In response to Hunter’s post, Guelzo spends a lot of time detailing how arrogant McClellan was, but at the same time Guelzo only mentions how the other generals performed actions that were to benefit their own reputations and to glorify their names. True, McClellan was more arrogant as he commented on the president’s intelligence and insulted the government, but why didn’t Guelzo call what the other generals were? All the generals were arrogant, but just not to McClellan’s degree. I thought Guelzo missed an opportunity to make a parallel.

I would like to comment on what Eric wrote. I really think Grant's life is interesting too. For starters, the guy who got him into West Point got his name wrong! I just find that slightly amusing. Although, maybe I understood the reading wrong. It sounded to me like the congressman accidentally got his name wrong. Anyway, Grant's actions that led him to take the 2 forts was pretty amazing to me. It just seems like a fairy tale story.

I've really enjoyed reading the details of the tactics and people involved. I too found it surprising that McClellan called Lincoln an "idiot" and the people in the cabinet "geese". I also find it sad that we, as Americans, know so little about our Civil War. I certainly wasn't aware of the many intricacies of the war. Why don't we delve into this stuff more in high school?

Gosh, what is there to say that hasn't been said already?

I agree with the rest of my group that McClellan was an egotistical figure of the Civil War, to sum it up swiftly. I was thinking about how Guelzo talks about McClellan expecting all of these great things for himself (President, Dictator) and then fumbles it all up by being slower than molasses in January. And then on the other hand we have Grant, who comes from a less prestigious background, has skeletons in his closet that could jeopardize his military career, and he ends up getting what McClellan wanted, the glory and eventually the Presidency. Very interesting.

In response to the last paragraph Kenneth's first message, I didn't notice that we were using the Southern terms for battle names in class. Then of course, I didn't know there were Northern and Southern terms for particular battles of the Civil War, other than "WE lost that one" or "WE won that one". Also, I didn't know the Battle of Bull Run was also called Manassas until I got to the battlefield itself three years ago. Could be a biased Northern education, or just plain old ignorance. Oh well.

Yeah, what more *is* there to say? I've procrastinated too long. Well, I'll just say what's on my mind.

The thing that struck me the hardest in our reading for today was General Grant. I really like this guy. He seemed hopeless in peacetime life, becoming an alcoholic, always staying away from his family, and just being mediocre at whatever job he drifted to. That is, until he got into the Civil War. The thing I appreciate most about him is his unorthodox tactics at Forts Henry and Donelson and his seemingly only care: to fight, not get entangled in politics. I even laughed at how he just casually let his superiors know that he was going to proceed to Fort Donelson right after finishing off Fort Henry, as if he had just snapped his fingers and casually said, "next." The tragic part of the story, though, is his future, when he became President. I remember from History 21 that he was an ineffective president. That's too bad, considering his impressive war record.

In response to the complaint about McClellan being unfairly called a "Young Napoleon," I just want to throw in my opinion. True, McClellan may not have been as great a general as Napoleon, but he at least brought some brains to the Union war effort, and his arrogance eventually got to his head, which is, I think, something he shares in common with Napoleon. I admit it's been a while since I've had Western Civ, but if I remember correctly, Napoleon wasn't exactly modest himself.

Also, a comment on "Operation Anaconda." Personally, I think it's a brilliant idea. Charging to Richmond was just stupid. Neither side was ready, and Manassas (or Bull Run) really could have gone either way. If only the Union had more resources (and I think they could have mustered the resources if they had converted their economy to one geared for war, but that probably would not have gone over well with the people, considering their penchance to republican ideals), they perhaps could have pulled it off. It's an age-old idea: siege! The winner is whoever can hold out longer. Unfortunately, the grim reality of the war was that both sides had untrained and inexperienced soldiers who did not know how to fight a war.

Edited by author 03-27-2002 10:42 AM

Battle Accounts

Suddenly the everlasting roar of musketry increased in volume toward the
extreme left, and the conflict seemed to grow fiercer than at any previous
time. This was about six o'clock, and as I galloped over the field, I looked
back and around upon the most sublime scene that the fierce grandeur and
terrible reality of war ever portrayed. The thousand continuous volleys of
musketry seemed mingled into the grand roar of a great cataract, while the
louder and deeper. discharges of artillery bounded forth over those hills and
down that valley, with a volume that seemed to shake the earth beneath us.
   The canopy of smoke was so thick that the sun was gloomily red in the
heavens, while the clouds of dust in the rear, caused by the commotion of
advancing and retreating squadrons of cavalry, was stifling and blinding to
a distressing degree. That memorable scene will never be effaced from my
recollection, and it seemed most like a battlefield, of any representation,
either real or upon canvas, that I ever saw.

-- Reporter for the Cincinnati Commercial at Gaines' Mills (Moore, ed., Rebellion Record, V, 240.)

Gallantly they sprang to the encounter, rushing into the field at a full run.
Instantly from the line of the enemy's breastworks a murderous storm of
grape and canister was hurled into their ranks, with the most terrible effect.
Officers and men went down by hundreds, but yet, undaunted and
unwavering, our line dashed on until two thirds of the distance across the
field was accomplished. Here the carnage from the withering fire of the
enemy's combined artillery and musketry was dreadful. Our line wavered a
moment, and fell back to the cover of the woods. Twice again the effort to
carry the position was renewed, but each time with the same results. Night at
length rendered a further attempt injudicious, and the fight, until ten o'clock,
was kept up by the artillery on both sides. To add to the horrors, if not the
dangers, of the battle, the enemy's gunboats, from their position at Curl's
Neck, two and a half miles distant, poured on the field continual broadsides
from their immense rifle-guns.

 The battle-field, surveyed through the cold rain of Wednesday morning,
presented scenes too shocking to be dwelt on without anguish. The woods
and the field before mentioned were, on the western side, covered with our
dead, in all the degrees of violent mutilation ; while in the woods on the west
side of the field, lay, in about equal numbers, the blue uniformed bodies of
the enemy. Many of the latter were still alive, having been left by their
friends in their indecent haste to escape from the rebels. Great numbers of
horses were killed on both sides, and the sight of their disfigured carcasses,
and the stench proceeding from them, added much to the loathsome horrors
of the bloody field.

-- Reporter for the Richmond, Virginia, Examiner at Malvern Hill (Moore, ed., Rebellion Record, V, 266.)

What always surprises me is how bad the Union generals overestimate Confederate forces. McClellan thinks Magruder has a ton of men, where as with only 15,000 men McClellan could easily clean house of the Confederates and take Richmond by storm. Then later McClellan believes Joe Johnston to have 200,000 men, whereas in actuality he only has 55,000. These common miscalculations easily explain why the Federal generals were so hesitant to make an attack, always waiting until they had their full force up. The Confederates, especially Lee and Jackson, will take the initiative, without their full numbers. Jackson took 15,000 men and easily confused 3 Union forces totaling 40,000. Because Gettysburg is so well known I'll use that as an example. The fight there was an accident, but although Lee did not have his best corp on the field he went ahead and fought the first day, whereas a Union general would have pulled back because he did not have his full force. I still wonder though, how with cavalry, scouts, spies, and pickets, one could so overestimate the strength of his opponent. Or did McClellan overestimate on purpose? Was he inflating the number of the enemy so that when he won it would be even a greater victory or in case he lost he can say he lost to far superior numbers?

I knew of the blockade, the blockade runners, Farragut, and the battle between the Virginia and the Monitor, but I did not know of the other naval affairs. In no previous American History class I've ever taken have I heard about how important the navy was in the Civil War. I find it very interesting how important both sides saw sea control to be. I never knew that the blockade nearly took us to war with England, I thought to be highly intriguing, that because of Wilkes England nearly came in to the Civil War against the Union. How different the war would have been had that happened then. After reading this section about War at Sea, we can once again see how the Union's supplies dwarfed that of the Confederates. The Confederates didn't have many sailors, did not have the supplied needed to build ships, or the money and capabilities to repair ships. Once again the Union has a distinct advantage over the Confederacy.

I generally prefer to wait until the late evening to post my discussions so that I can respond to what others have said; however, my mom is visiting today in celebration of her birthday. Thus, I find myself posting early, while I have an open block of free time in my day.

I resonate with Matthew Heathman in my previous underestimation of naval importance during the Civil War. Judging from Guelzo's treatment, one could almost assert that the federal blockade on Confederate ports and such was one of the two or three single largest causes of Northern victory. After all, Guelzo makes a nice point in saying that the blockade took away Confederate ability to "make war". Well, 1/2 of winning a war comes from being able to make battles that are beneficial to one's respective side. Hence, inability to make war brings inability to win war.

We need not look to hard to realize that Guelzo is not the world's #1 McClellan fan. He paints the Union general as selfish, overambitious, and even cocky. The error, I feel, comes with Guelzo seeming to imply this as a unique, personality-rooted stigma. McClellan's actions, in my mind, reflect the negative aspects of military structure. When one man possesses control of thousands and thousands of troops, who can blame him for having a sizeable head? I mean, a single individual has supreme authority over innumerable individuals that end up doing the "gruntwork". McClellan was like the CEO of a company that uses sweatshops for labor. A man with power to make such decisions--who succeeds often and early--is naturally going to develop egotistical, superiority feelings. No patriotic fervor or Union loyalty will ever trump such personal glory and individual achievement.

I agree with all of Matthew's statements. I do believe there was overestimation on both sides of the war, however. The South usually had more urgency and more to lose which could explain their lesser degree of hesitancy.

To note a discrepancy in Guelzo's CAR, written in 1995, and the main reason to always be questioning material is his account of the Hunley. "The Hunley destroyed itself along with the Housatonic" (p242). However, we now know the Hunley was, in fact, not destroyed. First, there was always the belief of the Hunley surviving the explosion because lookouts on land saw the Hunley's blue lamp after the sinking of the Housatonic. Second, it was discovered and surfaced two years ago and is now on display in Charleston. Here's a good link for the Hunley - www.hunley.org.

Another note, one cannot take the importance of the Peninsula campaign for granted. What if McCellen had succeeded in capturing Richmond? I don't believe the war would have ended but it's history would have been drastically different. Was McCellen too hesitant? Did he miss a grand opportunity? Or, was Lee that much more of a military genius? Did he not save Richmond? The Peninsula campaign is one of those turning points in Civil War history. Could one argue even more important than Gettysburg?