance. Confederates would take items such as clothing, food, and medicine to soldiers of their army in order to keep them nourished and in good health. Since the Yankee army had devised a plan of starvation and devastation of the South, keeping the soldiers strong became a difficult but imperative task for the southern community.
 
   In an attempt to stop the guerrilla warfare, the Union generals placed repercussions on Southern citizens for the actions of the guerrillas. These new war tactics did not end with such punishments; the Yankee army would also search and loot homes for supplies or guerrillas in hiding. This began the cycle of raids and destruction across the south, which ended in Sherman’s infamous march to Savannah. Yankees made a point of either stealing or burning anything that the South could use for survival during the war or even after the war was over. During this time, Southerners slowly turned against themselves and did whatever was necessary for their individual survival. This finally marks the end of what was once the tight community of the Confederacy.
 
   By hitting the South in a way that was most devastating for them, the Union managed to destroy what was the most important aspect of Southern life: communalism. Although the South tried to retaliate, their efforts were not enough to stop the Union army from stripping them of their homeland and dignity. The Yankees found every way possible to fight a war of no mercy and leave the South in utter destruction. This chain of events that ended badly for the South created a new way of fighting wars by targeting helpless citizens. The Yankees saw this as a logical way of punishing them for their participation in guerrilla warfare; yet, they demolished the South’s final attempt at communalism.

Edited by author 08-11-2003 08:17 AM
     Assumptions and preconceptions about the North, caused many Southerners to be extremely apprehensive about the arrival of the Federal soldiers in 1861. These “men without honor . . .would most certainly be savages . . .[who] would pillage, destroy, and rape.”[1]# At the beginning of the war, for some Southerners, these preconceived notions were proven false by many of the Federal soldiers who exercised a great deal of discipline, especially towards the women. Many Southerners, specifically the women, took advantage of the Union’s use of a “rosewater policy.” Losing patience, the Federal soldiers put into effect a harsher policy of occupation in 1862. With the help of individual accounts, Stephen Ash proves how this new policy, the internal divisions, and the external pressure led to the eventual demise of Confederate morale and resistance.
 
     At the start of the Civil War, it was the intent of the Union army to reassure the Confederate citizens that they came only to “stamp out rebellion.”[2]# Whatever their intention, they were met with mixed reactions. The Unionists and the blacks in a way saw the Federal army as Moses, coming to let God’s people go. Aristocrats and yeomen, for the most part, were not thrilled at the idea. However, ironically, in some cases the Union men were welcomed in order to bring order to the chaos created in the community by their own boys. In making sure that the Union soldiers were left with ruin, the Confederates set about destroying public and even private goods. Louisa Pearl hoped that “the Northern army will come and take possessions soon . . .” for she was scared that the Confederates would “take it into their heads to burn [them] out.”[3]
 
     The citizens, taking advantage of the rosewater policy, defied the Union soldiers in all the ways they could think of: from preaching sermons for the Confederates to actually spitting in the Federal soldiers’ paths or on the boots. At first the soldiers, just laughed these incidents off. But when soldiers began dying at the hands of citizen, either directly or indirectly (housing members of guerilla warfare), it was decided that enough was enough. They invoked a harsher policy upon the citizens. The citizens did not see the responsibility that they should hold for this stricter policy. But they did see themselves as victims to the North’s duplicity once again. “The North acted like they had our interests at heart, but it was just a scam in order to get us to let our guard down.”
 
     Unfortunately, the occupation itself and the new plan, brought into the light the internal divisions that would help bring a end to the Confederate spirits. Community was vital to the Southerner way of life. Everyone needed the other and they all helped each other in some way. Planters gave Aristocrats food, Aristocrats gave yeomen money or whatever they needed, and blacks in exchange for their labor were given shelter and food. Many Southerners thought that their way of life was great until the Union army came along and destroyed their way of living. However, they soon found out that their perception of Southern living was not loved by everyone.
 
     As Ash puts its, many whites were under the impression that blacks needed them. They were greatly disturbed to discover that the reverse was more the truth: they needed the blacks. The idea that were “content in their bondage was a cornerstone of proslavery ideology.”[4] Their slaves left them; they went over to the other side. When this realization set in, many were ready for this war to be over for they just couldn’t bear to lose anything else.
 
     For the poor whites, Southern living was not their idea of a good time. Several of them became bandits and began victimizing the middle, but mainly the upper class. Life had not dealt them a fair hand, and the aristocrats made it a lot harder for them to play the poor hand they had. They were looked upon with disdain, treated like dirt, and in some cases, slaves were treated with more respect than they. Life for them became good, rather a little better, under the Federal occupation. The Northerners took pity on them, teaching them how to read, write, do math and gave them food and things when they could. But they also played them against the aristocracy, convincing them to join the Union side.
 
     Another division within the Southern community was location. Depending on where one lived in the garrison towns, the Confederate frontier, or no man’s land, determined how they fared. Those living in the garrison towns were a lot better off than the people who resided in the other two. In the garrison towns there was more protection, better structure, and they were provided for. In the Confederate frontier, there was protection every now and then from both sides, leading to little structure and no one helping them out. And in no man’s land, they were definitely on their own.
 
     Many Southerners saw themselves as victims, as do many when they lose. Unfortunately a lot of their hardships were caused by their own stubbornness and pride. It was this pride that kept the war going and this pride that eventually caused their loss.


[1]Stephen V. Ash, When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995) 12.
[2] Ibid., 28.
[3] Ibid., 18.
[4] Ibid., 223.

In Stephen V. Ash’s book, "When the Yankees Came," he primarily uses a “three worlds” distinction to describe the underlying complexities and tensions of the United States occupied South [1]. This story of the occupied Confederacy at the dawn of reconstruction and in the last gasps of the Confederate Army is the social history of a people without a country of their own. Here the Yankee Victorian and sometimes ruffian ethos met the fading influence of white authority, robust Southern pride, and the infant freedom of the slave population. This is a story of acclimation and conversion-aristocratic whites, ardent secessionists and unionists, blacks and poor whites seeking to acclimate themselves to the rapidly growing and changing South, a South that was to be remade in the North’s image and the reality of emancipation [2]. Most gripping about When the Yankees Came is the unfolding realization that the real revolution of the Civil War came neither at the great battlefields of Gettysburg or Antietam nor from the florid script of the Emancipation Proclamation, rather the revolution came from the upheaval of the social order: the aristocrat humbled, the black made free, and the poor white vindicated.
 
Ash presents three “zones” into which the South was informally organized during the first years of occupation: Garrisoned Towns, the Confederate frontier, and “No-Man’s-Land. Garrisoned Towns were towns in which the Union army was regularly quartered and governance sure. The Confederate frontier was for the most part under the governance of Confederate authority but was regularly in the path of Union raids. “No-Man’s Land” is the term Ash uses to describe territory not regularly under the control of either side in this war. Typically this was the site of most social and civil upheaval that oft bordered on anarchy. The use of these distinctions creates an organization and somewhat systematic approach to the historical problem of deciphering the conditions of the occupied South. Ash indicates through the sheer depth of his book that the occupation of the former Confederate territories was messy business. Northern invaders sought to reorganize and “convert” the South from its pre-war organization around a powerful slave aristocracy to an enlightened and educated free society based on the principles of “hard work and free labor that had made their country great.” [3] This program of “moral reconstruction” was in direct response to the complex and negative social structures that were viewed as corrupt and debase by the Northern invaders. The conflict of these social structures, “the backward, undemocratic society”, with the nature of occupation and defeat is the crux of the remaining portions of "When the Yankees Came" [4]
 
Before actual reconstruction began, the very processes of invasion and occupation were in themselves forces that severely upended the traditional structures of the South. Ardent secessionists living in occupied territory were forced to endure the humiliating ordeal of submitting to a bitterly despised foe. For many white, aristocratic Southerners the humiliation they endured was tied closely with the freedom and confidence slaves began to feel as the Union armies approached. The transition from a slave society to one in which blacks were free was difficult for many whites to handle. Whites either lost their grip on their slaves as they began running towards the Union armies or slaves began to undermine the system through sabotage and disloyalty. Though in these ways it was possible for whites to retain their dignity, when they were forced to employ former slaves they were unable to do so with appropriate dignity [5]. This loss of dignity and loss of the economic system that whites were accustomed to and had relied upon was devastating and fear-inspiring.
 
In addition to the upheaval of the complex social system between Southerners there was also a complex relationship between the invaders and the invaded. The civilian resistance in the occupied South ebbed and flowed with the success or failure of the Confederate military. From the first occupations ardent secessionists were wholly dedicated to undermining the occupation. Zealous secessionists viewed secession as an act of decontamination from debase Yankee society and thus the presence of Union forces in their localities was a horrible transgression. Southern women especially never failed to take a moment to undermine occupation through verbal or other means. Under the initial “rosewater policy” of occupation Yankee tolerance was high and those who were not viewed as legitimate threats (i.e., women, children, and old men) were allowed a great deal of latitude in defying Federal forces. Men were not afforded such latitude and thus were required to maintain their sense of dignity through acts of noncooperation or at times guerilla warfare [6]. However, as the war wound to a brutal close and the South grew weary of war many Southerners began to view the occupation forces with less hostility. As Ash points out, Southerners and occupying forces eventually found themselves interacting socially and at times romantically [7].
 
The overturning of the pre-war Southern society of slavery and tyranny for both blacks and poor whites was difficult progress. However, as Ash indicates in his epilogue that progress was checked by the leniency of post-war reconstruction policy which allowed former secessionist officials to simply take an oath of loyalty and return to their former posts. From these posts they were able to reverse the revolutionary tide and return blacks and others to positions as similar to their old status as possible [8]. When the Yankees Came describes clearly the foundation of Southern society for the post-war era. This was the foundation that had formed under Yankee occupation from the destruction of the old order and the ushering in of a new order. This was an order in which slaves were freed, aristocrats humbled, family life altered, and politics upturned, and all this occurred under the watchful eye of Federal occupation forces whose presence was in many ways the primary catalyst for the profound change. What was required of Southerners was conversion and acclimation to the new order. Mostly this was difficult and frequently they tried to reverse the inevitable change. Southerners had no choice but defeat and change or total destruction through an even more protracted and bloody war.

[1] Stephen Ash, When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995) 76.
[2] Ash, When the Yankees Came, 171.
[3] Ash, When the Yankees Came, 172.
[4] Ash, When the Yankees Came, 171.
[5] Ash, When the Yankees Came, 167.
[6] Ash, When the Yankees Came, 42-44.
[7] Ash, When the Yankees Came, 220.
[8] Ash, When the Yankees Came, 233-234.

 In his highly acclaimed work entitled When the Yankees Came, Stephen Ash gives his readers a masterful portrayal of the Federal occupied areas of the South during the Civil War. Through scrupulous detail and unparalleled research, Ash beautifully explored this aspect of the War Between the States that is, surprisingly, often overlooked. The thoroughness of his research gives him instant credibility with Ash citing examples geographically ranging from the port of New Orleans, to the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, and every Union occupied territory in between. Not only did his sources have this vast representation stemming from every conquered area of the South, but they also came from a variety of different people; whether it was from a Northern officer, secession dedicated Southern woman, or a Southern Unionist. He tied this wide array of sources well into his work, and, because of these seemingly never-ending examples supporting his ideas, it is difficult for anyone to criticize his work. However, many readers would come away, after reading this work, believing the “conflict (turned) from a limited war into a revolution”1 in the South. This is not the case, and one can easily see this if they carefully read Ash’s work. Although he certainly proved the Civil War led to many changes in Southern society, one could hardly describe those changes as revolutionary, because they only lasted as long as the Union troops were in the South. The only true revolutionary occurrence, which happened between 1861 and 1865, was the emancipation of the slaves. Never again would the horrible institution of slavery plague the South, but the immediate and lasting change brought about by emancipation cannot be seen in any other aspect of Southern society. Although some may argue that other social revolutions took place, a close examination of When the Yankees Came would prove otherwise. It is safe to say there was a significant increase of consciousness in the South, but it did not lead to any immediate and lasting change in society.

 The first group one should explore, when questioning whether social revolutions took place in the Southern states, is the poor whites of the South. Ash did prove this class “began seizing opportunities denied them under the old regime”2, and this would lead some to believe this was the beginning of some form of a revolution. The poor whites quickly took possession of land left behind by fleeing aristocrats and secessionists, became informants for the occupying forces, and tried to position themselves as the next leaders in the post war South along with the unionists. There was also a minority of poor whites expressing an interest in a social revolution, which the Northern “invaders” had been trying to convince them to initiate. All of this seemed to strengthen the belief among property owners that these poor whites could not be trusted, and the repercussions of this increased distrust would prove to be detrimental to the elevation of these lower class whites after the Union army had left Southern soil. All of this seemed to be the makings of a revolution, but Ash quickly made it clear that this possible revolution would not come to pass. He claimed, “aristocrats came to understand that the unruly plain folk did not fundamentally threaten the social order”3, and thus they never became a threat to the “old order”. It was interesting, however, that Ash felt a social revolution of sorts from the poor whites could have come if the war had lasted longer. This suggests that Ash believed there was a form of class-consciousness arising among the lower class whites, but in no way did that consciousness lead to a social revolution. Once the Northern troops left the South, these poor whites found themselves in the same position as they were before the war. The land they seized was quickly reclaimed by the former landholders 4, and they were placed back under the power “local authorities.” In fact, the tensions between upper class whites and poor whites only got worse, and would continue to be a problem well into the Twentieth Century. Some could even argue that the tensions are as strong as ever today in the Twenty First Century.

 Another group, whose position change in society during the war could have easily been mistaken as revolutionary, was the Unionists. It is important to realize that a majority of these Unionists were from the lower social classes of small slave owners and independent farmers, and thus found themselves in the same situations as the poor whites. They too initially felt the presence of Northern troops in the South brought an end to their problems, but ultimately it turned out to be only temporary relief. The loyalists soon came to realize “that only a thin blue line stood between them and Rebel vengeance.”5 Before the Union troops had come to their areas, publicly known Unionists were subject to not only social isolation, but even physical danger. These men, who would eventually be known as scalawags, were considered by Southerners to be worse than the Yankee invaders. Thus, their social position, in the eyes of secessionists, was equivalent, if not lower than, slaves. One can imagine the torment and subjugation these men lived under during the early year of the war. However, when the Union troops came, the Unionists seized the opportunity to retaliate against their tormentors. They became informants, guides, formed home guards, and even joined the ranks of the Federal Army. Some Unionists went as far as to form their own guerilla groups to “wage guerilla war against the Rebels.”6 Once again, this seems like the development of a social revolution. But it wasn’t, because nothing ever lasting came of it. Once Union soldiers left an area, known Unionists had no other option but to leave with them. A great example of this was seen with the hurried departure of Unionists from Jacksonville when the Federal Army left the tactically worthless city. It would be nice to know what became of these Unionists once the war was over, but it is safe to say they were subject to great persecution from angry secessionists. Ash states, “Unionists came to understand that the advent of the Union army was not the answer to all their prayers, not a sign of final deliverance but merely a herald of continuing struggle.”7 Once again, one witnessed the failure of a possible social revolution, and the Southern norms remained intact.

 Lastly, the possibility of a social revolution coming from the black race was lost with the withdrawal of Union troops. Although emancipation is clearly a form of social revolution, it still did not elevate Southern blacks up the social ladder of their society. Some may argue that African Americans were just as bad, if not worse off than they were under slavery when the final Union troops left with the end of Congressional Reconstruction. However, just like the poor white and Unionists, they did have some hope during the Civil War in the Union occupied territories. Slaves frequently ran away from their plantations, and came in enormous numbers to Union camps; where they were eventually welcomed. However, their resistance to the social elites did not end with their crossing of the “Red Sea” and escape from the persecution of “Pharaoh.”8 Blacks joined the Union Army, contracted themselves out of “shantytowns”, and some still living with their masters demanded wages. Once again, this looks like the possible beginning of social change, but everyone knows that ended quickly when the departure of the Union Army and the instituting of Jim Crow laws. True social revolution would not come for another hundred years with the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960’s.

 Why didn’t these social revolutions take place when the opportunities looked so promising? The answer lies with the commitment of the Union Army, and the North in general, to social change in the South. Had they truly been interested in setting up this new, educated, Northern-like society in the South, they could have made these brief social changes become permanent. By 1865, Union forces had complete control of the South, and could have stayed there as long as Congress wanted them to. However, they ended up leaving the South by 1876 in the hands of the very men they were fighting against 11 years earlier. Confederate General Wade Hampton was left as the Governor of South Carolina for goodness sakes. The Union Army definitely did a lot of great things for poor whites, Unionists, and African Americans, but they didn’t finish the job. They left the “fire” 9 burning in the South, and these defenseless “lessers” of society were left to fend for themselves in the flames.


1. Stephen V. Ash, When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), Preface ix.
2. Ibid., 180.
3. Ibid., 193.
4. Ibid., 234.
5. Ibid., 112.
6. Ibid., 129.
7. Ibid., 130.
8. Ibid., 160.
9. Ibid., 232.

Edited by author 08-11-2003 04:23 AM
 In Stephen V. Ash’s, When the Yankees Came, he describes the how the invasion of Union soldiers effected the lives of people in all areas of the South. The destruction of communities played a major role in the Confederate defeat. It was a chaotic time, in which every man was fending for his or her own life. Before the arrival of northern armies, communities got along with the help of everyone. The system broke down and the Confederacy was severely weakened with little food, labor, and the influence of the house-ruling men. The role of the Southern women was crucial during wartime and Ash gives several examples showing the pride and toughness these women possessed. As the war progressed, many Southerners looked to the Union armies for relief and the hope of reasserting peace to the country.
 
There were mixed feelings with the first arrival of Union soldiers to the South. Some were glad to see them because Confederate soldiers had been such a nuisance to several towns. Others were not pleased and let the soldiers know exactly how they felt about them. Most of the initial reaction came from women, because many men fled their homes with the news that soldiers were coming to town. The ones that stayed behind did so to protect their property that they could not abandon.[1] Men who encountered soldiers were also more likely to receive more physical harm than women were. Women felt they could verbally abuse the opposing soldiers for this reason. Some women even expressed their willingness to fight, but were not allowed to because they were women.[2] It was shocking to see such a vivid hate for these men by many Southern women in the beginning. Granted they were the enemy, but it seemed as if they did little to provoke these nasty feelings. Lieutenant Colonel Voris wrote, “The women are bitter Secesh and spit it out with venom,”[3] describing the callous women of occupied territories. The protection of values, honor, and the Southern way of life was ever strong in many women, who had been left with their families to take care of the home while the men were gone.
 
Fear was a prominent emotion felt among those who were at home during the war. Slaves running away or rising up was a constant thought of many. Guerillas were also a threat to the people in no-man’s-land. While there was a country at war, internal wars were also taking place. Women could not control the slaves, guerillas often pillaged homes to survive, and Union soldiers did the same. Two people from Arkansas noted, “We have been robbed and personally maltreated to an extent unparalleled in Christian history.”[4] A growing hate for the war was developing in places where the people were tired of the inhumanities they had to deal with regularly. The violent insurrections of slaves that people imagined hardly came true. Guerillas were hunted by Union troops but still wreaked havoc on many homes. Even with the help from Yankees, many Southerners refused to take an oath to the Union in order to keep their pride.[5]
 
The Emancipation Proclamation caused even more trouble among households in the South. Whites had always controlled blacks in the South and now their most sacred value was being threatened.[6] Slaves began to seek refuge at Union lines and plantations were losing their work force. The food supply began to diminish and starvation became a problem. Neighbors were robbing each other and communities working together fell apart. The war on slavery had begun and slaves gained confidence in the arrival of Union soldiers. Riots would break out and white people locked themselves in their houses during these times. Slaves would knock whips out of their master’s hand and openly defy them in the presence of the army. When the troops left whites came out of their houses raging mad at their slaves and were quick to pick up the whip.[7] The time of slavery was coming to an end and blacks and whites knew it.
 
Ash discusses class conflict in the South and how it helped the Union emerge victorious. Wealthy aristocrats had long ruled the South and the poor were getting sick of it. An effort to educate the poor class was thought to be a remedy to their terrible situation.[8] Even the rich lost much of what they had and some were forced to beg Union troops for help. The poor class moved onto aristocrats’ property and claimed it to be their own. Revenge for the years of inferiority was sweet to the poor and the aristocrats could do little to suppress them. It was humiliating and the upper class realized they would not be able to push these people around like they once had.[9]
 
Chaos was the final stage that brought the South to its knees. Guerilla forces and gangs of robbers were rampant in the closing stages of the war. Unruly behavior was common because many had nothing more to lose. Boys became wild because fathers weren’t there and some schools had shut down, leaving the boys with much free time.[10] Confederate soldiers coming home also disrupted many towns by pillaging and robbing homes. The war had made people weary and many just wanted it to be over. Citizens in the occupied towns even befriended Union soldiers and welcomed their help in the closing of the war.[11] The hardest part now would be restoring peace in the South and establishing a new way of life free from slavery.

1)When the Yankees Came, Stephen V. Ash; UNC Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 1995; p.19.
2)Ibid. p.39.
3)Ibid. p.43.
4)Ibid. p.68.
5)Ibid. p.70-73.
6)Ibid. p.2.
7)Ibid. p.163-165.
8)Ibid. p.175.
9)Ibid. p.187.
10)Ibid. p.200.
11)Ibid. p.219.

Edited by author 08-11-2003 12:01 AM
Derick Henderson
8/11/03
Benson
When the Yankees Came, Stephen W. Ash


        The South created the monster that they claimed had already existed. Southerners’ created false stereotypes of Yankees as motivational tools to incite the rise against them. This resulted in a fear that bread the resistance that forced Yankees into those stereotypes, allowing Southerners to justify resistance by claiming that they were right all along. After reading Stephen V. Ash’s When the Yankees Came, one realizes that it is not fair to categorize the Confederate States during the Civil War under one simple heading such as “the South.” Referring to these states as “the South,” as they were to open this discussion, indicates a united sect that shares common goals and interests. Ash methodically shows that his is not the case. Distinct lines are drawn between the sects of Southern society, most notably the following: political, radial, class, and gender. Ash painstakingly explains in great detail how the motivations, ideals, and experiences differ among these sects. When his tedious identification and separation of the Southern social stratum is all said and done, however, the author fails to recognize the cross cutting fact that surfaces. No matter the differences, the “white bond” within Southern society bought into the image of the Yankees as a monster invading to destroy the rights that held together their families and communities, which were the essential institutions of Southern life.[1] Ash does admit the war disrupted these the sturdiest features of the social landscape across the entire South.[2] In defense of their honor, Southerners of all sects kept their moral and hopes strong, altering the course of Yankee occupation from conciliation to compulsion.[3]

 In the early Northern occupations of the South, Southerners encountered a Union army with a policy of conciliatory behavior that clearly opposed all of the preconceived notions about the character of Northern men, or lack there of, that they had been taught. The Yankees relieved an unstable South torn apart by Rebel army retreats by bringing order and security. This “rosewater” policy, aimed at winning the allegiance of Southerners, was based on the belief that Southerners generally supported the Union and were coerced into secession by the “Slave Power conspiracy.” Union officers were known to address occupied communities “to calm any apprehension of harsh treatment that might exist in their minds . . . [and] . . . to reassure their people and to confide in our kind intentions toward them.”[4] However, the North overestimated the amount of support for them in the South. Even under cordial occupation, citizens were hostile. Southerners’ psyche was offended and they felt subjugated to a slave class level under occupation. Passive resistance turned into active resistance over time.[5] Guerrilla tactics were implemented by Southerners in the three zones of Northern influence, garrison towns, no-man’s land, and the Confederate frontier.[6] Union soldiers resented this and developed a hateful and vengeful attitude toward the South’s citizens. The difference between an enemy soldier and a hostile civilian faded. They were no longer fellow countrymen with whom to work out problems, but rebels to be subjugated. Southerners affectively transformed themselves from potential friends to mortal enemies. Northerners began to view the cultures as incompatible and a war for reunification became one of purification in order to create a new South.[7] It became obvious that there was no moral way to deal with the resistance, but rather, a hard policy must be adopted. The Union army would have to impoverish the South to destroy their moral.[8] General Sherman promoted the hard policy by saying that the proper course towards Southern civilians was “not [to] coax them or meet them half way, but make them . . . sick of war.”[9] The Union’s war aims changed. Southerners believed it revealed the North’s true intentions and confirmed the stereotypes. But did this really have to happen? It appears that the South simply got what they asked for.

 In Garrison towns the Union had firm control. The economy and community life disappeared due to townspeople deserting and refugees filling the towns. However, public institutions and daily life structure remained intact. The people were dependent on the occupying power; therefore, relief programs and efforts to create a lucrative marketplace were made by the Union army in order to prevent the potential threat of rioting. This created opportunities and jobs for runaway slaves, escaping Unionists, and poor whites. These groups also found security from the oppression of the guerrillas and the upper class. In no-man’s land, Federal forces made regular patrols that kept secessionalists insecure but did not have enough presence to guarantee the safety of Unionists. Therefore, it was generally a vacuum of no authority. Raids and plundering depleted the zones and fear caused all to be idle. This stifled the mobility necessary for a productive community system and left the inhabitants subject to privation. The confederate frontier was victim to occasional siege but was usually under Confederate authority. Therefore, local government was still intact and slavery enforced. This helped keep the relief efforts of communities alive, however, legislation discriminating against poor classes were passed.[10] The North attempted to capitalize on this with a social and moral reconstruction policy in the South that aimed to destroy aristocratic hegemony by educating the poor in order to incite a revolt.[11] Ash raise an interesting point that had the war continued, the bonds of deference and paternalism may have completely been severed. In this sense, surrender at Appomattox actually saved the South’s old social order.[12] In fact, while other sects flared into rupture, women were the only ones “who fought to preserve the patriarchal system that subjugated and exalted them.”[13] However, no matter what the occupational zone or social sect of the South, the “white bond” overruled all other differences and motivational forces. In this regard, the South can in fact be simply categorized as “the South.”

1. When the Yankees Came, Stephen V. Ash; UNC Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 1995; p.196
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. p.51
4. Ibid. p.30
5. Ibid. pp.40-45
6. Ibid. p.76
7. Ibid. pp.50-53
8. Ibid. p.61-67
9. Ibid. p.52
10. Ibid. p.178
11. Ibid. pp.172-176
12. Ibid. p.193
13. Ibid. p.203

When the Yankees Came: The Intentional Destruction of the Foundations of Southern Culture and Society during Occupation

In Stephen V. Ash’s When the Yankees Came, the author describes the devolution of the traditional methods of life and social connections in the occupied South. The recurrent themes for Ash are the destruction of community, the devastation of traditional southern social relationships, and the defeat of paternalism. All three of these themes are inseparable from one another, and to extract one from the overall conglomeration would be to subtract a major premise of life in the South. These themes personify life for those outside the more widely studied military conflict and describe existence for those whom the war affected most dreadfully, and outline the broader sense of the loss of defense that the communal southern culture provided.

  The destruction of community in the throes of Federal occupation signaled a death knell for southern culture. “Families and communities,” Ash writes, “were…battered.” The most basic institutions of southern existence, such as the intercommunal sharing of food and other resources, were destroyed by the Yankee occupation. “Armed forces, Ash says, “threatened the sanctity of the home,” the base concept of Republicanism and of essential southern existence. After the “rosewater period,” or the era before the Federal war aims were revolutionarily altered, the procurement of civilian resources for Federal use reduced the community to essential beggary. Federal occupation forces, Rebel cavalry and guerrillas, and simple bandits swarmed across Southern communities as the plague of locusts in Exodus. While Sherman’s army in the “March to the Sea” garners the most attention, it was the rule of life across the occupied South for the Federal armies and garrisons. Life for those in the occupied South became increasingly individualized as mere survival became more and more difficult.

 A second interesting dynamic in the occupied South was the differing spheres of life for the southerner. The waning influence the Federals possessed over southerners the further one traveled from a garrisoned town is no surprise in itself. But the most interesting fact about the devolution of Federal influence outside the garrisoned towns, in no-man’s-land and on the Confederate frontier was how southerners themselves destroyed their communal existence. Rural homesteaders were plundered by bandits, who were occasionally prominent and respectable local citizens as much as they were stripped clean by the Federal armies. The lawlessness of these areas creates an interesting idea on the basis that the Federal occupation forces were not the only fearsome band in the occupied southern countryside- the communal existence, the common trust was being betrayed by southerners themselves.

Traditional methods of communal defense were also bypassed by Federal occupation. The devolution of the areas immediately outside direct Federal rule, what Ash terms the “Confederate frontier” and “no-man’s-land,” into banditry and guerrillaism exemplified the increasingly desperate life of the southern individual. Banditry was driven by a sense of revenge and desperation, inspired by starvation and revenge as well as mere greed and lust. Southern women fared the worst as a result of the appearance of banditry, both by southern deserters and their cohorts as well as Federal provision raiders. The defense that southern culture provided southern women was bypassed by the destruction of the sense of community, and the psychological strain to women was devastating. Fear of rape was the most terrifying. Guerrillaism was driven by a sense of dedication to the Confederate cause, yet also by a sense of defense of the community.

The destruction of traditional southern social relationships was another major alteration due to the presence of Federal occupying forces. The foundation of the southern communal existence was founded on defense: defense of women, defense against starvation, defense of one’s neighbor and kin, and defense against slave uprisings. The Yankee occupation rendered these defense mechanisms obsolete by making the communal relationships that tended it powerless. The aristocracy, which provided paternal sustenance in times of need for the huge population of yeoman-farmers and poor whites, was initially the primary target for Federal forage squads. As the war continued, the forage squads also raided the lower classes of white southerners, and with the presence of two reduced classes of whites, traditional intercommunal southern social relationships collapsed. The aristocracy could no longer provide for the yeomen and poor whites, and these lower classes began to lose their zeal for “quell[ing] the popular unrest and…bolster[ing] the moral authority of the aristocracy.” By reducing the aristocracy to beggary, as the Yankee occupation accomplished, social status and hierarchical relationships in the South had ceased to exist.
The intentional reduction of the prowess of the aristocracy defeated the foundation of southern culture: paternalism. Paternalism ensured racial superiority complexes would continue to exist and to function by providing for the lower classes of southern whites in times of need. “The sign of quondam plutocrats,” Ash writes, “lining up for Yankee handouts alongside the wretched rabble was no doubt shocking to many people in the occupied South.” Aristocrats had now been lowered to the status of poor whites, struggling to survive in the cruel world of occupation every bit as much as the yeomen and other poor whites.

The defeat of paternalism also threatened to devolve racial relationships. As occupation forces increasingly reduced the white power base in the South, the subjugation of blacks so carefully constructed by slaveholders came under fire. Ash supports Berlin’s argument that the slaves in essence freed themselves by claiming that the destruction of slavery in the South was in fact due to the combined forces of Union troops and the slaves themselves. With the occupation forces thwarting paternalism, slaves began to escape to the army lines, and began a process of armed resistance to the “peculiar institution.”

Southern whites detested the new black liberties allowed by the Union troops. The southern whites, so used to deference and respect in racial relationships, now faced “insolence” and “degradation.” The whites began to fear uprising, in the mold of the Haitian uprisings of the early nineteenth century. Most of the southern white fear was due to stereotypical descriptions of slaves. “It is a well known fact that one bad negro will corrupt many [good ones],” describes the attitude of the former paternal whites. It was feared by the whole of southern society that an isolated incident would inspire rampant racial violence, violence that mercifully never emerged.

The lives of southerners in the midst of Federal occupation were incredibly difficult. The foundational institutions of southern culture and society were undermined de facto by mere Yankee presence, and Federal governance eroded southern society and culture de jure. The methods of defense had been destroyed by the advent of hostilities, as southern men enlisted or were conscripted for the Confederate cause. The traditional role of women in southern life was the antithesis of the role they were forced to assume under occupation, and the transgenderation of southern society and culture was a step taken out of necessity. By the end of omnipresent Federal occupation in 1865, southern society and culture had been irrevocably altered, never to return to its former self.

The battle at Perryville is not popularly remembered as an important part of the Civil War. If the reporters and photographers had not been in the East, perhaps the battle would have received more recognition. The Cincinatti Gazette wrote a lenghty piece that focused on the local issues. They described their hometown boys McCook and Gilbert as showing no cowardice on the battlefield. Many irrelivant details are also included in this account, which made it drag on. I guess that just proves the point that something is not that interesting if it has no bearing on you. Watkins seemed to have a respect for Generals, but visibly preferred privates in the army. He admired them because they risk their lives in battle, while the General only risks his reputation. Keegan, as we said, did read like a philosophy book. The part that jumped at me was when he said most armies are not physically defeated, but the side that loses its nerve first usually goes down. Maintaing composure would have been a huge part of the Civil War, because there were so many battles in which the side that stayed on the field after the battle was the victor.

Emancipation was a concept in America that brought out several different opinions among people. Like Derick said earlier, it made the South think Lincoln had weakened and they were winning the fight. The thought of slaves becomong free was a terrifying idea to southern slaveholders. For fear of vicious uprisings like those in Haiti, the Southern men did not want slaves to be emancipated. As we talked about in class, Lincoln was being portrayed as a duplicitist. The war had always been about bringing the Union back together until now. Now it seems as if freeing the slaves had been Lincoln's intention all along. The old argument of what the war was being fought for is answered in the proclamation. Yes, preserving the Union was a major factor in the Civil War, but I believe freeing the slaves was always the issue that was in the back of many minds. I agree with whoever in class compared it to the issue in Iraq today. We went to seize nuclear weapons, but now we are liberating Iraq. You really don't ever know what or why someone does something.

I agree with everyone else with regards to Perryville and its absence from our collective memory. Simpson offers us a rather inexhaustive account of the campaign with the rapid flurry of detail about the number of men, the actions of the various commanding officers, and General Bragg's scheme to inaugurate a Confederate governor within hearing range of United State cannon. So we turn to other sources, most interestingly this participant's account by Sam Watkins. I find this to be one of the most compelling arguments against the romanticized battle accounts we have looked at thus far. Unlike the newspaper reporters and movie directors, Watkins offers us similar romanticism: "It was a life to life and death to death grapple. The Sun was poised above us, a great red ball, sinking slowly in the west" and again "The mantle of night fell upon the scene" (pg. 2, paragraph 2) It is very interesting that a participant would offer such an account from within the midst of battle. I also found his statement "Now, if you wish, kind reader, to find out how many were killed and wounded, I refer you to the histories" (pg 2, par. 4) What does he think he is doing? Was this not considered a valid entry into the canon of Civil War histories? Is it a valid entry in the Civil War history?

     Like Derrick, I was surprised at Lincoln’s justification of compensated emancipation in terms of the difference emancipation would cost in relation to the daily costs of the Civil War. To Cronkling, he claims compensated emancipation would save the taxpayers from the “greater taxation” of saving the Union, but one is left wondering if this was Lincoln’s true feelings on why the North needed to push this compensated emancipation. Although earlier documentation (Lincoln/Douglas debates) proves that Lincoln had a belief in civil equality for black people, he never ventured into saying anything about altering slavery in states where it already existed because of the risk of political suicide. I think the risk of political consequences was just as large in 1863, so I feel like one can not get an accurate view on Lincoln’s feelings towards ending slavery, because each of his decisions were heavily influenced by politics.

     I also felt that the Southern newspaper reactions to the Emancipation Proclamation were quite humorous. It seems like they have quickly forgotten what a disaster Antietam turned out to be; not to mention the CSA’s ever increasing number of losses in the western theater. In fact, Lincoln had waited until some military victories to introduce this proclamation, in order to avoid these types of accusations of being desperate, coming from his political opponents. But then again, these newspapers had an agenda of keeping Confederate morale up, so I guess it is not too shocking to see these words being written in the South.

In response to Keegan, I liked the sentence on page 71, that said "When a soldier is . . .known to the men who are around him, he . . .has reason to fear losing the one thing he is likely to value more highly than life - his reputation as a man among other men." I believe this to be true for the most part of the male species in general, dogs, beta fish, lions just to name a few must protect there territory. During the 19th century and before the norm was "men brought home the bacon and a woman's place was in the kitchen" and before the war and even times afterwards if that situation was ever reversed it was a huge detriment to a man's pride. This statement is also exhibited in Letter's to Amanda, though it was decided today in class that MHF probably wouldn't have had that big of problem of letting Amanda run things for a while, he was definitely concerned with the fact that he might never be able to show his face in GA again if he ever ran away from battle and I know MHF wasn't the only man who thought like that.
As far as the Battle of Perryville goes, I agree with Scott as it being "forgotten" for I never much heard of it myself, Gettysburg yes, Antietam, yes, but Perryville, not that I recall. But anyway, I think that Sam Watkins' account was great. it wasn't all one sided, we got action, human emotions, other people and everything. And then his final paragraphs in which he clearly criticized leaders who weren't as competent as the privates he served with: "I know...many a private who would have made a good General. I know of many a General who was better fitted to be excused from detail and fights..." Now I don't know either personally, but from all the accounts that I've read for this class I can certainly see where Sam Watkins is coming from.

Berlin's "Who Freed the Slaves" was a i guess stimulating would be the word, piece for me to read, for the simple fact that I never actually sat down an dissected the Emanicpation Proclamation, seeing what it really said and who actually cause it. I've always known the Emancipation Proclamation to be the document that freed all the slaves, I hadn't really heard the subtleties that lied within it, such as the facts that it didn't really apply if the rebellious states rejoin the union before the certain date and it didn't include the slave state still in the Union. As Berlin says, "Lincoln's proclamation . . .freed not a single slave who was not already entitled to freedom . . .it aplied only to the slaves in territories then beyond the reach of Federal authority."(109) I always thought it was all Lincoln, I mean I knew there were rebellions among the slaves, but I had no idea that they were so persisent as to be the "prime movers of emancipation" (112), thereby influencing the soldiers who influenced the officers who continued to influence until it reached Lincoln who had the ultimate power to do something about slavery. It was also good to see Lincoln doing what was best for the country/people and not himself. He was "no friend of slavery"(116), but for the purpose of keeping unity (although it dissolved anyway), he chose not to interfere. However, while at the time Emancipation was a great thing for most people we soon see that it was just the beginning of problems. (nevertheless, looking back one can be glad it happened).

Emancipation

I am quite interested in the complexity of the debate within historical circles regarding Emancipation, particularly the role and influence of Lincoln's Jan. 1, '63 proclamation. I very much buy into Ira Berlin's middle ground approach. I thought when I first began the piece that I would end up coming down with McPherson and opposition to the "new orthodoxy." However, when this approach (would Berlin, after his explanation, be in the new orthodoxy?) is explained it is the positive middle ground to explain the complex political and social process of Emancipation. The evidence supports Berlin's view, though I would imagine more compelling evidence coming from narratives, letters, newspaper editorials preceding the debate, and reporting of the debate and the presence slaves in Union camps (the historical accounts of the bottom-up pressure exerted on this issue from within the United States Army).

Lincoln outlines his first ideas of compensated emancipation in Delaware to be payed for with federal funds. Also any child born to a mother who was a slave was to be an apprentice to that owner until the age 18 for girls and 21 for guys. THe question of money comes up and lincoln makes the argument that compensted emancipation is going to be cheaper than fighting the rest of the war. Southern newspapers saw Lincolns emancipation as again the yankees going against the constitution. Also you see the papers attacking the character of the yankees saying they "steal all they can get their hands on."

Keegan- The Face of Battle

Sorry, forgot to incorporate Keegan...I found most of Keegan's point valid in our context, especially his connection between national spirit and military success...this is an academic definition of morale's relationship to military result, and the two are easily connected with ultimate success. His disregard for Du Picq I also found interesting, as I found Du Picq to be incorrect in many of his assumptions. His assumptions that large masses of soldiers do not clash, and that the civilized soldier always defeats the barbarian history has proven to be wrong, even prior to Du Picq's writing. One needs to look no farther than Rome and the commonly held conception, politically correct or not, of the massive "barbarian invasions" to discredit Du Picq's theory. Keegan's ideas on the motivations for men to fight and die in the Civil War were also very valid. Keegan easily tapped into the mindset of the Civil War soldier, and sees that a soldier's base fear is not death, it is dishonor and fear itself. Men fight because of fear, but they do not run because their sense of honor and value tells them otherwise. Keegan also discredits the long-held sense that generals dictate victory, as historians as far back as Herodotus and Caesar have written of. Keegan's belief is that the individual soldiers fight the battle, and no amount of tactics or orders devised by the mind of generals can override the fever of soldiers in battle. This is an interesting assumption, and can be construed to support a romanticized view of war which has been subjugated to a sense of reality lately. Keegan presents many excellent observations about the true nature and manner of war from the point of view of the individual soldier.

A general's account of battle is very different than a privates. One's perception of the experience of battle can be dramatically altered depending on which depiction is observed. This appears to be Keegan's basic argument. I found this to be true first-hand after reading reports of the accounts of the battle at Perryville. General Bragg and General Buell's accounts have an all-business tone. A short synopsis of the events and results is given. In this case, both sides claim victory while acknowledging the large cost for it. However, there is a sense of the "reduction of soldiers as pawns" that Keegan speaks of. In his account, Sam Watkins just tells it like it is. Both sides claimed victory but both sides were whipped. As opposed to the Cincinnatie Gazette's account, Watkins does not really romance the experience by glorifying either side's bravery or valour. He does assert that the plight of the private deserves more recognition than that of most undeserving generals. This is a point of consideration that Keegan champions: war from the view point of the tedium, discomforts, and other factors that would effect the fears and actions of the common soldier; rather than from the view of general stratagies and tactics divised by leaders unaffected by their physical situation.

Perryville.

Perryville does indeed seem to be the "forgotten battle" of the Civil War. In the key border state of Kentucky, with a prominent slave population, Bragg's failure to consolidate Kentuckian support with all the potential political implications- Lincoln's birthplace, Davis' birthplace, and the home of prominent former senator Henry Clay- a CSA victory at Perryville would have had a massive public opinion effect, and may have refuted the northern advantage gained at Antietam. Both sides describe the battle's ferocity and blood in no uncertain terms. Watkins "does not remember a harder fight," and finds "both sides whipped" at the culmination of hostilities. Bragg's desperation was evident, and he followed a wanton aggression similar to that of Lee in the eastern theater. Perryville represents a huge opporunity lost for the Confederacy, with plummeting prospects for victory in the western theater and the draw that was beginning to emerge in the eastern theater. The CSA was becoming surrounded and cornered, and resigned to success only in the eastern theater of conflict. The Federals had gained control of the backbone of the Confederacy, and the western theater was ready to fall.

The Deleware proclamation sets forth Lincoln's original plans for emancipation, and, true to his word, he intended to let slavery be until the later date of 1893, in the case of Deleware, who had a miniscule amount of slaves used mostly for merchant ships and naval uses. This proclamation outlines the South's radicalism in the face of Lincoln's election and the symbolic demise of the Slave Power. One needs to look no farther than the Charleston Courier to see the fanaticism being spewed forth. The Courier called Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation a "lion without teeth," and an "exhibition of wickedness and desperation." The Richmond Whig called it an open invitation for the Federal armies to "steal all they can lay their hands on," and also portrayed the Emancipation Proclamation as "a last resort of a defeated, perplexed, and a desperate government."
One point of confusion, or perhaps hypocracy, for me was the 2nd Confiscation Act, which allowed Lincoln to use slaves in any way to supress the rebellion. To me, the broad interpretation allowed by the wording of this document ensures that the black man was to remain in a perpetual state of servitude under northern interests, at least until Lincoln was able to consolidate enough political fortitude to pass a more permanent proclamation against the southern economic interests.

Lincoln outlines his plan for emancipation and justifies it. To the New York Time's editor Raymond (who actually supported him) he explains that the cost of paying for the slaves would be less than the cost of war if contnued at its rate. This is a motivation that I had not realized before and found fascinating. Was it all about the money?He then uses this argument to address voters divided on the issue of fighting for the freedom of the slaves. He says they would not be paying taxes to free slaves, but actually supporting less expensive measures to preserve the Union. I feel he genuinely desires for the equality of all men, but in the interest of voter support he bases his actions on what will best bring about preservation of the Union, whether that would be to free one slave, all slaves,or no slaves.
Southern papers seem to think that this emancipation is a good sign for the South. To them it indicates an act of desparation from a defeated government. They believe it is robbery but are not surprised at the North's behavior, it confirms their ideas of Yankees as unlawful. President Davis finds officers under Butler guilty of capital crimes to be punished if captured with execution. He does distinguish between officers and regular soldiers, a consideration I did not expect him to make.

The Antietam presentation page is located at:

(http://history.furman.edu/~benson/civwar/show/cw7.htm)

In MHF’s letters to his wife it is easy to see what he views as important in his life. His constant struggles for good food, clothing, and the knowledge of what is going on at home dominates his letters. It was amazing to read how much he cared for a son that he hardly knew. Fitzpatrick wanted to know every single detail in Henry’s life, which I think is commendable. As Joe mentioned, MHF’s faith helped him carry on day after day. He even once said, “I shall have my name taken off the church book for it is a shame and disgrace to the cause of Christ for it to be there.” (39) He had such a respect for religion and kept his faith throughout all of his struggles. I imagine it would be pretty easy to give up on God after seeing and living the life of a soldier in combat.
 
Fitzpatrick was a man dedicated to his cause and if it meant killing his opposition, he did not back down. He wanted to see the war end peacefully, but served to his fullest until his death. Sickness kept him from many battles, but he always regretted not being able to fight along side his comrades. After being sick or injured Fitzpatrick would go back to his regiment with a lively disposition. He probably did a good job with keeping other people’s spirit’s high, along with his own. As other mentioned, he most likely was putting on a front in some letters about how well he was doing. He knew it would keep his wife happy and make her not worry about him so much, which he said many times at the end of his letters.
 
MHF talked about how he was in battle to serve his country on numerous occasions. He held his home in high respect and was ready to defend it. He stated that if he fell, he wanted to be remembered as a man serving his country to his utmost. This way no shame would be on his family either. He cared much for his family and it apparent by the number of letters he sends to many family members. Fitzpatrick would be greatly disappointed if he had not received any letters from home in some time. He emphasized he wanted long letters and was not happy with some short messages. It makes me wonder if his wife ever sent him a long letter, because he requested them so often.
 
This book was interesting because it was kind of like a reality TV show, except in literature.(I know some don’t like reality TV, but it intrigues me. This was more real too because it wasn’t set up, he just did it.) I wish some letters written to MHF were in the book to see some responses that he was receiving from his letters.

Edited by author 08-01-2003 02:17 AM
 Marion Hill Fitzpatrick’s Letters to Amanda gives readers the privilege of seeing the Civil War on a personal level. So often we think of the Civil War in terms of great leaders, major battles, and casualty numbers, but through Fitzpatrick’s writings we get a glimpse into the life of a small slave owner volunteer in the 42nd Georgia Infantry. To many, Fitzpatrick was just another name on the killed in action list, but I think his writings is a phenomenal reminder that each name on that list, both North and South, was a human being with a family and not just another name amongst the 600,000 dead. This man constantly worried about his wife, his infant son, his brothers, his mom, and even his friends serving with him and in other places. Add to that his constant worries about his own welfare (food, clothing, health, and God forbid he not have his tobacco), and we see the torment each of these men must have been going through during the war. Although I think all the posts tonight were exceptional, I think Derrick best captured the feelings that a reader takes from reading this book. The thoughts of “heroism”, “character”, and “means of escape” should certainly come to the minds of every reader, and I think it is hard to word it better than Derrick did. I also agree with Kim that these letters were “sugarcoated” for his wife. After each instant of telling his wife he was sick, he constantly said he was feeling better by the day, even though doctors constantly told him he needed more time for recovery.

 Joe, you beat to the punch tonight and we finally do agree on something. These letters at face value say a lot about M H Fitzpatrick, but I find it more interesting what these letters are saying about Amanda and the evolution of the Southern woman. I’m glad Joe brought up the patriarchal society of the South, because these letters give us great insight into their families. What does Fitzpatrick mention in just about all of his letters? He always talks of his food and his clothing. I think the reason for this stems from the patriarchal society of the South. The first things that comes to mind when one thinks of the role of a woman in such a society involves food and clothing. The woman’s job was to make sure her husband had good healthy meals, and always had adequate clothing (whether that be through buying/making new clothes for him or mending his old clothing). An example of his beliefs (and the South’s) of the role of the woman can be seen in his Sept. 10th, 1863 letter when he states, “like a true and heroic Southern woman, I suppose you are making my clothes.”1 A couple of lines later, he states, “I know it is a pleasure to you to fix my clothes for me.” Although some may argue it was necessary to write about these things because he was in need of them, I think there is a subconscious factor here. After all, was he really in desperate need of food and clothing? He rarely seemed to go hungry (even though the food often sucked) and always seemed to find a way to get shirts, shoes, etc. even if his wife did not send them. I usually am not a big fan of this aspect of social history, but I just could not help but notice this trend in his letters.

 Going back to the evolution of the Southern woman, Amanda was doing quite well for herself with her husband two states away. She was running the farm (with the help of some of course – i.e. Alexander), running his business, and doing her normal duties of the antebellum period. Although she was getting some money from her husband, it rarely came, and her husband wasn’t even paid during his last six months of service. Obviously, the money just wasn’t enough when you add in debts already owed before the war (i.e. the “buggy”). All the while, she was constantly sending her husband food, clothing, and even, on some occurrences, money. Even more impressive was that she did not feel the need to keep their slave on loan (well, they were paying for her), Lyddia, from Hill’s mother Nancy.3 I think Hill came to a realization during the war of his wife’s ability, and I wonder how many other Southerners came to the same conclusions. Hill states, “ if it weren’t for the patriotism and industry of the women the Southern Confederacy would soon come to nothing. Many a soldier can now realize the value of woman’s work that thought but little or nothing about it before the war commenced.”4 If I knew more about the post war Southern family, and judging by the words of Fitzpatrick, I would go as far as to say that the Civil War was a turning point in the Southern family to the more companion relationship between husband and wife that we see in the 21st century. This might be stretching this a little bit, but is it too bold to say that the Civil War might have actually been a good thing for the Southern woman?

 While Amanda was demonstrating her abilities outside the home, Hill was developing domestic skills normally attributed to woman’s work. Hill bragged about his cooking, and how well he could mend clothes now. He even was making a business out of it by making haversacks and doing other mending jobs for his fellow soldiers. He even joked about how he could open a mending business when the war was over. It almost seems like he wouldn’t want to be bragging about such abilities given the society he was from, but it seemed as if Hill was alright with being able to do domestic duties. I think this certainly demonstrates at least a minor change in feelings on the part of Hill, and I wonder if this was going on with other soldiers. I also agree with Joe that MH would have felt at least somewhat awkward returning home in regards to his role in the house.

 Although I didn’t want to spend so much time on this subject, I just felt like that was the main aspect of the book that stuck out to me. I’ll quickly list some other things I found interesting. Did anyone notice the book Fitzgerald was reading in 1863? It was Calvin Colton’s The Life and Times of Henry Clay. How ironic is this? Here Fitzgerald was reading a book about a Kentuckian who never really sided with the slave states over the free states in political debates (compromising position), and more importantly was a huge influence on the political feelings of Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln himself was a Clay Whig in his early political career. I found it interesting that Hill would be having a “fine time”105 reading a book about Henry Clay. Also, I found it interesting the capitalistic trade going on within the Confederate camps. One never thinks about soldiers selling goods or trading with other soldiers, because it seems like they wouldn’t have to considering our modern perceptions of the logistics of armies. However, I think it shows what a desperate situation they were in that they had to value what was most important to them, and either trade, sell, or leave behind whatever wasn’t.

 In closing, I would just like to remark on the death of Fitzgerald. It came as a shock to me, because the war was coming so close to an end. I should have picked up on this from the picture of his family, with him being absent, in the front of the book, but I really was hoping he was finally going to get to go home. It was pretty sad he only got to see his son a couple of times, and never got to see his unborn daughter. However, I guess he got his wish of his bones bleaching the Virginia countryside instead of being a loser in the war.




1. Jeffery C. Lowe and Sam Hodges, "Letters to Amanda," (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1999), 85.

2. Ibid, 85.

3. Ibid, 111.

4. Ibid, 62.

5. Ibid, 105.

In Letters to Amanda, one is immediately struck by the great age of the writer. Though they are not advanced in years, Marion Hill Fitzpatrick speaks to his wife as if he has borne the burdens of a person twice his age. Adding to how striking that is, is that his “wisdom” beyond his years does not come from the war but is present from the very beginning of his letters. Fitzpatrick is also quite patronizing to his wife and this perhaps helps to explain the false optimism present in his letters, which others have mentioned. It is plausible that he thought the true terror of the war and squalid conditions in which he lived would be unbearable for a woman and such a disclosure should not be given her. Furthermore, his rather distant age from Amanda might explain this patronization in his concerns about debt and the farm and his attempt to manage and be involved in these home decisions as an example on page 14 he says: “Be kind, Amanda, and obliging to all. I find that one kind word or deed will often accomplish great things, by so acting you will never lack for friends.” He sounds quite fatherly. It would be interesting to discuss the re-acclimation of Civil War soldiers into the household, especially the patriarchal household following the war. Had MHF made it home, the home Amanda had run for several years without his help, it seems that he might have had a hard time adjusting or fitting in. It is also amazing to me the way just living occupied so much of the soldier’s time, thought, and energy even up until the last days of war. On pg. 188 in December 1864, Fitzpatrick speaks of the papers and the warm, pleasant weather. You don’t get the feeling he is doing this simply to keep up appearances with Amanda, but he seems to be genuinely interested in those things even until his 100th letter. Though a soldier he remains throughout a young, interested, loving friend, father, and husband.

Kim and Derick spoke of MHF’s abiding cheerfulness throughout his correspondence (with a possible notable exception of letter 97) and I agree very much that his cheerfulness and optimism are exceptional considering the conditions in which he must have lived the last 3 or so years of his young life. I wish to attribute his cheerfulness to a deep faith, which I find present throughout. It is also characteristic of a different time and place. Death was a much greater reality to Marion and Amanda, to everyone in the 1860’s than it is to us. Perhaps because of his deep faith and constant awareness of death and death’s presence all around him, he learned to die well and evidently from William Fields’ letter he did just that. To simply deal with the great stress of living and of dying our ancestors were imbued with a faith that was simple and strong, a comfort for them in the dark and gloomy days of war and in the anxiety of daily life on a farm for a young, practically single woman. I find his constant benediction and request for prayer in his letters to be much more sincere than there constancy makes them seem. A blessing, at the close of a letter, takes on a greater depth and profound urgency when you may never write again. In this sense, MHF speaks for his generation. A generation fired up about fighting the Yankees or the rebels and then having to say goodbye, to constantly endure much suffering, witness unimaginable carnage, and to finally to give up your “noble boy” and beloved wife to the cause. This book shows us the human toil that war takes on the soldier. What must be endured for God and country. When reading these letters I sense great resonance with the World War I English poets who immortalized the tragedy of that war with their first hand accounts. The great tragedy of the Civil War is cheerfully accounted for here in Fitzpatrick’s letters, in his life, and in the broken people he had to leave behind.

Letters to Amanda: Existence of the Individual and Community in the Civil War

Letters to Amanda is a poignant description of the factual, everyday events in the life of a Confederate soldier. The letters describe the trials facing the Confederate soldiers- rampant disease, common food shortages, and the obvious trials of facing death everyday at the hands of Yankee rifles, and the allusions Marion Hill Fitzpatrick makes to the continuance of the Revolutionary Republican legacy at the hands of the Confederate government.

The omnipresence of disease was a reality of life for Fitzpatrick. Nearly every letter he writes, he is either seriously ill or recovering from illness. The prominent feature of all of Fitzpatrick’s letters is the presence of sickness- nearly every one of the letters has some mention of his current state of health. Living conditions in the Confederate camps were especially atrocious- Fitzpatrick writes of the presence of lice and bedbugs, not to mention the horrifying sanitary conditions for those men unlucky enough to get wounded. Surgeons had little comprehension of modern sanitation, and the common answer to combat infection was merely amputation. Based upon these conditions, a seriously wounded man had no real chance for full recovery, and this reality was a prominent realization in the minds of Confederate soldiers.

Another facet of Fitzpatrick’s’ letters that makes his correspondence especially relevant is the overarching sense of humanity pervading all of them. Fitzpatrick is, in many cases, the “Everyman” of the southern male. He is pulled in every direction due to his sense of southern chivalry and his sense of duty, in the Sir Walter Scott sense. The complexity of his loyalties show his humanity in the barest sense. He worries constantly about his wife and her adjustment to the gender reversal that the Civil War brought upon women. The tasks that were once devoted exclusively to men Amanda now found herself responsible for, and the responsibility Amanda accepted was one that Fitzpatrick was immensely proud of in his wife. Amanda’s self-sufficience was a trait that many of the belli women were forced to possess. Not only did Amanda have to handle the traditional tasks of a southern woman, but she also had to take over Fitzpatrick’s jobs and also support the war effort. Fitzpatrick constantly begs Amanda to help him with garments that the Confederate government was ill-equipped to distribute to its shoulders. His unconditional love for his “darling boy,” whom he had hardly ever seen, also pervade his letters. Fitzpatrick is devastated by missing Henry’s boyhood, but tempers his emotion by reminding himself of the duty he is serving for his country, a fact that he constantly reminds Amanda of. Every tiny nuance of Henry’s boyhood Fitzpatrick implores of Amanda to share with him, in the true sense of a devoted father. This is the humanity of the Civil War- the sacrifice of the family and the community- and Fitzpatrick’s letters outline this sacrifice beautifully.

A surprising inclusion in many of Fitzpatrick’s letters is the reference to the philosophical conflict represented in the Civil War. Fitzpatrick refers several times to the legacy of Republicanism discussed in class. Several times he also refers to his willingness to die for the cause of the Confederacy (in his context the Revolutionary legacy) and ultimately sacrifice would be his fate. Fitzpatrick writes, “There seems to be a general desprondency [sic], at this time throughout the Confederacy. I am truly sorry to see this and sometimes wish I could instill my feelings on this subject in every man, woman, and child in the Southern Confederacy.” Fitzpatrick’s dedication to the cause is unquestioned, and his passion for the cause is his primary motivation for his struggle. In fact, in continuing with the theme of the Revolutionary legacy, Fitzpatrick alludes to Thomas Paine, and his famous pamphlet “Common Sense.” This solidifies the idea of the southern conception of their inheritance of the Revolutionary legacy.

Another theme of the book is the interconnectedness of community and the individual in the context of the war. Fitzpatrick and Amanda’s correspondence is thick with news of relations involved in the conflict- Amanda and Fitzpatrick’s siblings, their Crawford County neighbors, the ability of the elder folk to survive without the presence of the chivalrous southern male. Fitzpatrick worries especially about his mother and her ability to withstand the rigors of war on the home front without his able help.

Fitzpatrick’s portrayal of the last year or so of the conflict is a vivid description of the difficulty of Confederate life under constant Federal attack. The siege of Petersburg and the dwindling supply of food and the increasing disease epidemics in camp is very accurate in describing the absolute horrific difficulty faced by the Confederate soldiers and southern civilians. The civilians have become so used to the destructive nature of war that Fitzpatrick writes of the Petersburg women not even hurrying their steps under heavy Federal shelling. The camaraderie of which Fitzpatrick writes is also indicative of a greater truth in the sense of military fraternity and brotherhood in the context of a common cause. But Fitzpatrick’s losses are so acute- in one failed offensive, most of his messmates and best friends throughout the war are captured or killed, such as Tip Hammock, Edd Jordan, and Jim Drew. This is only too common in the case of war, and the anguish Fitzpatrick must have felt losing his comrades-in-arms are only too common in war.

The difficulties of war are a primary description of the Fitzpatrick letters. The greatest sadness is the fact that after writing over one hundred letters to his wife expressing his love and devotion to his wife and son, Fitzpatrick was cut down three days before Lee’s merciful surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia. The sorrow inherent in his death is only too indicative of the struggle.

Finally, the complexity of the existence of the individual and community in relation to the Civil War is a theme explored deeply yet subtly by Fitzpatrick. Amanda’s difficulty with survival in the traditional role of a man speaks volumes of the gender reversal common in the role of the individual on the home front. Great individual strength was required for mere survival in Civil War on the home front, and can be easily defined by Amanda’s struggle in Crawford County to support herself, her son, and her family. The community complexity is primary based upon the devotion of the southern soldier. As Sherman begins his march through Georgia, Fitzpatrick writes of his worry for his homestead and is relieved when Sherman bypassed Crawford County. This worry represents a primal human sense of devotion to locality and individuals, culminating in devotion to multiple manifestations of individuality- otherwise known as community. The Southern individual existence, which Fitzpatrick fought and died to preserve, in effect was supplemented by the need of the southern communities to rally around each other to survive. Ironic this observation may be, but it is a reflection of the adjustment made by southerners in the face of military occupation and extreme difficulty.

Fitzpatrick’s letters speak of an individual account of the huge difficulties faced by the nation in the Civil War. They provide a description of the incredible tragedy evident in the life of Fitzpatrick. Fitzpatrick ultimately made the sacrifice for his cause, yet was never able to return to his wife and son or the community that he fought and died to defend. Fitzpatrick’s story resonates of common characteristics of Greek tragedy in a bloody American manifestation, and represents the overarching sense of humanity fought by armies of citizen-soldiers in conflict for preservation ironically ending in mutual death and destruction.

In the book “Letters to Amanda” the Civil War is described through a Confederate soldier named Marion Hill Fitzpatrick (MHF). This puts an entire different perspective on the war than what I am used to hearing from history books. The hardships were not all on the battle field but many came with day to day activities such as having enough clothes and food. MHF frequently writes home to tell his wife how he is doing. In these letters he is mainly concerned with his wife and his son. He sends the little money he has home and tries to remind his wife to pay off all debts. He also is very curious to see how is son is doing as he begins to walk and speak in his fathers absence. I find these letters home helped him forget about the troubles of war and it amazes me that despite going through hell on the battlefield he had the memory to remind his wife to pay off the debts. MHF describes in his letters the poor conditions of the hospitals and how often he became ill. This is very similar to Randall’s description how unsanitary conditions were during the Civil War.
 In many letters MHF writes about how “we have whipped the Yankees badly so far” (68). I find it ironic that in many of the letters the on going theme of beating the Yankees. MHF even goes on the state near the end of the book if Sherman meets up with Grant “we will whip him for sure” (203). I believe that he kept this optimism for fear of defeat and never wanting to fall under Yankee rule. MHF is a determined soldier and under no circumstances would he give up fighting. In one of his last letters he tells his wife “Yankees may kill me but they will never subjugate me” (194). He finds it difficult for people not to want to fight to defend their southern ways. Fitzpatrick had such pride in his regiment that his mortal wound occurred while he was hit with shrapnel while rushing to the top of a hill to replace the battle flag of the 45th Georgia regiment. Despite his modesty he deserved the badge of honor he received for gallantry and bravery in the battle of Chancellorsville.

Edited by author 07-31-2003 06:24 PM
     I completely agree with Derick's assessment of "Letters to Amanda". It was cheerful and optimistic. But I would really like to know if these were is true feelings, like I wish we weren't reading letters to his wife, but maybe to someone who he had no trouble disclosing the actual truth to. Because it seemed to me like he was sugarcoating the entire thing to spare his wife the horrors that he actually saw. And if in fact that was the case, it amazed me how he was able to keep that despondency out of his letters. I know that he doesn't let trouble bother him. He says in one of the letters,letter number 62 to be exact that he doesn't "take trouble to heart like some folks."(p.129) I think that's good and all but at some point seeing all the death has got to get to you at one point.

     However, if we go by his letters, Fitzpatrick never really saw anyone killed while at battle, for he wasn't at battle half the time himself. Whenever, a battle occured in which his regiment was actually a part of he was never there, in the hospital. Every time MHF gave an account on the number of death, the Federals were always on the losing side, having lost a significant number of men while the Confederates were barely affected. It was easy to see how much MHF love his wife and child and just family and friends altogether. And the pride that he held for them and himself would never let him do anything that would bring disgrace upon them which is why he never thought about deserting. As a matter of fact after his second furlough when his family tried to get him to stay because they heard things were not looking good for the Confederates it is said that he claimed, "I would rather for my bones to bleach in Old Virginia than to be called a deserter in Georgia" (p.198).
     
     The relationship between MHF and the Yankees appeared to have changed towards the end of the book. In the beginning, "we [could] see the DEVILS plain now" (11) or "it will be better to do without meat altogether than submit to yankee rule" (29). But by the end, "they [were] quite friendly with us . . .[and] We have traded with them some too" (158). MHF even traded his knife for another knife that had a crosshandle with U.S. on it and he sent it home to his son Henry for a present. Now I don't believe that when this war started he would have accepted anything from the U.S and given it too his son. Sure he picked the Federals' things off battlefields, but most of that was out of necessity.
     
     My final comment, was that I believe MHF lost his optimism for a sec on the 14th of Feb, 1865. For the one and only time in his letters MHF told his wife good-bye. It was a very sorrowful tone: "You have done all you could for me. I can never repay you, but God will bless you for it . . .I earnestly hope that we may yet meet again" (200). And then he said goodbye, when in every other letter he said, "May God bless you and Pray for me." It was like something happened that made him lose his bravo attitude of "we may expect hard times, but we must bear up under them with fortitude and be willing to suffer almost anything,to gain our liberty." (65) And MHF pretty much did.

Derick Henderson
6/31/03
Benson
Letters to Amanda, Lowe and Hughes


         The character consistently displayed in the conduct of Marion Hill Fitzpatrick could arguably define that of a hero. Amid the pain and suffering of the battlefield, Hill never puts his worries or concerns before those of his family and countrymen. The call of duty is always preeminent to personal concerns. For the majority of his military experience, Hill is scrambling for food, clothes, and good health; basic comforts ordinarily taken for granted. Instead of focusing on the miseries of hunger, disease, injury, and discomfort, he consistently focuses on the blessings he has received such as a good meal, a day of good health, and pleasant weather. If he could not fight, he spent his time helping the sick and wounded. When his wife, Amanda, consoled him or expressed sympathy for his plight, he would rebuke her graciously and remind her that many others were worse off. He instructs her that to be sad is a bad habit, and to always endure what comes “cheerfully.”
 
        Cheerful is exactly the word that comes to mind when reading Hill’s letters. This account of the Civil War could almost be an oxi-moron. It is the most sobering depiction of the realities of war delivered within the most cheerful context of war simultaneously. Certainly, one would venture to reason that this was to comfort his wife. However, his selflessness and compassion along with his positive attitude seem to be deeply rooted in his faith. He professes Christian values and gives glory to God, always giving thanks. His humility is also characteristic of a Godly man as he does not even perceive how extraordinary he is, and he actually criticizes himself for the slightest grumbling and not being thankful enough. Most of his writing is spent with concern for his family’s needs. Bombs could be exploding outside his tent and he would be comforting his wife about her knitting or helping her figure out how to pay the bills and feed and clothe their son.
 
        It becomes clear that Hill’s extensive writing is his means of escape. It takes him away from the field and returns him home to his family. He admits as much when he says he feels like he is actually talking to her and that writing home brings him his greatest joy. He lives for the replies, the hope of a letter gives him a reason to hold on for tomorrow. Over time, he becomes less and less tolerant of Amanda writing infrequently and more and more demanding of her content extensiveness. Perhaps, as the tide of the war turned, this is an indication of his feelings that he may never return home. However, one would never know this, Hill always remained cheerful and hopeful for peace, even in the face of Sherman and Grant, who he thought inferior to Lee.
 
        How could a man of such compassion so easily kill another? It is clear that he sold his soul to the popular Southern belief that Yankees must be endowed by the Devil and inherently evil. He could not imagine submitting to those “demons in human shape.”[1] This stereotype truly did rule the day as rumors of Yankee behaviors stood testimony to it, confirming their “false philanthropy.” Hill heard of Yanks taking slaves and not feeding them. It was said that Yanks would not “let” slaves call them masters and they just could not wait to return to their masters, reflecting the vie that slaves were better off and even preferred being slaves. As the war progresses, his opinion of Yankees reaches and all time low when he says, “I will believe the Negro in preference to the Yank.”[2] Obviously, the perception of Northerners as duplicitous and untrustworthy is alive and well. Hill claims that Yankees had to get drunk to fight and that “Penn cannot describe nor tongue tell the degradation and suffering of our people if we ever submit.”[3] His opinion of free Negroes seems to reflect that of the South’s. His only accounts of them are instances where they, in keeping with their wild nature, are cruel and disrespectful, as if to say the South was right all along. He never spoke negatively about anything until after attending Mason Lodge meetings, so one could suspect its influence on his attitude. For a man so committed to his duty, such an ending could not possibly seem more unjust than dying three days before surrender. Hill would have had it no other way.
  
1. Letters To Amanda, Lowe and Hodges; Mercer University Press, Macon, GA., 1999. (p.99)
2. Ibid. (p.165)
3. Ibid. (p.196)

I am in no way saying that Lincoln considered the war to be about slavery. However, I do believe that things happen for particular reasons and Lincoln's limited suspension of habeus corpus in certain regions was in the service of higher ideal. Whether he cared about that or not, I don't know, but I do not always believe that the intentions make a just action just. Quite frankly I don't care if it held weight in 1861, I would have probably fought against civil liberities violations had I been around, but I was arguing against your opinion from the vantage of a history class in 2003 in which we consider the meaning of particular events. I don't believe you asked us to assume the mindset of a Marylander of 1861 and so I assumed we were discussing the interpretations of Lincoln's actions as we see them. You see them as being unconstitutional and I see them as working together for a higher good, whether Lincoln cared for that higher good or not.

History has looked back on the governmental actions that I cited with great disdain. However, I believe the actions I cited should be juxtaposed with Lincoln's actions. Simply some actions are good and some actions are bad. I believe Lincoln's actions to be good and in the service of the Constitution and I believe the actions of other executives to enforce the other laws to be bad and not in the service of the Constitution. On a base level, this sorting seems to me to be one of the principle duties of historians and theorists. I think essentially this might be an issue of the spirit of the Law versus the rule of the Law.

Edited by author 07-31-2003 02:22 AM
 Like Scott, I was also thinking about the South’s self conceived “macho” feelings about themselves when I was reading today’s assignments. Lee was out manned, out supplied, and on unfamiliar grounds, yet he still “gambled” and mounted offensive campaigns in Pennsylvania and Maryland. It almost reminded me of those men in Gone with the Wind saying each one of them could “whip” twenty Yankees by themselves. I agree with Nolen that it seemed like Lee was almost in a fantasy world in believing that he could successfully mount attacks in the North. Alexander said himself, “60 percent of our chances for a great victory were lost by our continuing the aggressive” , and it seems with so many disadvantages for his army, Lee would have been conservative. Nolen suggests that Lee could have even threatened Washington instead of going to Antietam, and would have not suffered nearly the amount of losses. It all made me think about how overconfident the South was about its abilities, and I wonder how much that contributed to their defeat. Another great example was the Seven Days chapter we read. The South praised Lee for a win (granted not a great one), yet he still claimed that under “ordinary circumstances the Federal Army would have been destroyed”. It’s funny because the Federal Army didn’t have to be completely destroyed for a Southern victory – it simply had to be outlasted. This offensive strategy by Lee also made me think back on the successes of Fredericksburg. I don’t know how many of you have seen Gods and Generals, but if their interpretation of Fredericksburg was historically correct (which I don’t know if it is), the South demolished the North by simply defending and retreating. Granted, Burnside was not a very capable leader, but I wonder how many disasters like Fredericksburg the North would have undertaken. It seems like casualties and time would have effected Northern politics more than battles on their homeland. In fact, you would think that attacking the North would tick them off more and motivate them to fight harder. Regardless, I think it is really interesting how Lee has been praised as a military genius, but yet his “addiction” to the offensive seemed pretty stupid. Of course, hindsight is 20/20, but it still seems he should have seen the consequences of an attack on the North.

In response to Joe….

I’m not in disagreement with you in the fact that one can “legitimately argue that the South was in a gross violation of the "rule of law" through the existence of negro slavery by citing the Preamble to the Constitution”, but that is not what my posts have been about. I agree with you that the natural rule of law obviously shows that the South was in the wrong in the slavery issue. However, I was questioning the Constitutionality of the suspension of the writ of habeus corpus. You’re claiming that it was alright for Lincoln to suspend the law on the basis that he was choosing “transcendent and eternal laws of the universe” in freeing the slaves. The war was in no way was about freeing Southern slaves (at least on the Northern side), as evident by not only the Republican Party Platform, but also Northern sentiments in 1861, until January 1st, 1863 with the Emancipation Proclamation. And even then, slaves were only freed in the “rebelling” states. New Jersey had slaves until 1865 for goodness sakes. Thus, Lincoln did not suspend habeus corpus in this appeal to higher principles of freedom for slaves, as you said in your last post, because he suspended it in 1861. He suspended it to keep other states (mainly Maryland) from going along with secession. Now if you argued that it was his duty to do so because of Article IV, Section IV, then you might have an argument. But arguing for this appeal to the higher laws of the Creator in freeing slaves holds no weight in 1861.

Lastly, you cited some really good examples about the infringements of liberty during wartime. Was it right to imprison Japanese Americans during WWII? Is it right for the FBI to harass Muslims? NO! It’s not alright, and how has history looked back upon those actions? It’s hard to find people who thought imprisoning Japanese during WWII was a justifiable thing to do because we were at war in Europe and the Pacific. How come we look favorably upon Lincoln and not for those who infringed rights in 1942?

I very much agree with Kim's post regarding the selections of Lee that we read for tomorrow. My questions have to do with the decision making within the Confederate administration. It seems from Nolan's presentation that Lee was acting on militarily in ways that were opposed to Davis' professed "offensive-defensive" strategy. It makes one wonder who was truly the commander in chief and in what ways was Davis (if at all) exerting his authority as Chief Executive.

In response to Sam's post:

It seems that the recognition of slavery in the U.S. Constitution was in itself the initial violation of the natural law. To often we accept the Constitution as the end all of questions of just government and proper civic life and we do so without any regard to the fundamental reason the Creator has endowed the human race. Reasonably slavery was and is an egregious violation of the natural law. I think that I could legitimately argue that the South was in a gross violation of the "rule of law" through the existence of negro slavery by citing the Preamble to the Constitution, which reasonably has as much legal weight or more than the rules for apportionment and taxation in which slavery was recognized.

I do believe it to be legitimate for the executive to cut corners on the particular rule of law (the Constitution) in the defense of the higher principle of natural law and human freedom. I do believe that there are times of extreme gravity that require the sacrifice of a particular portion of the law for the return to the natural order (human freedom). Lincoln sacrificed the rule of law (whether he did so knowingly or not, with noble intentions or not, I don't know) in service to the transcendent and eternal laws of the universe. Ultimately history should not fault him for temporary suspensions of the rule of law in Maryland, etc. only Southern apologists will.

As for my statement regarding the normative infringement of liberty in wartime, I would point you to the LOYAL Americans (of Japanese descent) interred during World War II, the loyal Arab Americans who have been harassed by the FBI since September 11, and the loyal African-Americans who anguished under Jim Crow, just to name a few. I would direct you to David Cole's excellent article from the Dec. 2002 issue of The Boston Review (http://www.bostonreview.net/BR27.6/cole.nclk). Much of what I have expressed here I originally gleaned from him and he also goes into a interesting discussion of Dred Scott about half-way through the piece, in which you might be interested.

As we said in class today, a well established line of communication is crucial to any war. Even the title of chapter 19 in Thomas's book was "The Federal Army SHOULD have been destroyed." It was not destroyed because communication between Lee and his other leaders was not good. Lee was quite upset that he could not get his orders followed, as any general would have. Nolan added that Lee was always eager to attack or take the initiative. It's qualities like these that made Malvern Hill appear as murder. Lee should have waited for Jackson to arrive. As others have already pointed out, Lee knew he had no numerical advantage. I don't believe he thought the war would turn out the way it did, but he still ended up sacrificing many troops on that battlefield. I do agree with Derick that Lee was justified in sending the troops because if the original plan was carried out, the Confederate army would have been sitting pretty.

This is a post that was supposed to be yesterday, sorry. It seems that McClellan could have won the war a couple times, but chose not to. Even with urges from Lincoln and others, Little Mac never pursued his opposition with great force. He comes across as a coward and even worse, his enemies knew he was scared. Magruder marched his troops back and forth at Yorktown to scare McClellan into thinking he possessed more troops than he actually did. By not attacking, Mac allowed time for more Confederate troops to join Magruder. He even wrote his wife that Lincoln can come do it himself! I know Mac values his life and that of his troops, but c'mon, it's his job! Had he attacked, he could have serioulsy put a hurting on the Confederate army. Mac only ordered a partial pursuit after that. He had the chance to do some real damage to his enemy and didn't capitalize. Mac also should have pursued Lee after the Seven Days war, but let Lee get away. If he chases Lee's force, he potentially could have ended the war right there. Basically, McClellan threw away two great chances to seriously hurt the Confederates. I think this is a little bizarre, but his side won the war anyway, so I guess he knew what he was doing.

In response to all the reading for today or tomorrow whatever, it was interesting to see the different perceptions on Robert E. Lee. In Nolan's book, we saw how the admirers of Lee saw he aggressiveness as him having no other alternatives; while a critic in some respects of his claimed Lee to be addicted to the offensive strategy. And then there's Nolan. Nolan takes a kind of objective view, but he lends more towards disagreeing with Lee's admirer's as well as sticking up for Lee against the claim of offensivness being an addiction for him. Lee saw the problems, at time he calculated the risks, he continued to ask for more men, but not once did he back off. Nolan argues that if Lee had adopted a defensive strategy like the one in 1864 in 1862 and 1863 then the South probably would have fared a lot better. In the other book, Emory Thomas'"Robert E. Lee" in the part I read it seem to me like Thomas was all for the "no other alternative" theory.

In regards to the other reading America's Civil War, I just have two comments. 1: What was with the civilians bringing picnic baskets to the sidelines of the war like it might have been a reenactment or something? and 2: I liked how despite the war going on between the North and the South they still found ways and reasons to do business with the other. Granted it was business needed to keep the armied going the fact was they put differences aside even though it was only for their sole benefits. It reminded me of something Dr. Block said about nations always finding ways to agree to disagree when needed or no other option except war is available (or something to that effect). I know the "no other option except war" doesn't really apply to the Civil War seeing as how they are in a war already, but that's the gist of the message.

In response to Joe, there is no denying the fact the southern slaveholders were "grotesque" violators of human liberties, but the point of my post, in regards to habeus corpus, was the Constitutionality of the suspension. Obviously, we can look back now and say it probably was all the better, because it helped end slavery, but put yourself back in 1861. On the eve of the civil war, as horrible as it was, our Constitution recognized slavery as legitimate through the 3/5’s clause (Article 1 Section 2). Thus, your argument that the South had equal violations of the “rule of law”, using the abuse of the rights of slaves as your main reference, would not have held any weight in 1861… in either the South or the North. Sure, in hindsight, we know the South was violating the natural rights of slaves, but even the Republican Party was hesitant to mention race issues due to possible repercussions to the North’s willingness to fight. When a Northern politician spoke of the reestablishment of rule of law, I doubt there were many who felt that Southern violations included the natural rights of slaves. As you said yourself, Lincoln was just trying to preserve the Union, but in no way was he interested, at least publically, in bringing liberty to the slaves in 1861.

Also, Joe claimed that it was acceptable to “cut corners on the rule of law for the maintenance of a higher principle”. What exact higher principle of the Constitution was Lincoln maintaining in 1861? And once one has an answer to that, who gets to choose which principles of the Constitution are more important than others? If there is an executive who suspends law on his own judgement, then what is the point of even having laws written down? Like I said in my original post, Lincoln’s suspension of Habeus Corpus was not effecting anybody in the seceding states, so this was only being felt by citizens in states that were still loyal to the Union. Joe, you claim, “the infringement of both civil and human rights has long been normative in wartime America,” but this suspension even effected LOYAL Americans.

It is easy to by into the image of a daring, audacious general as one who will be a dominating successful general. Thomas seems to report his account of the Seven Days with significant stock in this idea. He presents the General's glorious campain as a successful one that did not accomplish complete annihilation of the enemy only because of poor communication and the shortcomings of subordinates such as Jackson. He mentions the tremendous losses rendered due to the campain as an after-thought. He admitts that Lee was a bit caught up in his visions of annihilation when he sent his men to be murdered on the last day, but he does so in a way that holds to the excuse that if everything had gone according to plan then they would have achieved complete victory. Does that warrant sending the men up Malvern Hill even after it was clear things had NOT gone according to plan?

Nolan says no. He asserts that a great military leader is not defined by his glorious audacity or offensive addiction (disguised by Lee's fans as courage, guts, and Scott Mcpherson's "macho southern male" stereotype), but rather his ability to apply his resources affectively to the task at hand. To Nolan, Lee simply overplayed his hand. The cards delt to him did not match up to the North's. Perhaps had he discarded and drawn a few new cards to build a hand, he would have had a chance. A defensive strategy would have at least provided a better shot at victory.

After reading Simpson I feel that Lee may have had such a sure assessment of McClellan's tendencies (tentative, hessitant) that he could not resist the aggressive strategy. He smelled a weakness and tried, again and again, to exploit it. He also thought his army's movement in the North would decrease North support for war and increase international support for the South. However, offense creats more casualties, irreplaceable to the South and replaceable to the North. His casualties ran away like inflation did in the South. The growing number inferiority he found himself in was not just due to natural consequence, it was accelerated by his offensive strategy.

Nolan gives a controversial interpretation of Lee that is not entirely without merit in his discredidation of Lee's overall "Grand Strategy" of attack. Nolan attributes, in effect, the failure of the Confederate cause to Lee's failure as a commander and Lee's incomprehension of the limits of his cause. Nolan harps on the numerical advantage the federals held over the CSA. Lee's wanton aggression lost men the Confederacy could not afford to replace, both in "field leadership" and merely operative soldiers. Lee, even in his early days as commander in the Seven Days' campaign, used his men recklessly, suffering nearly 20 percent casualties on some occasions. In Lee's major northern strategic offenses, which would culminate in Antietam and Gettysburg, Lee lost tens of thousands of men, and many of those who did not become casualties deserted. Desertion, despite the somewhat mythic devotion attached by many to the advocates of the Confederate cause, was rampant. The desertions may also figure to discount another Southern myth, that of the charasmatic and inspiring General Lee (not the Dodge Charger).

Lee also serves to solidify another Southern stereotype- that of the "macho" southern male. Lee's overall strategy for the war was one of rampant aggression in the face of what many would consider to be the CSA's best interests. However, it is apparent that Lee, a man of inarguable honor and integrity, did not plan to win or fight the war on a basis of an "offensive defense." Lee's plan was to destroy the Federal army, plain and simple. While admirable, the plan did not turn out to be the most well-concieved or most advocatable for the larger southern cause. At Gettysburg and Antietam, Nolan says that Lee attacked unnecessarily and eventually unsuccessfully. However, one must compare the leadership of both factions in the war to truly warrant Lee's aggression. Northern leadership had been indecisive, and strong, aggressive moves coordinated with well-organized divisions may have eradicated the federal army as early as First Manassas and perhaps at Fredericksburg. Lincoln would have been only too happy to possess an offensive-minded general such as Lee, but once again, the argument circles back to which strategy was in the best interest of which side. While Lee himself wrote "we only have to resist manfully," it is obvious that that was never his intention. Lee intended to win the war decisively by the utter destruction of the Federal army, never by waiting patiently behind earthworks and in trenches.

Nolan gives a controversial interpretation of Lee that is not entirely without merit in his discredidation of Lee's overall "Grand Strategy" of attack. Nolan attributes, in effect, the failure of the Confederate cause to Lee's failure as a commander and Lee's incomprehension of the limits of his cause. Nolan harps on the numerical advantage the federals held over the CSA. Lee's wanton aggression lost men the Confederacy could not afford to replace, both in "field leadership" and merely operative soldiers. Lee, even in his early days as commander in the Seven Days' campaign, used his men recklessly, suffering nearly 20 percent casualties on some occasions. In Lee's major n

Lee Considered and Robert E. Lee
Lee although a great military leader lost large amounts of troops in many of his battles. His theory of being on the offensive even when on the defensive did help him to win battles like the Seven Days campaign, however these tactics cost him valuable soldiers that were irreplaceable. Lee's final attack on Malvern Hill in the Seven Days Campaign show his demand for total annilation of McClellans army. This move to charge up the hill turned out to be a major mistake and defeat for Lee's army. Lee blames McClellans esacpe on his subordinates, mainly Jackson who showed up late. Lee had other major flaws that caused him to lose battles. His main flaw was his missmangement of his troops. His suicidal tatics at Malvern Hill cost him soilders he couldnt replace. Even when Lee was victorious he lost a greater percentage of troops then his enemy. Lee knew the Union army out numbered him and could replace troops something his army could not do yet he still had no resevations on the battlefeild.

Emory Thomas, Lee:

In chapter 19 of the Thomas book, Thomas gives his take on the Confederate strategy of the Seven Days' campaign. He quietly invalidates some of the ancient southern myths regarding the Civil War. To Thomas, in the Seven Days' strike Jackson was an indecisive, bumbling commander, not the lightning-quick, ruthless attacker that would become his reputation for the remainder of his life. Jackson's fatigue, Thomas implies, from the Shenandoah Valley campaign inhibited his judgement and he appears to have suffered from a reluctance to act on the Sabbath (Jackson being a devoutly religious man) and physical fatigue which was taking a toll on his mental capacity as an infantry commander. Lee's utmost trust at this time, after his restructuring of the Army of Northern Virginia, was in Longstreet.
But Thomas' most striking point in the selection is the theme of "missed opportunity" for the Confederate cause. In following the discussion of communication difficulties brought up in class today, Lee had an incredibly difficult time relaying orders to his commanders and subsequently getting them followed. When his orders were followed literally, conditions had changed (such as at Malvern's Hill) to the point where his orders were obselete, and as D.H. Hill stated, "murder." Lee's commanders did not act independently in the face of rapidly changing battlefield circumstances, and this doomed the Confederate campaign. The proverbial "fog of war" was firmly encamped all along the Confederate battle lines. Returning to the theme of missed opportunity, the Confederate cause in the Seven Days' campaign lost a prime opportunity to eradicate McClellan's Army of the Potomac. This was Lee's intention from the beginning, seeing the paradox involved in a long war. While a long war would aid the Confederate war aim of international recognition, it would also benefit the much larger industrial capacity of Lee's northern opponents. When Lee's chance to destroy what he knew was an opposing army under inferior leadership, in essence cornered against the James River in a potential chance of close proximity to render the Federal gunboats obselete, the Confederates were not able to press their advantage, and instead the Seven Days' campaign ended in a draw. The federal army escaped, but did not take Richmond; the Confederates failed to press a prime advantage and opportunity to destroy the federal force, yet retained control of the ground and forced a Union retreat.

I do want to speak to Sam's comments from yesterday regarding Lincoln's justification for force against the Southern states. Personally, I do not see the difference that is made in the scale of the Shay's Rebellion v. the larger scale rebellion of the Confederacy. Rebellion is rebellion and treason is treason regardless of the scale. It is understandable that the suspension of the Writ of Habeus Corpus is constitutionally questionable, however the infringement of both civil and human rights has long been normative in wartime America down to the present day, but these are justified as being in the interest of the United States and are thus left un-protested. Precisely the point of this whole thing is that it is the power and perogative of the executive to enforce the laws. This is the same thing articulated in the Freeport Doctrine. It seems unfortunate though, that in the cause of preserving the Constitution the first rights to be eliminated are those basic and fundamental liberties considered by the founders to divinely decreed. Sam also points out that "This seems like the ultimate paradox with Lincoln and the Union, because they claim to be waging war to protect the rule of law, yet they have no problems breaking laws that do not serve their purpose." Though this is technically true, we cannot lose sight of the reality of negro slavery in the South. Since the early 1600's Americans had violated the most sacred princples of human liberty through the peculiar institution. How can Southerner's legitimately cry out for their "liberties", when they themselves are among the most grotesque violators of human liberty in western civilization. My point is simply that all things in this time are relative to that particular violation and though Lincoln was technically a violator of the rule of law he ha d pledged the protect, the South which he was fighting and was crying out for "liberty" and "property" was engaged in the most sinister of fictions. The entire life of the slave owning South was a masquerade on the issue of liberty and law. Lincoln was only seeking to maintain the Union and the sacred principles on which it was founded. It is excusable that he would cut corners on the rule of law for the maintenance of a higher principle.

I am also interested and confused by the statements about Britian's recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent. How is the so? What is the legal definition here?

The issue over the Federal generals begs the question of who was running the war. With the War department in shambles by the departures of Scott and Cameron and the obvious incompentency of some the major players in field one wanders how much Lincoln really was in control and if the Confederacy or his political enemies ever sought to capitalize on these issues.

With the norths domination of the western theater and the mississippi river I find it ironic that the norht could not take Richmond. McClellans failure to follow out Lincolns orders to attack and led to Lees succesfulness in defending Richmond. McClellan did not attack on Richmond and waited for Lee to make the first move which he did with Stuarts raid. This raid also alerted Lee to McClellans vulnerability. Lee attacked Porters flank and drove them back. If Jackson had arrived on time to support this attack Lee's army could have wiped out the Army of the Potomac. McClellan was forced to retreat. Lee mad a critical error in chasing after McClellan afet he had already established the high ground. One soldier claimed "it was not war it was murder."

The 1861 and 1862 campaigns clarify the differences in leadership quality between the Federal army and the Confederate army. Political normalcy, "business as usual in Washington," debased the achievements of the only repeatedly successful Army general they possessed in the only theater of war that they had been successful in in U.S. Grant and the Western theater. Grant showed tactics that he would use throughout the war, especially in his willingness to sacrifice his men in the face of an enemy whose men were much less replaceable. Shiloh shows this tactic very well, but at Shiloh, Grant won an extremely important victory at an extremely high cost. Grant's use of the river "flotilla," as Simpson calls the odd Federal river fleet, precipitated a form of combat that would be manifested again in the precisely coordinated attacks of the German "blitzkrieg" of the 1930's and 1940's. In the Western theater, where the Union was able to press its unrivaled naval superiority, victories were won by even mildly capable leaders such as Halleck and Buell.
Contrastingly, the Federal military leadership in the East, as Derick pointed out in his post, was inadequate and apprehensive at best and idiotic and cowardly at worst. McClellan's primary desire seemed to be to flood Lincoln and the new Secretary of War Stanton with requests for additional troops, when the 100,000 well-trained, disciplined troops he possessed should have been more than enough to defeat a Confederate force by far numerically inferior, if used even marginally intelligently. McClellan's blunders were numerous: he was readily fooled by Magruder's "show of arms," JEB Stuart literally ran a circle around his army while losing only one man, and overestimating the Confederate force to roughly four times its actual strength. He also prostrated the Army of the Potomac for fear of one Confederate ironclad gunship. McClellan's numerous blunders only suceeded in blooding the Army of Northern Virginia and destroying a significant portion of his own force, and only by sheer luck was he able to avoid a cataclysmic defeat at the hands of the newly joined Lee and Jackson, who would become arguably the most capable commanders in the history of American armed conflict.
Where the southern cause was losing ground rapidly in the Western Theater, the events in Virginia were very promising for the Richmond government. The CSA had succeeded in arming a gunboat that struck fear into the populace of the federal capital, and managed to incapacitate four federal ships before withdrawing to the Monitor at Hampton Roads. This was a great victory for the CSA, yet ultimately one that it would be unable to follow up due to lack of sufficient resources and, after 1862, the lack of an adequate port facility. The North had effectively severed the economic lifeline of the South, the Mississippi River, save for one last Confederate stronghold at Vicksburg. Winfield Scott's blockade concept effectively held the South in an economic stranglehold, and one must question the wisdom of the CSA's attempt to subordinate the British textile interests to southern cotton production, in the face of new cotton cultivation in Egypt, France, and China. However, the Virginia occurances held a bright hope for the CSA war effort.
Jackson's Shenandoah Campaign and Lee's defense of the Yorktown Peninsula and the Seven Days' campaigns are definitive examples of what the Army of Northern Virginia would succeed in time and again throughout the war. Lee exploited an obvious lack in federal leadership and moved boldly and decisively in the the face of a numerically superior but poorly led foe. Lee's lesson at Malvern Hill would be one he would carry with him, and would re-emerge at Fredericksburg and Gettysburg. As political ineptness and military incapacitation pervaded the federal war effort, the southern cause was being furthered and elevated in the eastern theater.

For the first time in my life, I actually found the details of battle that I have had to read pretty interesting. I'm not sure if it was Simpson's account of them or it if was the fact that since Im reading "Letters to Amanda", a good book, at the same time in heighten my curiousity about what actually went on. Then again it could be the sarcasm Simpson used at times used talking about McClellan. My favorite part was on page 65 when he said "so much for sharing the dangers of battle" it was great, that sarcasm.
I agree with Derick. If the North had recognized McClellan's faults, such as him being "more anxious to attack the administration on paper that the Confederates in battle" p.66, then the war might have ended faster and in the North's favor.

I have a quick question for anyone who knows the answer, in the book America's Civil War, it says that Britain proclaimed neutrality in the conflict. Why did this declaration equal a recognization of the Confederacy as a belligerent? Why didn't it mean anything for the north, besides for them it was one step away from COnfederate independence

It amazes me that the North did not recognize McClellon's apprehensiveness as a major weakness. It was evidenced again and again by his inert tactics, unwillingness to be aggressive, and knack for looking for excuses. This cost them a great opportunity to end the war sooner when he would not take Richmond and almost was annialated in retriet from the persueing Lee who only lost because McClellon had the high ground. If they had had more decisive victories then, the South's civilian attitude may have never gotten so resolute in response to the Confederate governments measures to stay alive and the Union's reaction to them. This change in sentiment intensified the conflict and broadened the scope from the battlefield to "extermination, not of soldiers alone, that is the least part of it, but the people." One of the measures used by Jefferson Davis was martial law. This was within his rights under the circumstances as it was for Lincoln in 1861, Sam Wells.
  
Simpson seems to have a Northern bias in his historical depiction. I admit I am more used to hearing the praises of Lee for what he did accomplish by driving out McClellon than the shortcomings. McClellon's shortcomings are usually more criticized but Simpson acts as if he really was the great military leader the North was holding out for and simply never felt really good about anything. Grant's drinking problem has always seemed to be presented as common knowledge. Simpson argues it was questionable here-say, never proven, born from the rumors planted by unsatisfied superiors. I also found it ironic that the citizens of the North indirectly killed their hero "Unconditional Surrender" Grant with throat cancer.

Sorry this is late, I spent Monday night studying for the test. Lincoln and Davis's arguments are founded on opposite interpretations of the State's originally intended role in the formation of the nation after the Revolutionary War.
Lincoln insists that that it is the Union that created the states and the rights and independence of the states are within the context of the Union. "The States' status is in the Union." The states did not exist first. Lincoln is clearly confident that he is merely fighting a minority who uses coercive measures to win majority support. He is reaching out to the "plain people" and informing them that "secession" is sugar-coated terminology for rebellion.
Davis asserts that the Union was created by the States which are separate, sovereign entities from it. When the federal govn't fails at its given job to protect property rights, it must be cast off.
I feel the opposite sentiment that Sam feels. I cannot be convinced of Davis's justification of the Ft. Sumpter operation and sympathize with Lincoln. Davis seems to admittably been going on roomers of Northern preparations for a major campain and new they simply need to supply the fort with supplies for survival.

  The Trent Affair was an interesting point concerning international aid to the Confederacy. Wilkes happen to stop a crucial message from ever reaching Europe. He detained Mason and Slidell and prevented the two from meeting with London and Paris. Had the two men arrived in Europe, they might have been able to persuade the countries to provide military aid to the South. It might have lead to an alliance with Europe and a different outcome to the Civil War.
  It is also a good thing for the North that Britain did not send a naval force to America for messing with the Trent. Lincoln, knowing it was not a good time for a war with the British, apologized for Wilkes' actions. He also released Mason and Slidell upon request. It would have been interesting to see the outcome if the two diplomats made their way to Paris and London on their original journey. Lincoln dodged a major bullet with Europe and it proved to be quite excellent for the North's war effort. It's crazy that such a "small" incident might have prevented an international war.

Sorry, Ben. I didn't read your post before I posted, but I do agree that this Lincoln's speech made me think of Randall. I guess great minds (hopefully not the opposite) think alike.

 Maybe it is my Southern nature, but after reading Lincoln’s War address I was left with many questions about his justifications for armed conflict against the seceding states. The first aspect of the speech that really caught my eye was his explanation of the legality in the steps of his actions. He states that the raising of 75000 troops was legal, and one would think that the Commander and Chief has the constitutional right to do so. However, does that part of the Constitution apply to raise such a force against half of his own country? Sure, one might point to Shays Rebellion as a perfect example of predecessors doing the same, but those farmers in Massachusetts were on such a smaller scale. Personally, I don’t know what to think of this, but I do believe it all depends on the word “rebel”. If these states were in rebellion against the Union, then sure he has the right to raise troops. However, if they were considered secessionists, then it would seem he would not have the right to do so, because they would not be trying to dissolve the Union, but merely wanting to leave it.

 The next issue that raises skepticism is his justification of suspending habeus corpus. This seems like the ultimate paradox with Lincoln and the Union, because they claim to be waging war to protect the rule of law, yet they have no problems breaking laws that do not serve their purpose. His justification for breaking this law is simply that it is necessary to break some laws to preserve others. My main question to this would be who gets to choose which laws to keep and which to disregard? After all, he had no control of the seceding states anymore, so this law was imposed on citizens of states that were still in the Union. The only real “danger” to the union that Lincoln could control through this suspension would be opponents of force against the South in states like Maryland, Missouri, and even Delaware.

 I don’t want to keep rambling on because there is so many angles to take whether one believes Lincoln was justified or not, but I do find it interesting that Lincoln says he’s happy because “plain people understand and appreciate” his actions. Plain people are always the easiest to manipulate, but I’m sure the same manipulation was occurring in the South (as evident in Jefferson’s speech). That makes me think back to Randall, and his point that the war was caused by a minority and through propaganda became the section’s war. I’m starting to buy that argument more an more.

War Messages of Lincoln and Davis

Lincoln:
Interesting in Lincoln's address is his refusal to accept a measure of responsibility for the occurances at Fort Sumter. Lincoln blasts the former executive administration, calling some of the naval movements as protected under a "quasi armistice" formed by the Buchanan adminstration. Lincoln, in the broader scope of the events in Charleston harbor, also calls into question the southern secessionists' devotion to the legacy of "free government upon the earth." Lincoln, in all his political savvy, had construed the attack as completely the secessionists' doing, despite Washington's maritime attempy to resupply the fort. Despite the vast political, social, and economic predecents, in this address Lincoln forgoes the complexity of the conflict in order to construe the opening of hostilities as at the complete fault of the hotheaded southern secessionists.
A second interesting point of Lincoln's speech, however brief, is his insistence on alienating the state of Virginia. Doubtless, as Lincoln points out, Virginia had made serious steps towards joining the previously seceded southern states. However, with the inarguable economic and political leader of the southern states (the author does include South Carolina in this opinion), one would think that the President would take much more precaution with such a powerful entity immediatly south of the federal capital. Following with the point of Lincoln's alienation of Virginia, the call for 75,000 volunteers isolated the remainder of the wavering southern states. With what the staunchly-defensive state legislatures in the unseceded states, they were now faced with an armed invasion threat from the federal army. Faced with the options or arming or being invaded, the final step to ultimate secession had been taken by Lincoln, despite the image he attempts to paint throughout his speech.

However, Lincoln was acting as any executive would have done faced with the same situation. Faced with armed insurrection in his own country, under his own watch, one cannot blame Lincoln in the slightest for calling volunteers to preserve what he viewed as the legacy of Western civilized government, in continuing with the broad scope of events that the President himself delineated in the opening pages of his speech. Lincoln's statements are compatible with what we have seen in other writings- Randall, in particular- in his belief that the southern seceders have "drugg[ed] the public mind," forgone rationalism in favor of Randall's "fanaticism." To Lincoln, the seceders had violated the sacred stipulations of the Constitution that they themselves quoted and appealed to in defense of their actions. Lincoln spends much time, understandably, on the obvious issue of the legality of secession. Finally, Lincoln appeals to the sentiments that describe why so many, contemporary or no, view the Civil War as a romantic affair. "This is essentially a people's contest," Lincoln says, and he then appeals to the honor code necessary to military officers and servicemen. Lincoln concludes with a sense of fate, sealing his final two to three pages with the words that would describe what many thought of this conflict- honorable, "of the people, by the people, for the people," brave, and "manly."

Davis:
Davis' speech is a celebratory manifesto repeating the Confederacy's rationale for the dissolution of the Union. Davis appeals back to the Treaty of Paris of 1783, which specifically called on the States for the supreme power to conduct post-war diplomacy. One can see where the issue of "States' Rights," and all associated connontations, would readily enter into any defense of the Confederacy's actions, regardless of the total accuracy of such a claim. Davis, like dozens of politicians before him, construes the remainder of the Union as some fierce mythological beast terrorizing the honorable southern states. Only in this particular case, it was not the monster that terrified the southern secessionists as much as it was the foundation their society was based on: slavery and the threat of a massive uprising. Davis harps on the issue of slavery, lending to the claim that the Civil War in fact was based on the issue and all surrounding ramifications of the slavery debate.
Jefferson's depiction of the events surrounding the Sumter attack reiterates the southern code of honor associated even with warfare. To Davis, the northern garrison was given every chance to surrender honorably to what, ironically, the garrison would have considered a foundationally inhonorable cause. This incident is merely one more example of the incompatibility of the two factions, despite the fact that a common conception bound them, and also despite the fact that their codes of honor were inherently similar...Davis and Lincoln's calls denote the political manipulation of a factual event, to further each's political purpose, such is the nature of politics. What both fail to realize is that they are resonating the same chord- the the code of honor so important to both was breached by the other.

Lincoln
Lincolns war address claims that the union "exhausted" all measures of peace before forced into the war. Lincoln goes on to say that the majority of the people of the seceding states were corrupted by those who wished sucession. This goes back to the what was stated in "The Blundering Generation" by Randall that the war was caused by a small minority and regions and sections were dragged into the war.

Davis
Davis addresses the reasons for secession and why war is necessary to defend their liberties. He looks back at the Articles of Confederation where "each state retained its sovereignty and independence." Davis then goes on to claim the duplicity of the northerners who claim the national government is above the states not a "compact between states."

In “The Slave Power: the Free North and Southern Domination”, Leonard Richards argues from well-documented and extensive evidence that there was a conspiracy of slave-owning, Southern whites to dominate the Federal Government for their own interests from the days of the Constitution through the Civil War. Richards’ argument is tenuous and relies too much on the contemporary, first-hand, evidence that a slave power conspiracy was feared and working against the interests of Northerners. His argument also appears to be based on the presumption that slave owners were unduly seeking to influence government more than other politically active people of the day. Perhaps, it can be similarly argued, that all American politicians were engaged in various “conspiracies” to control the government and Southern, slave owners were simply more successful in what was (and remains) an essentially universal effort.
 In his opening chapter, Richards outlines the history of the “Slave Power Thesis” particularly dealing with the “knockout punch” delivered by the historian Chauncey S. Boucher.1 Boucher argued that “the Slave Power thesis reflected the larger dynamic of antebellum life, the ‘paranoid style’ that seemed to dominate political and social thinking.”2 What is most plausible is the position taken by Eric Foner in what is the middle ground between Richards’ argument and Boucher’s. Foner argues that though Boucher’s thesis is credible there must be at least something to the slave power conspiracy for it to warrant a place in the antebellum mind. The most plausible way that there could be something to the slave power conspiracy stems from the Constitutional Convention, the three-fifths compromise, and other pro-slavery concessions in the early Republic that institutionalized the dominance of the slave power in national politics.
 Richards rightly argues that the three-fifths compromise was a major factor in securing Southern domination of the Congress, the Presidency, and thus the Supreme Court in the early days of the Republic. The three-fifths compromise allowed Southerners to count slaves as three-fifths persons in determining population and thus Congressional apportionment. Most Northerners at the Constitutional Convention supported the “proslavery provisions in exchange for commercial concessions.” Only Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts regularly argued against the three-fifths clause. 3 The rules for Congressional apportionment also determined the number of votes each state would have in the Electoral College and thus the South was given more representation that its free population warranted. This institutionalized dominance was called out as the reason for the Northern loss of power in the election of 1800. Richards asserts that because Jefferson benefited from the “slave” seats in the Electoral College (while not winning New England) the slave power delivered the Presidency into the hands of Jefferson and the slave owning, Southern elite. It was a blow from which the New England Federalists would never recover.4 The three-fifths compromise and Jefferson’s election would serve as better proof of a slave power conspiracy if Richards included evidence of strident opposition from Northerners. However, because no such evidence is present in Richards’ argument (except the failed Ely Amendment) the idea that there was a “conspiracy” against Northern interests holds less weight. If indeed the convention compromises were a “conspiracy” it follows that there should be documentary evidence of Northern opposition to the compromises present in Richards. There was no conspiracy, rather there were compromises, which benefited the South greatly, but as Richards’ points out the North was not without its commercial benefits from the very beginning of the Republic.5
 In the later history of the 19th century Republic the rise of Northern “doughfaces”, or Northerners who voted with Southern interests, demonstrates the participation of Northerners in the “slave power.” Is this voting somehow more than simple political maneuvering for advantage and power on the behalf of Northerners? Richards clarifies the argument by indicting Van Burenites:

…the collapse of Jeffersonian Republicanism might lead to antislavery political parties. Such a development would not only send shock waves through the nation, it would destroy the working arrangement between the Van Burenites and the Virginia elite and would rend New York’s political fabric.6

Thus Van Buren (and his disciples) becomes a participant in the slave power conspiracy simply from conservative motivations to maintain his power and influence. Richards highlights certain cases where Northern politicians engaged the slave power block to maintain patronage positions. Maybe there is not a slave power conspiracy at all, rather a peculiar manifestation of the perennial power conspiracy universal to all governments.
 Richards fails his otherwise convincing argument in his frequent use of evidence from men who believed in the slave power conspiracy. By using this contemporary evidence which most certainly was used to make political hay in the North, Richards allows his argument to be diluted by the political propaganda of the 19th century. His use of this contemporary evidence: “the new party specifically attacked the ‘aggression of the slave power’”, suggests that he relies on the politicians of the day to provide his historical analysis. Just because he cites evidence of a widespread belief in a slave power conspiracy does not mean that such a conspiracy existed.7
 Perhaps a conspiracy can best be defined by those who are the object of the conspiracy. Who and what are the object of the conspiracy is not answered sufficiently by Richards. Yes, there was domination of white, Southern slave-owners over national government, but as Richards displays it was a conspiracy that heavily involved Northerners as well. Was it simply the nationwide conspiracy to continue to enslave blacks (of which both Northerners and Southerners were a party)? The conspiracy was one of white power led by the slave interests to control national politics. It was not simply a matter of northerners or southerners, slave-owners or not. If this is the case, and Richards’ evidence points in that direction, the slave power thesis (perhaps it should be appropriately renamed to reflect the diversity of its adherents) would greatly redefine culpability in American history and involve Northern politicians as minions in the so-called “slave power” conspiracy.

1 Leonard Richards, The Slave Power: the Free North and Southern Domination, 1780 1860 . (Baton Rouge: University Press, 2000) 17.
2 Richards 18
3 Richards 36
4 Richards 42
5 Richards 36
6 Richards 122
7 Richards 155

Works Consulted

 Gerteis, Louis. “The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860.” The Journal of Southern History 68.2 (August 2002): 683-684.

Looking back on David Hume’s A Treatise on Human Nature, it may be assumed that humans will always try to explain the unexplainable. It was true when Hume was alive, it is true now, and it was certainly true in the 1800s. The South had to have cooked up a little plot, what else could explain their constant victories?
 Leonard Richards proved with countless statistics, numerous facts and data that the Slave Power theory was correct, but was there a Slave Power conspiracy? Republicans such as William Seward and Abraham Lincoln thought there was. Seward claimed there to be a conspiracy in the Dred Scott case and Lincoln used conspiracy as his main point in his “House Divided” speech, but neither man was able to provide evidence of the alleged conspiracy.[1] The South (using this term just as a generalization, not meaning the entire southern part of the US) obtained several victories in heavily disputed issues that lend some credit to the theory of a conspiracy: the three-fifths rule, the Fugitive Slave Law, the Missouri Compromise, the Compromise of 1850, and the Dred Scott case. So while the South united on charge of “black Republicanism,” the North united of the Slave Power threat. There were three goals of this conspiracy according to Russell B. Nye, author of The Slave Power Conspiracy. The goals were: “to reopen the slave trade; to extend slavery throughout the entire nation . . .;and, . . .to make the free white man a virtual slave to a privileged aristocracy of Southern slaveholders and Northern capitalists.”[2] When looking at the events of the time, these goals were not far off the mark which is a reason why so many people believed this theory to be true. Proslavery southerners were relentless after 1850 in trying to get the slave trade going again. The Missouri Compromise of 1820 and the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 gave credence to the expansion of slavery goal. It was hard to obtain proof of the final aim, but it succeeded as a very useful propaganda tool.[3] These reasons and many more are why a number of antebellum northerners took the Republican claims to be true; they were based on truth. Many rumors begin using the bases of truth.
 In the Senate is where Slave Power is exhibited in its prime. To use Richards’ words, “controlling the Senate . . .was child’s play for southern leaders.”[4] Bills that made in through the House were rejected by the Senate if they did not favor the South. For example, the Wilmot Proviso after passing through the House twice, never became a law because it was voted down by the Senate. The reverse was also true. Bills that barely made it through the House, were passed much easier in the Senate: Jackson’s Indian Removal Act. Southerners for the most part were in charge of the Senate as well as the positions appointed by the president. Therefore it is easy to see how several government positions came to be occupied by southerners, even the extreme ones.[5] The South not only controlled the Senate and the presidential appointments, they were the main voice in the Supreme Court. According to Richards, out of the thirty-four Supreme Court appointments between the time of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln, nineteen of them were slave owners. The best evidence of southern dominated Supreme Court lies in the Dred Scott Case of 1857. Roger B. Taney, Jackson’s appointee to chief justice, declared that Congress could not stop the territorial expansion of slavery. Out of the five justices that voted with him, only one was not a slave owner.[6]
 But sometimes, parity in the Senate was not enough. In Richards’ proof of the existence of Slave Power, he shows that no matter how much control the southerners had they still needed a little more help. This help came in two ways. The first and probably the most influential was the three-fifths clause. The three-fifths clause caused a change of opinion for some: Rufus King favored the clause at first, but later began to prove the negative side of it. This clause caused the diminish in power of the Federalist party, which King was a member.[7] This clause caused John Taylor’s defeat in running for Speaker of the House. It caused James Tallmadge’s amendment to fall through and it effected many more for years. However, it’s main significance was its contribution to the Slave Power.[8] The three-fifths clause allowed the southerners to have once again a dominant voice, which really came in handy in the 1800 elections or the 1812 caucus.[9] The next help came from for the most part northern Democrats and northerners who voted with the South, also known as “doughfaces.” These doughfaces helped turn the Senate into a “bastion of southern strength,” frequently causing a “southern minority position in the House [to turn] into a majority . . .”[10]
 Because of the equality of power in the Senate, the three-fifths clause, and the splits in the North, one could see that the Slave Power did in fact exist, but was it a conspiracy? Professor Nye claims there to be a common conviction amidst the leaders in the South that there was nothing wrong with slavery and it should be “retained and extended.”[11] In addition, he adds that the conspiracy was “no doubt a natural alliance of common political and economic interests . . .”[12] Richards doesn’t specifically say. I just say that it was the Southerners using what was handed to them and what was already available to them to their advantage.


[1]Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination 1780-1860, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000) 7-11.
[2] Russell B. Nye, The Slave Power Conspiracy, 1830-1860, Science and Society 262-274 (Summer, 1946) http://medicolegal.tripod.com/analysesofabols.htm#nye
[3] Ibid.
[4] Richards, Slave Power, 88.
[5] Ibid., 91-93.
[6] Ibid., 94-96.
[7] Ibid., 40-41.
[8] Ibid., 80-81.
[9] Ibid., 68.
[10] Ibid., 82,107.
[11] Nye, The Slave Power Conspiracy
[12] Ibid.

 In his widely acclaimed work entitled The Slave Power, Leonard Richards gives a detailed account of the dominance of the federal government by Southern slave owners during the 19th Century. Surprisingly, Richards tracks this “slave power” theory all the way back to the Constitutional Convention and follows it thoroughly through the rise of Lincoln and the Republican Party, and, through scrupulous examination, easily convinces his reader that “slaveholders ruled the Republic.”1 However, there are some elements of his argument that should raise questions from an educated reader, and although it is obvious that these Southern slave holders had enormous influence on the national government, it is not reasonable to suggest that there was some form of a wide spread “slave power conspiracy” throughout the 19th century.

 The first aspect of Richards’s argument that one will notice as a reach is the relation he tries to establish between the “slave power” conspiracy of western expansion and the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. Richards claimed that Federalists saw the Louisiana Purchase as a “violation of the Constitution (that would destroy) forever the balance of power between the free states and the slave states.”2 Although he doesn’t come out directly and says he believes this was some sort of plan cooked up by Southern slave owners to expand slavery westward, he implies it indirectly through “the eyes of many New England Federalists.”3 He says Federalists felt that as many as eight slave states could be molded out of the new acquisition of land, and, because Thomas Jefferson was a Southern slaveholder, this must have been something organized by the pro-slave owner Jeffersonian administration. This assumption could not be farther from the truth. If he had more thoroughly studied Jefferson’s intentions for the land acquisition, he would have left this blurb out of his book. Thomas Jefferson, although a slave owner, was privately in favor of the eventual emancipation of slaves. He thought that, naturally, slavery would die out, and this belief is seen in numerous letters he wrote to friends and colleagues. Also, Jefferson was a big proponent of the importance of an independent yeoman farmer society, which was a widely accepted belief among the American forefathers, in order to have a true Republic. In order to have a true, non-corrupted voting population, every citizen needed to be self sufficient, and the only way to be fully free of any possible corruption was to maintain a self-sufficient farm. With a growing population, it was important to have available land in the future so everyone could have these independent homesteads. Thus, the Louisiana Purchase would solve that problem for generations. Although it was convenient for future slave expansion, it is far fetched to believe this was some form of a conspiracy considering the intentions and beliefs of Jefferson.

 Another discrepancy one would find in Leonard Richard’s The Slave Power is seen in his explanation of the southern dominance of the early Republican caucus. He argues that a “state like Georgia was entitled to more votes in the caucus than a heavily populated state like Massachusetts,”4 and this was just an example of Southern slave states dominating the predominant political party of the country. This argument of the slave states controlling government through the Republican caucus does not tie into his thesis. Naturally, the Republican caucus would give more electors for their party’s nomination to the states that voted more Republican, and the North, with states like Massachusetts, was dominated by the Federalists. This is not some form of conspiracy, but just the usual set up of caucuses in a two party system. True, the Southern states were more influential during the “formative years of the party’s development,”5 but most of the northern states were still allied with Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists. Thus, why should a state like New York be influential in deciding who runs on the Republican ticket? Richards says himself that “with the further decline of Federalism, northern Republicans finally were a match for their Southern colleagues,”6 and in this point in time they should have had equal or even more clout than their Southern brethren. After all, there was an even split in the Senate, and the North’s larger population gave them the edge in the House, so if there was any interest in curbing the “slave power” crowd why would the North not seize this opportunity of being united under one party? The South still held the presidency, and would do so for years to come, but if the North was to unify could they not have won the presidency instead of always settling for the vice presidency? It seems that any influence the South had on Northern politicians could have been curbed, but maybe the North was not as firm on their convictions, as seen with changing opinions coming with patronage, as their Southern counterparts. One cannot blame the South or accuse them of a slave conspiracy just because of this. It was simply the politics of the Republic, and can even be seen modern Republics.

 Lastly, one should question why Richards did not commit much of his time to explaining the Whig victory of the presidency, with their famous military candidate William Henry Harrison, in 1840. Such a victory in the midst of the Democratic Party’s dominance of American politics deserved more consideration than Richards gave to it. This Whig victory seriously undermines his thesis, because why would the “slave power” contingency of 1000, which had dominated American government since its inception, allow a candidate from another party to win the presidency? There was some Whig support in the South stemming from anti-Jackson feelings, but the Democratic Party was still the predominant party amongst slave owners. After all, the doughfaces were Democrats, and the Southern slave owners had Van Buren and all his disciples in their back pocket. Since they had all this power and influence over the necessary Northern politicians to dominate American government, why would they want to change anything? Also, this was a critical time for the slave states, because they were still looking to have Texas admitted as a slave state. Thus, this would be the worse time for a new party to take over the presidency and all the advantages of patronage it encompassed. Richards states, “when he (Van Buren) lost the presidency in 1840 the pro-Texas lobby’s influence was nil,”7 so the Southern slaveholders must have been pretty upset with the outcome of the election. The outcome of this election proves one of two things must have happened. Either the large number of voters that showed up on Election Day proved the North had enough votes to elect a man without the South’s approval, or the South must have split its votes between the Whigs and the Democrats. Either of these two possibilities is detrimental to Richard’s thesis, because either the South wasn’t unified or it didn’t matter because of the overwhelming population of the North. If the slave owners of the South were truly in power for eighty straight years, this would not have happened. Thus, he did not go into the meticulous detail he went into with every other major political event in the 19th Century.

 Although The Slave Power had these, as well as some other discrepancies, Leonard Richards did an excellent job at collecting and analyzing enormous amounts of information. However, because of those discrepancies, it is hard for a reader to buy completely into his argument. The “slave power” influence can be seen in the national government in the 19th Century, but not to the extent to which Richards would like his readers to believe.



 1. Richards, Leonard L., The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination 1780-1860, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 214.

 2. Richards, 43.

 3. Richards, 43.

 4. Richards, 61.

 5. Richards, 61.

 6. Richards, 69.

 7. Richards 142.

 In Richards’, The Slave Power, he explores the theory of how slavery played an integral role in politics during the years leading up to the Civil War. In many examples he shows how southerners controlled which proposals were sent through Congress. Slavery was not only an important tool to the labor force of the South, but also as a way to run the government. The South tried to gain more influence by extending the country’s boundaries to the West and making more slave states. In doing so, the government was faced with many difficult decisions that began to clearly divide the Union into feuding sides. Richards goes on to show the rise of the slave power and the eventual decline of Southern slaveholders’ influence over the nation.#
 Slaves were used as leverage for the South to get what it wanted passed in Congress and intimidate northern politicians to vote in favor of southern interests. Richards said, “They were motivated strictly by the desire for political power,” and some politicians did not actually care about the slavery issue (Richards, 77). He used that quote to define the underlying intentions of two New York congressmen. The slave power was nothing more than a way to gain influence in the government. Few people actually cared about what came of slaves until later. The main issue in the government was to see which side could gain the most power and the South used slaves to its full advantage.#
 The South had command of the government because the three-fifths clause gave it more votes in Congress than the free North. The North had many more free whites than the South, but the South had thousands of slaves that gave them more votes. A puzzling question was why the North cared so much about the votes the slaves accounted for? They argued that every man was equal, but when the South was running the government the issue proposed disagreements. If the slave population did not count, the North would have had the power in Congress. The southern states knew that and that was the reason slavery was being protected. Slaves were viewed as nothing more than livestock by the North and it was seen as unfair for them to count in the census.# Southerners were not as dumb as they sounded and knew keeping the three-fifths clause was their key to success in the Congress.
 Northern politicians were also a major factor for southern slaveholders controlling the government. They were the men of the North who voted with the South, who came to be described as doughfaces. These men were described as weak and timid men whose opinions could be easily molded in favor of southern politicians. Doughfaces often had strong ties to the South or President, who for a number of years was from Virginia.# The South prolonged its force on the government by using doughfaces to ensure a majority of votes in Congress. These men should have been voting with the North, but chose to try and gain political power instead.
 The South started to lose power as Irish Catholics came to the United States in the thousands. Most of them settled in the North and the white population started to grow ever higher. Whites were moving out of the South at the same time to pursue western lands and perhaps find a fortune in the California gold rush#. This was not good for the South because they were losing seats in Congress, while the North was rapidly gaining power. The growing population in the North led to the need for the South to acquire land from the Indians. They did this under Jackson with the Indian Removal Act.
 For fear of the slave power spreading into the West, anti-slavery petitions came pouring into Congress. Every meeting seemed to be focused around the slavery issue and a “gag rule” was put into place. This allowed the petitions to be set to the side for a certain committee to discuss.# The North saw the anti-slavery petitions as a step to ending the slave power of southern politicians. A sudden blow to the South’s domination was Calhoun’s secret letter justifying slavery to Texas. When the letter went public, a suspected conspiracy for slave power in the South was exposed. The doughfaces were placed in a difficult position regarding the Texas bill now. The South lost their northern support for the concern of northern politicians being linked to a slave power conspiracy.# The northern Republicans would no longer be a pawn to the Southern democrats anymore.
 When Lincoln was elected President, southern politicians knew the slave power that once controlled the Congress was finished. Many congressmen gave up and resigned from office, sensing the time of secession was near. The men that resigned can be held responsible for the ultimate death of a slave power government.# The South was running a slave power government for years and the North knew it. Just like politics today, many decisions during the 1780s-1850s were made by congressmen to increase their own political strength and not based on the progress of the country.

  The book Slave Power by Leonard Richard discusses the effects of the Slave Power theory leading up to the Civil War. The Slave Power theory was the idea that the slave owning south had the political power to run the government of America to ensure the continuation of slavery. This was possible due to the power and influence the south had in political offices including the presidency and congress. The three-fifths clause which made every five slaves equivalent to three free men in the south gave the south more seats in the Senate. Any bill that made it through the House that was not beneficial to southern leaders was very easily crushed by the Senate (p.88). Also many northern representatives would side with the south in return for appointments to public offices. Any northerner who sided with the south became known as a “doughface” as coined by John Randolph of Virginia. The Slave Power theory and the arguments that it caused is one of the many reasons for the outbreak of the Civil War.
  The Slave Power theory was drawn up by northerners who thought that the south had too much undeserved power. This is due to their unfair dominance in Congress because of the three-fifths compromise. The Free Soil party of the 1840s and early 1850s along with the Republicans in the late 1850s were both advocates of this theory. Governor Morris of New York was highly against the three-fifths compromise because all it did was give slave masters more representation in Congress and reward them for having more slaves (33). Also he claimed “the direct tax provision of the three-fifths compromise turned out to be almost meaningless, and accordingly all it did was give the slaves states more power.” (55). James Tallmadge Jr. also a supporter of the theory, wanted gradual emancipation of slaves in Missouri just like in New York, however this was shot down when fourteen northern representatives voted with the south (80). This amendment that Tallmadge proposed would have passed if it was not for the northern “doughfaces.” This outraged New York representative that not every New Yorker was in favor of this bill. “Doughfaces” and other southern supporters in the north was one of the main reasons the Slave Power theory was able to exist.
  People who believed the Slave Power theory did so because time and time again the southerners were able to win political decisions in their favor. The Missouri Compromise of 1820 which admitted Missouri into the union as a slave state and banned slavery north of 36 degrees 30 minutes latitude. This law passed with a ninety to eighty-seven majority. The Indian Removal Act of 1830 which removed the Indians from twenty-five million acres of land in the south only benefited the south. The bill passed by only five votes in the House. In 1836 southern leaders wanted to stop the anti slavery petitioning for fear of a slave uprising again northerners voted to a gag rule which banned antislavery petitions. In 1850 northerners voted with the south to tighten the law on the fugitive slave act and again in 1854 when the Kansas- Nebraska Act repealed the ban on slavery in northern part of the Louisiana territory. Without the help of the northern “doughfaces” many of these bills would not have made it through the House of Representatives. Why then did so many northerners vote for the south? They did so because of the north’s dependency on southern agriculture and because the southern leaders controlled the government and presidency. Voting with the south would help your political career and possibly get you elected into a public office.
  Southern leaders began to get more demanding and they began losing some of their important supporters in the north. Martin Van Buren a representative of New York supported the south in the Atherton gag which again banned the ability to petition antislavery propaganda. This was not enough for the south they wanted “the outright rejection of antislavery petitions.” (138). This was too much for the Van Burenites and this was the first time they failed to provide the south with the much needed northern “doughface” vote. Van Burenites decided it was in their best interest to distance themselves from the south and to promote their own congressional districts needs. Stephen Douglas of Illinois worked hard to get the Kansas-Nebraska Act passed in favor of the south. After this passed it lead to his party’s end, he refused to accept responsibility and blamed it on the rise of the anti-immigrant notion. (191) With the controversy over the legitimacy of the Lecompton’s convention in Kansas he turned against the southern states. Southern Senators spoke of him as a traitor. (206) When Buchanan came to office as president the south lost support in the north. Due to his actions of claiming the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional and opening up all territories to slavery.
  With the election of Lincoln in 1860 the south feared the abolishment of slavery. This also put an end to their Slave Power that they had controlled since the turn of the century and put a northern president in control of the south. Many southerners urged for secession. The Slave Power theory did allow the south to be very powerful early in the 19th century, but instead of trying to win back seats in Congress and possibly the presidency the south decided to secede. Secession however was the beginning of the end for the south and the start of the Civil War.

Derick Henderson
07/25/03
Benson
The Slave Power, Leonard L. Richards



 Democracy begs for disagreement and lusts after divisiveness. It is for these aspects that it exists and without them any form of government would function perfectly. In reality, men disagree and democracy provides a forum for them to try to advance their respective causes. To reach this end, one must achieve the support to obtain the influence necessary for their cause to be successful. In the antebellum era, the Southern slaveholders wielded that support and influence over government policy. In his book, The Slave Power, Leonard L. Richards discusses how Northern politicians regarded this “Slave Power” as and aggressive conspiracy aimed at ultimately destroying the rights and liberties that define a democratic nation. Understanding that the nature of politics in a democracy is the freedom to conspire for your interests, the “Slave Power” is not a conspiracy, but democracy functioning at full steam.
 The alleged conspiracy of the Southern slaveholders was only their attempt to maintain their way of life. They had a culture that provided for their economic wealth. Slavery supplied the muscle for its agricultural production and a control over society that gave Southerners a sense of stability. The South had a smaller white population than the North so the slaves not only provided economic strength, but also political strength under the Three-fifths Clause complimented by “Northern men with Southern principles,” doughfaces. (p. 85) Richards explains how the Three-fifths Clause and doughface support were instrumental in the Southern slaveholders’ successful efforts to expand their system westward and to defeat the North’s attempts to contain and eventually exterminate their culture. This was not a planned conspiracy to dominate, but their democratic right and obligation to themselves in action.
 The Southerners’ attempts to protect their interests or the Northerners’ thought-out scheme to portray the slaveholders as conspirators; which is truly the more pure conspiracy? By definition, the Northerners are guilty of their own accusations. They are doing nothing wrong, however, but are actually celebrating their democratic rights by attempting to raise the support necessary to catapult them into the same powerful position that the Southern slaveholders were holding. When Northerners looked south, they saw a system that looked out for its own interests and overwhelmed their own. They sought what the Southerners had, which was not a conspiracy, but the upper hand in a democratic system that simply boils down to getting the votes. The issue was not racism because that existed everywhere and still does. The issue was a democratic one, the desire to campaign their position from a subordinate level to one of influence over federal policy. Topics such as racism conveniently became useful as propaganda for Northerners to rally around. Richards points out that Northerners despised the slaves as much as the slaveholders and hated slavery for fear of the Negroes. Their opposition to it is not of a moral nature, but rather in the interests of political power. Ending slavery or preventing its growth would cripple the South’s political hegemony sending more votes in the Northern parties direction.
 Doughfaces were regarded as weak and “willing to be led about by those with stronger mind and will.” (p.85) Perhaps these men had more of a sense of democracy than anyone of the era. They saw that it was about differences among people and made compromises in order to be successful in the political arena. Doughface men did not look at the political scene from a sectional standpoint, but an opportunistic one. They received positions where they could be influential and promote their interests and those of their constituency. A railroad to the Pacific was important to Senator Douglas of Illinois and his methods earned him distinguished recognitions such as “the doughface of doughfaces” and a “traitor.”(p.206) Those Northerners who held this opinion, such as William Seward, Abraham Lincoln, and Charles Sumner, did so because they did not see a healthy democratic nation with tolerance for differing opinions, but a nation in danger of ruin because the opinions of those more powerful than they conflicted with their own. The doughfaces were successful until the gag demands of the South became so great that the Northern public became alarmed and began to unify around the anti-slavery cause that promised to save democracy from the “Slave Power.” This desire to silence the ideas that they felt provoked insurrection among the slaves is very similar to the desires of conservatives today to silence the ideas found in music, movies, and television that cause rebellious behavior among the youth. Given the tools of mass media we have today, the abolitionist propaganda may have been much more consequential. As the North unified under the emerging Republican Party’s banner, the Democratic Party that connected the North and South became divided and lost control of the Senate. Northern politicians were able to achieve power within the realm of the democratic system.
 Richards credits the dominating “Slave Power” conspiracy with manipulating Northern politicians and parties into their subjection by promising Presidential backing and federal patronage. This enabled them to always have a slaveholder in most of the vital government positions such as the Supreme Court. In effect, this is really no different then what a liberal or conservative President does while in office even today. Richards suggests that the Southerner’s greed for power became excessive, specifically, with the push for the gag rule. He asserts that this caused the North to become united under abolitionism, which ultimately spelled the end of the “Slave Power” domination and the secession of the South from the Union leading to civil war. However, if the South had continued to play within the boundaries of democracy they may have been able to regain power, as the North had. Greed for domination did not destroy them and the Union, but instead, their lack of faith in the system brought them to complete defeat.

Sumner
Edgefield, S.C. Advertiser (Democratic)
"Hit Him Again" titles this article in which its author praises the admirable actions of Brooks on the Senate floor, and challenges Southerners not to not put up with the insults of the North and "let the conflict come if it must."

Dred Scott
Charleston, S.C. Mercury (Democratic)
Almost like an "I told you so" claim from the author saying that Southern "secessionists" have been right for decades and the Supreme Court is finally catching up with them in realizing limits on slavery are unconstitutional.

John Brown
Springfield, IL State Register (Democratic)
A criticism of Republicans (ie Seward and Lincoln)"traitorous" acts in inciting such uprising among their "ruffian" followers with their claims of an "irrepressible conflict" existing in the United States. The author claims this is just a first in a long line of bloody acts of diisunion as long as traitors like Lincoln are out there preaching.

Richmond, Virginia Enquirer: 10 March 1857. The article celebrates the Dred Scott decision and the "rebuke of sectionalism," the "staggering of abolitionism," and the addition of another cornerstone of "our institutions."

Louisville, Kentucky Journal 16 March 1857
Louisille, KY Journal- (Dred Scott decision)- This article speaks of how the party platforms were destroyed by the decision, the Republicans because of their reliance on the decision in the presidential elections, and the Democrats because it comprimises the principle of popular sovereignty in the new territories.

Albany, New York Evening Journal 19 March 1857
Denounces the hold the South has had over the Supreme Court, with 5 of 9 judges raised on plantations and the poor representation of the judiciary, with the less-populated South's interests elevated above that of numerically superior popular democracy.

Sumner
Detroit, Michigan, Free Press [Democratic] (23 may 1856)
It was the most un-american and unpatriotic speech ever delivered in the senate. He did not deserve the assault on him though.

Dred Scott
Natchez, Miss. Courier [American] (14 March 1857)
It was a blow to squatter sovereignty, but not as strong a blow as they had wished.

John Brown
Charleston, SC, Mercury [Democratic] (18 Oct. 1859)
The town was in possession of insurgents and peace was promised in a swift manner.

Sumner
Milledgeville, Georgia, Federal Union [Democratic] (3 June 1856)
AND
Sumner
Buffalo, New York, Morning Express [Republican] (24 May 1856)
I couldn't decide between these two articles because I thought they were both exciting.

Dred Scott
Albany, New York, Evening Journal [Republican] (10 March 1857)
This decision shocked "the moral sense of the public."

John Brown
Richmond, Virgina, Enquirer [Democratic] (25 October 1859)
This editoral is calling to the people of the North, more specifically New York, to do something.

Sumner
Louisville, Kentucky Journal [American] 24 May 1856
This editorial calls for Mr. Brooks to be expelled from the senate after striking down Mr. Sumner over words that were said during a senate debate.

Dred Scot
Pittsburgh, PA Gazette [Republican] 7 May 1857
Claims that the decision of the Dred Scot causes be considered nullified. "It is not a law, and it has no binding force upon either the people or the government."

John Brown
Richmond, Va Whig [Opposition] 18 October 1859
States the John Brown raid was blown out of proportion and was not that big of deal however they are sending their whole volunteer Regiment to Harpers Ferry.

I think this satisfies the assignment for tomorrow:

Sumner
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Gazette [Republican] (24 May 1856)
This is a call to arms for Northern men to stand up to Southern aggression and “barbarism.” It asks the question of men seeking public office “Who will fight?”

Dred Scott
Richmond, Virginia, Enquirer [Democratic] (10 March 1857)
This editorial claims Dred Scott as a triumph over sectionalism and that the “assailants of the South and enemies of the Union” have been put in their place by the decision.

John Brown
Cincinnati, Ohio, Enquirer [Democratic] (19 October 59)
This editorial attacks John Brown and the abolitionists for attempting to plunge Virginia and Maryland into a war and it accuses the disciples Chase and Seward wishing to “deluge the land in blood to carry out their fanatical views”

      My name is Sam Wells, and I’m a senior Political Science/History major from Orangeburg, S.C.. In case you’ve never heard of it (which you probably haven’t), it’s a little town in between Columbia and Charleston that served as a pitstop for Sherman on his way to Columbia. Obviously, I’m not a big fan of Sherman, but I guess that is another argument for another time. Anyway, I’m taking this class to learn some more details about the civil war than the generic rundown you get in normal American history classes. That desire for a more intensive look into the conflict is already starting to be fulfilled by our readings today.

 I was pretty intrigued by the Fitzhugh article, although I do agree with some of you on this board on how it just seems like the common view of the South shared by slave owners. I thought it was interesting how he compared the socioeconomic environment of the North to the feudal barons of Europe, and goes as far to say that conditions were worse for laborers in the North. Obviously, Americans must have thought the feudal society of Europe had been awful, and that’s why Fitzhugh used it as a comparison. I find this ironic, however, because Southern society was about as close to feudalism as you get – with just the slaves replacing the serfs. Another thing that stood out to me (as others of you have already pointed out as well) was how he portrayed the North as dependant on Southern food (planted and harvested from the labor of slaves) because of their growing populations. In other classes, I’ve learned that the most densely populated slave areas in South, called the black belt, was where King Cotton ruled. Did Fitzhugh forget about the Midwest? He shouldn’t of because that is where the food for the growing cities was coming from (thus the large number of railroads between the section). Because of these and other reasons, I just couldn’t take this guy seriously because he sounded more like a cheerleader for the Southern slaveholder. The Preston Brooks speech (which happened to be the same year) was much more sound with his appeal to preserving the Constitution (which was signed by slaveowners who thought their “property” would be protected by government), nature (saying blacks needed the white man’s guidance – i.e. Jamaica), and the bashing of Free Soilers instead of the North in general. Although in modern times we would all disagree with everything Brooks said, put yourself back in the “mind of the time” (Randall) and you would see that he had some sound arguments.

 I was very impressed by J.G. Randall’s “Blundering Generation”, because I believe he was giving us a “real” glimpse into the Civil War rather than the “romanticized” B.S. we usually get to hear. I agree with my classmates in that I believe he is right on how the war just can’t be generalized and broken into nice clear causes and effects. Some of you have already covered this article really well, so I just will point out a couple things I haven’t seen posted. I found it interesting when this article was written – 1940. America still has World War I fresh in our minds, and Hitler was looking like more and more of a threat back in Europe. Randall states, “the going to war by an individual in the sixties was due less to any broad “cause” or motive than to the fact that war existed, so that fighting was the thing to do”. I think this relates well to where America was at during the time this was written. Was fighting in Europe again the thing to do, and should we just keep waiting for a nice clear reason to go? No, because it was a complex situation just like the War Between the States. I know this is way off the subject of this course, but I just found the similarities interesting. The same signs were going on before the Civil War as now with problems in Europe – “mass thinking, social solidification, and of politics”

My friends call me Derick Henderson. I am a junior currently majoring in history with aspirations of doubling in political science. I'm from Gainesville, Florida, home of the Florida Gators. I never missed a football game until my obligations to Furman pulled me up to Greenville. I love to play ball (any ball), surf, and snow ski. My sister is having a baby tomorrow, I'm an uncle.

As for our discussion in class today that seemed to never end, I enjoyed scratching under the surface of the Civil War and realizing there are many more aspects to it than slavery. It made me question whether the controversy over slavery from a morality standpoint arose first and spawned differences in other arenas such as economics and political power, or if the latter differences escalated first and the slavery issue was then used as a issue to rally around. In The Slave Power, Richards is makes the strong argument that the primary motivation for opposing slavery did not come from the warm places of the Northerners'hearts, but actually from the same selfish desire for more power that motivated the Southerners to support slavery. The idea that there was a conscious Southern conspiracy for power may have to grow on me, however, the South clearly saw the trend that the Three-fifths Clause was setting in their favor and attempted to maintain it. I have to aggree with Mr. McPherson on Fitzhugh's article. He does sound like the quintessential ranting proslavery Southerner preaching the it's-for-their-own-good gospel on slavery.

  My name is Chris Siler and I am a senior history major. I am from Greensboro, NC and have lived there my whole life. I enjoy sports, watching television, and listen to almost all kinds of music. It looks like the course will be challenging, but also interesting as we move along.
The Simpson introduction made me question my thoughts on the war. I thought I essentially knew what the Civil War about, but the intro. made me reevaluate my entire perception of the events at hand. It made me realize there is much more to learn about the topic, especially the main themes we discussed today. The Fitzhugh article tried to justify slavery and show it was a good thing. All the slaves had a home unlike some northerners, but they were not all happy. I agree with Ben that this view is from a biased southerner. The article goes on to further point out aspects that make the South sound like a great place, when in reality it had many flaws. I tried to access the Randall article from off-campus and could not figure out how to get JSTOR to work, so I have not yet read the article. (sorry)

My name is Joe Waters and I am a junior history major from Greenville. My other interests include music, politics, and theology. I decided to take this class to spoil my pre-conceived notions of the American Civil War, particularly in dealing with the “Lost Cause.”

I found the Fitzhugh article interesting for its criticism of the northern, industrial complex and its dependence upon the slaveholding South for its very existence. This fits in nicely with what I have read in the first part of The Slave Power and points to the consensus on this thesis that was held across sectional boundaries. Fitzhugh’s assertion that the Southern way of life is all “peace, quiet, plenty, and contentment” rings hollow because he seems to be addressing the way of life for that white, minority in control. Certainly human nature might tell us that where there is systematic oppression of a whole race it is accompanied by an underlying tension waiting to explode to the surface in the potential horrendous slave rebellion always feared by white Southerners (because of the Haitian example).

In “The Blundering Generation”, J.G. Randall calls us away from the romanticized, consensus view of Civil War history and directs us to “true” causes of conflict (of which there is a great plurality). From his treatment of the American mind in the Lincoln- era (pg. 16) I would disagree that his argument is Eurocentric, rather he makes a very American argument illustrated with the European examples which were perhaps more familiar to his audience. This continues in his treatment of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Quaker pacifism, and intra-American migration. In fact, his whole focus on the human experience, human fanaticism, etc. and his turning away from the “splendor of battle flags” and the political causes is perhaps a history for the individualistic, democratic America. It is a refutation of European style history and the creation of complex history that reflects the complexities of the American fabric.

My name is Ben Thornton; I am a junior history major from West River, Md. I am in the ROTC program here at Furman and I enjoy sports and outdoor activities. I am taking this class to gain more knowledge on the Civil War.
The Fitzhugh article states that the south was better off than the north and all of the slaves had a home unlike the north where poverty was rampant. Fitzhugh comments "the slaveholding south all is peace, quiet, plenty and contentment." I find that very ironic because many slaves were not content with being slaves. This point of view came from a white slave owner and is biased.
Randall gives facts on how bloody and unsanitary this war actually was, stating that possibly up to 2/3 of union deaths were due to poor medical conditions. He states that individuals could choose which side they wanted to fight for, however some picked sides not for their beliefs but for who they thought would win the war. He alluedes to the idea that this war did not start out as a region verse region war it started out with small minorities and they dragged their regions into war.

My name is Scott McPherson; I am a junior history/political science major from Conway, Arkansas. I like baseball and basically being outside, canoeing and such. I've always been interested in the Civil War for some reason, and being that as it is I figured this is a good class for me to be in.

My responses to the assignments on the web are as follows:

I thought Fitzhugh wrote about the nearly cliched rationale behind a Southerner's view of events right before the outbreak of hostilities. Slaveholders gave slaves room and board in return for their labor, therefor ensuring that the influx of poor migrant laborers that was beginning to manifest itself in the major Northern cities due to the new industrial factory economy did not occur in the South. Fitzhugh also claims the North was dependent on the South's agrarian economy for basic needs, and "the North would die if commercial contact with the South is severed." Fitzhugh also claims the South is exempt from the social ills affecting the North, once again due to the industrial economy.

Randall provided a more philosophical account of the Civil War, apparently from a Eurocentric perspective, in which he discredits the idea that the Civil War was the last Romantic War fought with gallantry, chivalry, and honor, and instead tells of the overlooked horrors of the conflict, mainly the disease epidemics caused by poor medical techniques and sanitation. He also harps on the multifaceted causes of the conflict, showing how no single factor can possibly be construed as the primary cause. His emphasis on "fanaticism" I thought was a very intriguing argument, and I am inclined to agree with him on the basis that more rational, compromising minds may have averted the crisis.

My name is Kim Lawrence. Im a senior history major from Atlanta, Ga. A quick guide to my hobbies: I like to read, write (sometimes), shop, watch TV or movies, hangout with my, but my all time favorite thing to do is play sports, mainly basketball.
I'm interested in all kinds of things, but am sadden to say that I know nothing about the Civil War except the fact that it was fought between the north and the south. The north didn't want slavery, the south did. Now I know that this generalization doesn't even began to cover the Civil War, not to mention that in part it's wrong because not all of the north nor all of the south was for the same thing. I also learned a few things in HST 21, but the civil war wasn't the main focus. That's why I know that this class will be a good one for me to take. It is my hope that I will be able to give my input in in-class discussions as well as out of class on the Civil War when this term is over.
In reference to Simpson's introduction, I'm anxious to read his opinion's on the 5 key issues that Dr. Benson gave us. Simpson already answered the first issue of revolutionary change by making points from both sides of the arugment. I also found a similarity to Hume's "Myth of War" on page 3. In which he claims that the "lack of Confederate nationalism" probably wouldn't have been heard of if they had won, which in some respect parallels Hume's thought on they are only demons and evil-doers if they are on the opposite side. Sort of like a "we can do what we want, but they can't".

Welcome to the Summer 2003 Civil War Era Discussion Board